ISLAM
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Negotiating Modernity

EDITED BY
NORSHAHRIL SAAT

ISEAS
YUSOF ISHAK
INSTITUTE

ISLAM
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

The **ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute** (formerly Institute of Southeast Asian Studies) is an autonomous organization established in 1968. It is a regional centre dedicated to the study of socio-political, security, and economic trends and developments in Southeast Asia and its wider geostrategic and economic environment. The Institute's research programmes are grouped under Regional Economic Studies (RES), Regional Strategic and Political Studies (RSPS), and Regional Social and Cultural Studies (RSCS). The Institute is also home to the ASEAN Studies Centre (ASC), the Nalanda-Sriwijaya Centre (NSC), and the Singapore APEC Study Centre.

ISEAS Publishing, an established academic press, has issued more than 2,000 books and journals. It is the largest scholarly publisher of research about Southeast Asia from within the region. ISEAS Publishing works with many other academic and trade publishers and distributors to disseminate important research and analyses from and about Southeast Asia to the rest of the world.

ISLAM
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Negotiating Modernity

EDITED BY

NORSHAHRIL SAAT

ISEAS YUSOF ISHAK INSTITUTE

First published in Singapore in 2018 by
ISEAS Publishing
30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace
Singapore 119614

E-mail: publish@iseas.edu.sg
Website: <http://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg>

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.

© 2018 ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore

The responsibility for facts and opinions in this publication rests exclusively with the authors and their interpretations do not necessarily reflect the views or the policy of the publisher or its supporters.

ISEAS Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

Islam in Southeast Asia : Negotiating Modernity / edited by
Norshahril Saat.
1. Islam—21st century—Southeast Asia.
2. Islam and politics—Malaysia.
3. Muftis (Muslim officials)—Malaysia.
4. Salafīyah—Malaysia.
5. Students—Indonesia—Religious life.
6. Islamic fundamentalism—Indonesia.
7. Islamic leadership—Indonesia.
8. Islamic renewal—Singapore
9. Southeast Asia—Relations—Middle East.
10. Southeast Asia—Relations—Southeast Asia.
I. Norshahril Saat, editor.
BP63 A9I828 March 2018

ISBN 978-981-4786-99-7 (soft cover)
ISBN 978-981-4818-00-1 (E-book PDF)

Typeset by International Typesetters Pte Ltd
Printed in Singapore by Markono Print Media Pte Ltd

CONTENTS

Preface vii

About the Contributors ix

1. Introduction 1
   Norshahril Saat

Section I: Malaysia

2. Emergence of Progressive Islamism in Malaysia 13
   Wan Saiful Wan Jan

3. Competing Discourses Among Malaysian Muftis: Still a Case of Arabization? 35
   Norshahril Saat

4. The Riyal and Ringgit of Petro-Islam: Investing Salafism in Education 63
   Mohd Faizal Musa

Section II: Indonesia

5. The Middle East Influence on the Contemporary Indonesian "Campus Islam" 91
   Yon Machmudi

6. Contemporary Middle Eastern Islamic Thought and its Transmission in Indonesia: A Critical Assessment 112
Azhar Ibrahim

7. Plural Islam and Contestation of Religious Authority in Indonesia 140
Ahmad Najib Burhani

8. Preachers-cum-Trainers: The Promoters of Market Islam in Urban Indonesia 164
Najib Kailani

Section III: Singapore

9. Shariah Revivalism in Singapore 195
Noor Aisha Abdul Rahman

Index 231

PREFACE

This edited volume comprises of specially commissioned chapters and selected papers from a 2015 workshop entitled "Islamic Developments in Southeast Asia". The workshop was jointly organized by ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute and Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS). All selected papers from the conference have been revised to include any new developments related to Muslims living in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore.

This book would not have been possible without funding support from KAS. I also wish to thank the former Director of ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, Mr Tan Chin Tiong, for initiating this project to understand contemporary issues in Southeast Asian Islam. The original aim of the project is to examine the Middle East impact on the region. Its scope has, however, been expanded to uncover regional and local dynamics in shaping Islamic discourses in the Malay-speaking world. I also wish to express my appreciation to Dr Terence Chong, Deputy Director of the Institute, for providing useful comments on the book concept. He was also the co-convenor for the 2015 workshop.

I also wish to express my gratitude to Ms Pearlyn Y. Pang for her editorial assistance. I am also grateful to the excellent work by the ISEAS Publishing team, particularly Mr Ng Kok Kiong,

Ms Rahilah Yusuf, and Ms Sheryl Sin Bing Peng for providing useful feedback in the overall production of this book.

Finally, I wish to record my deepest appreciation to all contributors in this volume. May their efforts offer new insights on Islam in the region.

Norshahril Saat (PhD)

ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

Azhar Ibrahim is Lecturer and Deputy Head of the Department of Malay Studies, National University of Singapore (NUS). He obtained his PhD and MA from the same department in 2008 and 2002, respectively. Previously, he was a lecturer at the National Institute of Education (NIE), Nanyang Technological University. His research interests include sociology of religion, sociology of literature and critical literacy, as well as the Malay–Indonesia intellectual development.

Ahmad Najib Burhani is Senior Researcher at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), Jakarta and Visiting Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore. He received his PhD in Religious Studies from the University of California-Santa Barbara (UCSB), USA. During the last year of his study, he won the Professor Charles Wendell Memorial Award from UCSB in the field of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies. His academic interests include religious minorities in Islam, urban mysticism, and religious movements in Southeast Asia. His most recent book is *Muhammadiyah Berkemajuan* (2016).

Mohd Faizal Musa is Research Fellow, Institute of Malay World and Civilization, National University of Malaysia (UKM). He has won numerous literary awards including the

Anugerah Seni Negara (National Arts Award) in 2006. Among his earlier published novels are *Cinta Hari-hari Rusuhan* and *Perempuan Politikus Melayu*. His book *1515* won first place in the Hadiah Sastera Utusan Malaysia-Exxon Mobil 2002. It also received the National Book Prize in 2005 under the Malay Language General Fiction category.

Najib Kailani is Lecturer at the Department of Interdisciplinary Islamic Studies, Graduate School UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta, Indonesia. He received his PhD in Southeast Asian Social Inquiry from the University of New South Wales (UNSW) Australia. His research interests include urban religion, youth and pop culture, and economics of religion. He has published with *RIMA: Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs* and contributed a book chapter entitled "Muslimising Indonesian Youths: The Tarbiyah Moral and Cultural Movement in Contemporary Indonesia", in *Islam and the 2009 Indonesian Elections, Political and Cultural Issues: The Case of Prosperous Justice Party*, edited by Remy Madinier (2010).

Noor Aisha Abdul Rahman is Associate Professor and Head of the Department of Malay Studies, National University of Singapore (NUS). Her research and teaching areas include Malay legal history and institutions, Muslim law and its administration in Southeast Asia, and sociology of religion (Islam and Malay religious orientations). She has authored and edited monographs and journal publications on Malay *adat* laws, Shariah in Singapore, religious education, teenage marriages within Singapore's Muslim community, religious orientation of the Malays, and Muslim women and development.

Norshahril Saat is Fellow at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore. In June 2015, he was awarded a PhD in International, Political and Strategic Studies by the Australian National University (ANU). His research interests are mainly on Southeast Asian politics and contemporary Islamic thought. In 2018, he published *The State, Ulama and Islam in Malaysia and Indonesia*. His articles have recently been published in journals such as *Asian Journal of Social Science (AJSS), The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, Contemporary Islam: Dynamics of Muslim Life*, *Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs*, and *Studia Islamika*.

Wan Saiful Wan Jan is Visiting Senior Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore. He was previously Chairman of the Istanbul Network for Liberty, a global network of scholars and researchers interested in exploring and promoting the principles and values of a free society in the Muslim world; and Founding Chief Executive Officer of the Institute for Democracy and Economic Affairs (IDEAS), Malaysia. He is a regular commentator on Malaysian and ASEAN affairs, and his views are widely quoted in local and regional press.

Yon Machmudi is currently Head of Post Graduate Program of the Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, School of Strategic and Global Studies, Universitas Indonesia. He received his doctoral degree from the Faculty of Asian Studies, the Australian National University (ANU) in 2007. He specializes in Political Islam in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. His current research includes "The Impact of Social Changes and Modernization of Pesantren toward the Decline of Ulama's Authority in Indonesia (2013–2015)" and "Why They Resist

the State: The Transformation of Darul Islam in Indonesia (2015–2017)". His book publications include the following: *Islamising Indonesia: The Rise of Jemaah Tarbiyah and the Prosperous Justice Party* (2008) and *The Contemporary Middle East History: The Leadership in Saudi and Libya* (2016). He has also contributed the following book chapters: "The Development of Political Islam in Indonesia", in *Norms, Interests, and Values: Conflict and Consent in the Constitutional Basic Order*, edited by Henning Glaser (2015) and "Saudi Indonesia Relations", in *Saudi Arabian Foreign Policy: Conflict and Cooperation*, edited by Neil Partrick (2016).

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Norshahril Saat

The aim of this volume is to understand contemporary socio-cultural and political challenges facing Islam in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. It is particularly interesting to examine how Muslims in these three countries grapple with modernization and change which has significantly impacted laws, politics, ideas, and consumption patterns. Undeniably, there are many books in the market that have addressed similar concerns. Previously, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute has published books discussing similar issues. They include *Readings on Islam in Southeast Asia* (compiled by Ahmad Ibrahim, Sharon Siddique, and Yasmin Hussain in 1985); *Islam in Southeast Asia: Political, Social and Strategic Challenges for the 21st Century* (edited by K.S. Nathan and Mohammad Hashim Kamali in 2005); *Voices of Islam in Southeast Asia: A Contemporary Sourcebook* (complied by Greg Fealy and Virginia Hooker in 2006).

This edited volume does not attempt to cover Islam in all Southeast Asian countries, except for the three maritime states mentioned above. It is also focusing less on security issues such as the ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) or Al-Qaeda threat. In fact, the book makes a deliberate move not to cover separatist movements in the Southern Philippines and

Southern Thailand, or the humanitarian crisis in Myanmar, even though these issues concern Muslims as well. The book is a modest attempt to take stock on recent developments facing the three countries that scholars used to consider the bastion of "moderate" Islam.

Quite the reverse, scholars today are alarmed that Islam in Southeast Asia is becoming more conservative, radical and intolerant. They are also anxious with groups promoting political Islam (also referred to as Islamism) and how such fundamentalist ideas will impact multicultural societies in the region. Conservative preachers can now mobilize thousands of people to support their exclusivist agendas, causing much distress to the scholars.

Undeniably, Muslims in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore have begun to outwardly express their piety. The *dakwah* movement (referred to as Islamic resurgence by some) which emerged in the 1970s decreased the Malay and Indonesian character of how Islam is practised in the region. Today, scholars argue that "Arabization" is on the rise in the Malay world. Islamic resurgence altered the way Malays practise their faith, their relationship with the state, and their relationship with other communities. *Dakwah* groups demanded for a greater role of Islam in the public sphere. Their requests included the following: Islamic institutions, Islamic banks, Shariah-compliant goods, and Islamic state. Unlike in the past where Southeast Asian Muslims were able to integrate their religious beliefs with local practices, thus their dance, arts, and literature flourished while they remained committed to their religion, post-resurgence Muslims began to question whether their cultural practices are in-sync with Islam.

Judging from contemporary writings, there is a tendency to equate Arabization with radicalization. Undeniably, some

states in the Middle East are in political turmoil today, and Iraq and Syria are still recovering from their battles with ISIS which wants to establish an Islamic caliphate. The importation of extreme ideas from the Middle East is real and there is no denying of that. Arabization as a social phenomenon has impacted the way Malays think, dress, eat, and behave. The Sultan of Johor, Sultan Ibrahim Ibni Sultan Iskandar, criticized Malaysian Muslims who mimicked the Arabs. He opined that Malays are no longer practising their culture and Muslim men and women prefer wearing Arab-style garments compared to the traditional Malay *baju kurung* and *baju Melayu*. Since the 1970s, more Malay women are putting on the headscarf.

Wahhabi-Salafism is also making inroads into Southeast Asia, threatening the moderate style of thinking long promoted in the region. Wahhabi-Salafism is a puritan brand of Islam which is upheld by Saudi Arabia's religious elites. The ideology condemns a number of religious rituals commonly practised by Muslims in Southeast Asia as innovations (*bid'ah*) because they contradict the Quran or Prophetic traditions. It frowns upon rituals such as *ziarah kubur* (grave visits of pious Muslims), *kenduri* (communal feasting), and *maulid nabi* (celebration of the Prophet Muhammad's birthday), even though these practices have been practised in the Malay world for centuries.

Is growing Arabization among Southeast Asian Muslims threatening their quest to modernize? Recent developments in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore would suggest so. In Malaysia, the government has undertaken a state-led Islamization by building institutions, enlarging the religious bureaucracy, and co-opting *ulama* (religious elite) in the name of Islamic development. These efforts were undertaken by Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad (1981–2003) and

continued by his successors Abdullah Badawi (2003–9) and Najib Abdul Razak (2009–present). Progressive civil society groups in the country have complained about the Islamic bureaucrats growing assertiveness in the religious sphere. The moral police have interfered with intellectual discussions and banned books they deemed as not in line with their orientation.

In the political realm, Malaysian Islamic politics have become more fluid since the 2013 general elections. The two biggest Muslim-led parties, UMNO (United Malays National Organisation) and PAS (Islamic Party of Malaysia) faced internal split. Former Prime Minister Dr Mahathir Mohamad, along with his son Mukhriz Mahathir and former Deputy Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin, left UMNO to form PBBM (Malaysian United Indigenous Party). In 2015, PAS left the opposition coalition Pakatan Rakyat (People's Coalition) to go solo, while the progressive faction within the party parted ways with the conservatives and formed Amanah (National Trust Party). The enmity between UMNO and PAS since the 1980s has subsided. Already, the parties have collaborated in pushing for an amendment to ACT 355 Shariah Criminal Administration, which seeks to increase the maximum penalty for Shariah Courts from the present three years jail, fine of RM5,000 (US$1,180) and six strokes of the cane to 30 years jail, RM100,000 (US$23,600) and 100 lashes of the cane. Prime Minister Najib Razak and PAS President Abdul Hadi Awang are also comfortable sharing the same stage on many occasions.

In Indonesia, experts are worried about the country's conservative turn. Some called this the rise of "un-civil" Islam, the reverse of Hefner's terminology "civil Islam". These

concerned experts cite the recent "Ahok" blasphemy incident to substantiate their case. In November and December 2017, Jakarta witnessed large-scale demonstrations, believed to have involved thousands of participants, protesting against the then Jakarta Governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, who is known as Ahok. Protesters claimed that Ahok had insulted Islam during one of his campaign speeches for the Jakarta elections. In February 2017, Ahok beat two candidates in the first round of the polls, but lost in the second round held in April the same year. He was subsequently jailed for blasphemy. Apart from the Ahok case, scholars point to the recent treatment of religious minority groups Shias and Ahmadiyahs to demonstrate Indonesia's conservative turn. Besides, the authorities uncovered some citizens who are influenced by radical ideas promoted by ISIS. Non-violent Islamist groups have also not disappeared as predicted in the last 2014 elections, showing that they still have substantial support from sections of the electorate.

Singapore Muslims are sandwiched between the two Muslim-dominant countries. The Muslim community, which comprises of 15 per cent of the total five million Singapore citizens, are mostly Malays. Since 2015, the government has revealed that some members of the community have travelled to the Middle East, or planned to do so, to fight alongside ISIS militants. Some foreign workers in Singapore were also found to be ISIS sympathizers, and they have been detained under the Internal Security Act (ISA) or repatriated back. While majority of the community have rejected terrorism and radicalism, and have worked alongside the government to counsel potential ISIS sympathizers, many remain ambivalent about non-violent extremists. They have not outrightly condemned groups that show exclusivist

attitudes towards religious minorities and LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender) groups. For example, the conservatives have been against the Pink Dot movement, which celebrated the freedom to love and calling for LGBT rights to be respected. In 2017, the government expelled an Indian imam for praying for the destruction of Christian and Jews in a sermon. The imam apologized and returned to India. On top of these, there have been groups pressing for the rights of Muslim women to put on the *hijab* (headscarves) during their duties. At this moment women in uniform groups and nurses are not allowed to put on the headscarves, though in general, Muslim women are free to don them outside their duties.

This book explores how Muslims in the three Southeast Asian countries grapple with change. Their response to these issues provides insights on their mode of thinking. On the one hand, the book compares networks and flows of students, teachers, ideas, and literature from the Middle East to Southeast Asia, and within the region. On the other hand, it seeks to understand the evolving nature of Shariah Courts, bureaucracies and civil service; the emergence of Islamic culture/politics in contemporary society; as well as the reaction from both Muslim and non-Muslim communities towards increasing Muslim religiosity. There are several issues which this book seeks to answer. How strong is the Middle East influence on Southeast Asian Muslims today? Scholars have conveniently used the term "Arabization" to depict growing exclusivism among Muslims in the region. However, the discourse of Arabization and equating it with extremism neglects the local factors shaping Muslim societies. How the locals react to outside influence vary from one country to another. Some chapters in this volume point out that

progressive ideas emanating from the Middle East also found its way into the region. Moreover, not all exclusivists are Wahhabi-Salafis, as sensationalized by some scholars. Self-procalimed Sufis, the so-called counter to Wahhabi-Salafis, are also guilty of promoting ideas that are not in-sync with modern realities. Moreover, exclusivism could be episodic and in response to an event in the country.

This volume attempts to cover as much grounds as possible: in the field of politics, bureaucracy, social, authority and law. However, given the constraints of this book, it is unable to look at other areas that are equally important. The book is divided into three sections and they are based on the three countries to be focused on, namely Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore. The central argument of this volume is that the Middle East influence is more nuanced than what scholars think: while the negative impact on changing the attitude of Malay-Muslim in the Nusantara is felt, there are also positive influence as well. On the other hand, there are also intra-regional dynamics that analysts have ignored.

The breakdown of the chapters is as follows. Focusing on the political aspects, Wan Saiful Wan Jan in Chapter 2 traces the evolution of Islamic political parties in Malaysia. The term Islamism has always conjure negative connotation, yet Wan Saiful highlights the contestation between the progressives and the conservatives. In his chapter, Wan Saiful traces the split within PAS which led to the formation of Amanah in 2015. The progressives have difficulties organizing themselves in the past but have been able to consolidate their struggle into one party (in the form of Amanah) since the split. Wan Saiful's chapter asks if the progressives can sustain their struggle against the dominant conservatives in the political arena.

In Chapter 3, Norshahril Saat looks at the discourse of the Malaysian muftis, the heads of state Islamic religious councils, portraying the diversity among them. Their differences counter the many perceptions that Malaysia is heading towards Arabization, or becoming inclined to Saudi Arabian brand of puritan Islam, called Wahhabi-Salafism. The chapter does not deny the existence of such ideas though they remain marginal. However, Malaysian religious elites remain conservative despite their differences in theological viewpoints.

Mohd Faizal Musa examines the impact of puritanical ideas on Malaysian institutes of higher learning in Chapter 4. Here, he traces the role of Wahhabism (particularly Salafi-Wahhabism) resulting from Saudi Arabian Pan-Islamism movement. Applying forensic theological approach, he examines how Wahhabism underpins the setting up of MEDIU University based in Malaysia.

In the second section, the book discusses how different actors negotiate modernity in the realms of education, politics, and discourse. Yon Machmudi in Chapter 5 traces the Middle East influence on the Indonesian campus movement. Existing works have looked at the influence of Saudi Arabia and Egyptian groups (particularly the Ikhwanul Muslimin), but the chapter also looks at other influences such as Shi'ism (Iranian) and the Hizmet (Turkish). Tensions between groups that are Middle East-inclined with Indonesia's traditional ones, such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, are bound to happen. To counter these Southeast Asian chapters of Middle East organizations, Indonesian movements conceptualized Islam Nusantara or Islam Berkemajuan. Yon argues that the Ikhwanul Muslimin and Hizmet are accommodative towards local Indonesian Islam. However, Shia, Salafi and Hizbut Tahrir are less inclusive.

In Chapter 6, Azhar Ibrahim paints a rather optimistic picture for Indonesian Islam. Observing from the discursive standpoint, Azhar observed that the overview of religious discourse is a contested terrain; on the one hand, there are books circulated with a fundamentalist bend, but on the other hand, works by progressive Muslims from the Middle East are also widely translated, published and circulated. Books by progressive thinkers in the Middle East such as Hassan Hanafi, Abed al-Jabiri, Nasr Abu Zaid, and Muhammad Syahrur have been discussed within the Indonesian circles, even though these works may not be representative of mainstream Islam in Singapore and Malaysia. Azhar observes that the presence of these diverse range of translated works would only generate a critical mass of Indonesian public.

Ahmad Najib Burhani takes the discussion of contestations further to the religious elite level in Chapter 7. Relating to the incidents surrounding the movement *Aksi Bela Islam* in 2016 and 2017 against former Jakarta Governor Ahok, Ahmad Najib questions the strength of traditional Islamic organizations, NU and Muhammadiyah, in the eyes of the Muslim public. He argues that non-mainstream Islam are gaining a foothold in Indonesia and steadily growing, undermining the two organizations that have dominated Indonesia for decades. Central to Ahmad Najib's argument are the challenges posed to traditional religious authority and how these may impact Indonesian Islam in the long run.

Najib Kailani in Chapter 8 moved away from conservative–progressive tensions to understand yet another phenomenon in Indonesian Islam: the rise of capitalist-driven religious market. In this chapter, Najib discusses religious preachers promoting market Islam, which targeted the growth of the middle class in the country. The chapter traces the influence

of Imaduddin Abdulrahim and Toto Tasmara as pioneers of preacher-cum-trainer in the Indonesian Islamic landscape, introducing Islamic management theory. It also examines the presence of new actors in the field such as Ary Ginanjar, Muhammad Syafii Antonio, Abdullah Gymnastiar and Yusuf Mansur. The chapter argues that despite the changing socio-political context between the New Order period and the post-New Order period, there have been some continuities in terms of the efforts to promote Islamic management methods.

The book concludes with a chapter on Singapore by Noor Aisha Abdul Rahman, who traces the growing trend of Shariah revivalism among the religious elites in the country. Muslims in Singapore constitute a minority, though culturally, they are similar to their Malaysian counterparts. While not openly promoting Islamist discourse, the religious elites continue to hold minority *fiqh*, looking at modern and Islamic discourses in dichotomous terms. Noor Aisha cited the example of marriage, inheritance, and laws.

I hope that this book will spur greater debate on the role of Islam in Southeast Asia and counter discourse that merely paint Middle East influence in a negative light. In essence, the Middle East impact on Southeast Asia is diverse, with local actors constantly engaging and contesting external influences. On the other hand, merely focusing on Middle East influence—through the phenomenon known as Arabization—ignores regional and local dynamics which colours Islamization in Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore.

SECTION I

Malaysia

Chapter 2

EMERGENCE OF PROGRESSIVE ISLAMISM IN MALAYSIA

Wan Saiful Wan Jan

INTRODUCTION

All political parties in Malaysia—whether Muslim majority ones or otherwise—cannot escape discussing Islam's role in public policy. No Malaysian politician can ignore Islam's significance in defining the country's political landscape. But when it comes to "political Islam", the political party that is most frequently studied and cited is the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS). Established in 1951, PAS has a long-standing history in the country. Over the years, PAS faced its fair share of factionalism and splintering, with the latest split occurred in 2015, when a sizeable number of its national leaders and activists left the party to form Parti Amanah Negara (Amanah). This chapter explores the evolution of political Islamism in Malaysia by looking at PAS as a case study. It examines the party's past internal conflicts with a special focus on the 2015 incident which eventually led to the formation of Amanah.

There are different ideological camps in PAS. It started off as a conservative party in the early 1950s. In the late 1950s and 1960s, prominent leftists and radical nationalist figures joined the party in large numbers. In the 1970s and 1980s, the party welcomed pan-Islamists into its fold, and later, during the

reformasi era of the late 1990s and 2000s, party membership opened to individuals who did not have any clear ideological leanings.[1]

During the 2000s, PAS was distinguished by two schools of thought: the conservative Islamists and the progressive Islamists (Wan Saiful 2017, pp. 3–5). The conservative faction has been commonly referred to as the "*ulama*" camp, though non-religious scholars are also part of this group. This camp includes those who are not trained in the Islamic sciences. Still, when it comes to politics, this faction generally adheres to a conservative interpretation of Islam, arguing that Islam should be incorporated into public policy. Often, they focus on the legal aspects of Islam, calling for immediate implementation of the Islamic Shariah law or *hudud* (punitive Islamic laws that include stoning, amputation, and whipping as modes of punishment). They also hold an exclusivist view when it comes to dealing with non-Muslims, believing that major policy decisions affecting Islam—be it at party or government levels—must be mainly, if not solely, in the hands of Muslims. The conservatives are comfortable with a Malay-centric agenda as they see it as an extension of their Islamist campaign. Among the current thought leaders of the conservative group are the party's President Abdul Hadi Awang, Vice President Nik Mohamad Ammar Abdullah, Information Chief Nasruddin Hassan and central committee member Mohamad Zuhdi Marzuki.

On the other hand, the progressive faction in PAS are commonly called the "professional camp", implying that they come from professional backgrounds as opposed to the traditionally educated *ulama*. All leading figures from this group have left PAS and they now hold top posts in Amanah, including current Amanah President Mohamad Sabu, Deputy President Salahuddin Ayub, Director of Strategy Dr Dzulkefly Ahmad, and

Information Chief Khalid Samad. PAS progressives are labelled as "Erdogans" to distinguish themselves from the conservatives, whose views are more aligned with Turkey's previous conservative president Necmettin Erbakan.[2] The progressive camp also consists of individuals who have both secular and Islamic education backgrounds. They differ quite significantly from the conservatives in their political outlook, especially pertaining to governance, human rights, and the Shariah law, of which they consider the higher objectives of the Islamic law (*Maqasid al-Shari'ah*) to be more important than the immediate implementation of the Shariah law itself.

The progressives are also more inclusive of non-Muslims. They acknowledge that it is necessary to respect the views of both Muslims and non-Muslims, and that all these ideas need to be negotiated within a liberal democratic framework. While the progressives still believe in the need to create an Islamic state that implements the Islamic law, they prioritize the creation of a supportive ecosystem before its implementation. In other words, elements of conservatism exist in their agenda, but more gradual and inclusive strategies are adopted along with flexible and accommodative disposition where necessary. Hence, some scholars use the term "neoconservative" to describe this group, arguing that progressivism is in fact a feature of neoconservatism.

TOLERANT CONSERVATIVES

As the only political party that openly champions an Islamic agenda, PAS is the most obvious party for anyone with interest in political Islam. Despite being an essentially conservative and traditionalist party, progressive Islamist activists are still able to integrate into the party. Progressives have been in PAS since it was first established, and they have witnessed many more activists

from other Islamic organizations joining the party particularly in the 1970s and 1980s. Activists included those from organizations like the Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement (Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia, ABIM) and the Islamic Representative Council (IRC). However, the progressives have never organized into a distinct group within the party, and preferred to work within the established party structure, even if this means being surrounded by conservative leaders and members.

Following the *reformasi* years of the late 1990s and early 2000s, the progressives were given more opportunities to shape PAS' political agenda. Conservative firebrands, such as then Deputy President Abdul Hadi Awang and Ulama Wing Chief Haron Taib, gave way to them. These conservative leaders even altered their views to suit the rise of the progressives in the party. As a result, the party was able to quickly adapt to the new environment and create a welcoming atmosphere that worked well for the progressives. From a party that was seen as essentially conservative and exclusivist, the late 1990s and 2000s saw PAS transforming into a more inclusive party that was increasingly accepted by the electorates across ethnicity and religion, credit to the conservatives' tolerant attitude.

One early example of the conservatives' tolerance can be observed in 1999, when the party faced the real possibility of a sea change in Malaysian politics following the ousting of Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim. Around twenty members of PAS central committee, led by party President Fadzil Noor, travelled to the Islamic Foundation in Markfield, United Kingdom, to attend a meeting with renowned Islamic scholars Yusof Al-Qardhawi, Rached Ghannouchi, Khurshid Ahmad, and Kamal Alhelbawy. I was one of those who assisted in organizing that meeting. The top items on the agenda were, firstly the

acceptability of working with the Chinese-majority Democratic Action Party (DAP), and secondly handling the possibility of Wan Azizah Wan Ismail, Anwar's wife, becoming leader of the Parliamentary Opposition. In that meeting, conservative figures, such as Abdul Hadi, Haron Taib, central committee member Hashim Jasin, and several others strongly opposed both ideas. Ultimately, these conservative figures relented after all of the invited scholars argued that these were Islamically-justified and strategically necessary.

During the two-day meeting, my observations of the private interactions amongst PAS leaders fascinated me. The differences between Fadzil Noor on the one side, and Hadi Awang and Haron Taib on the other, were striking. While Noor firmly supported the new partnership, the other two persistently challenged Noor's views, arguing that the move is not Islamic. Nevertheless, and to the conservatives' credit, the party presented a united front once a majority decision was reached. All conservative leaders joined their progressive counterparts to publicly support the new political partnership, and this eventually led to the formation of a strong multi-ethnic opposition coalition in Malaysia. That meeting exemplified the willingness of the conservatives to tolerate the rise of progressive ideas in the party, and they demonstrated admirable discipline in championing the idea that they initially opposed.

As PAS pursued its newfound strategy, it spoke less about establishing an Islamic state. Instead, the party adopted a more progressive language: promoting good governance, social justice and anti-corruption, which bore resemblance with its other opposition counterparts—the DAP and the National Justice Party (Keadilan). In the early 2000s, the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) started mocking PAS, inciting that the party, having succumbed to pressure from their non-Muslim

partners, had lost its Islamist identity. In response, Fadzil Noor formed a team to draft a document outlining PAS' vision of what an Islamic state should look like. In response to UMNO's criticisms, Noor intended to present the nation a document detailing the policies PAS would introduce if they were to come to power, combining progressive ideas with Islamist principles (Salahuddin 2017). However, Noor's untimely demise in June 2002 changed the scenario. Abdul Hadi Awang was elected to replace Noor as the party's president, and he appointed arch-conservative Haron Din to continue drafting the document that Noor initiated. Haron's team eventually produced the *Dokumen Negara Islam* (Islamic State Document), which was released in November 2003. The contents fell short of any real policy prescription. It only provided a brief and broad outline of PAS' vision of a state, a list of arbitrary one-line policy statements, and was filled with Quranic verses and quotations from the hadiths. The document missed the mark of the policy document that the late Fadzil originally envisioned (Salahuddin 2017).

THE PROGRESSIVES: DETERMINED BUT UNORGANIZED

Disappointed with the party's inability to chart a clear and modern vision, the progressives decided to rewrite the document with more concrete propositions. In 2008, they successfully persuaded the party to adopt the theme "Honest, Fair, and Clean Government: Towards Negara Berkebajikan"[3] for its general elections manifesto. The progressives took it further when, on 3 June 2011, Abdul Hadi Awang as president of the party, announced through his policy speech at PAS' annual general meeting that it would put the creation of a "Negara Berkebajikan" its top agenda. Following the speech,

a leading progressive figure, Vice President Salahuddin Ayub, was approached to head a team detailing what is meant by "Negara Berkebajikan". On 11 December 2011, another booklet was published entitled "Negara Berkebajikan: Tawaran PAS".[4] The term "Negara Berkebajikan" was often confused with the Western welfare state but PAS translates this term as "Nation of Care and Opportunity", to distinguish it from the costly redistributionist welfare state (Dzulkefly, PAS and its "Benevolent Nation" concept, 2012). In the new document, the party also toned down the call for an Islamic state and the immediate implementation of the shariah or *hudud* law, emphasizing more on good governance and socioeconomic progress. This documentation served as a major achievement for the progressives who finally saw their ideas officially sanctioned as policy of the party.

However, in their haste to promote "Negara Berkebajikan", the progressives neglected one major development that was occurring in the background. Their arch-rival UMNO was chiding them for not including the *hudud* law as part of the promise in the "Negara Berkebajikan", implying that PAS has completely lost its original identity and purpose. More importantly, the conservatives, too, were becoming agitated. The conservatives felt that the "Negara Berkebajikan" proposition was chipping PAS too far away from what was supposed to be the party's *raison d'etre*, that is the creation of an Islamic state that implements the Shariah law.

The progressives pushed ahead, ignoring internal resistance that was starting to build up among the conservatives. They made two more radical proposals, first, they wanted PAS to open its membership to non-Muslims; and second, they wanted to shift PAS away from leadership by *ulama* to a more inclusive leadership paradigm. The responsibility to push these ideas to

the wider membership was taken up by a rising figure among the progressives, Mujahid Yusof, who is also the son of Yusof Rawa (a revered former PAS president). Mujahid played an important role in helping PAS reach out to non-Muslim voters. He played a pivotal role in forming PAS Supporters Club in 2004, a platform for non-Muslims. On 7 November 2008, Mujahid presented a five-point proposal to PAS' central committee (Mujahid 2009), which sought to:

1. Amend PAS' constitution so that non-Muslims can become a member.
2. Turn PAS Supporters Club into a "wing" of the party.
3. Upgrade the party's National Unity Bureau into a department until the new "wing" can function fully.
4. Put non-Muslims as PAS candidates and to appoint them to official posts in state governments controlled by PAS.
5. Appoint non-Muslims as senators and other important positions in the party.

Mujahid's proposals were accepted and immediately executed. On 23 May 2010, PAS finally announced the formation of the Dewan Himpunan Penyokong PAS. This institutionalization was a historic step to formally include non-Muslims into the party hierarchy.

Mujahid then went further in his attempt to transform PAS. In 2010 he released a book entitled *Menuju PAS Baru: Krisis, peluang dan dinamisme* (Towards a New PAS: Crisis, Opportunity and Dynamism). The book was followed by *Rejuvenasi PAS: Idea, realiti, aplikasi* (Rejuvenating PAS: Ideas, Reality, Application) in 2012. In both books, Mujahid discussed an even more sensitive subject relating to the reformation of the party's leadership: from one that is spearheaded by *ulama* and religious scholars

to one that is more accountable, professional, and inclusive of the non-*ulama* too. In the first book, he briefly deliberated on the idea, arguing that the principle of leadership by *ulama* (*kepimpinan ulama*) as it was originally introduced was not meant to elevate any one person. It was about the collective leadership of the Majlis Syura Ulama as a whole. He also explained that the Majlis Syura Ulama was formed in order to curb centralization of power in the hands of any one person, especially the president.

In the second book, Mujahid provided a more forceful critique of the Majlis Syura Ulama. He argued that the body complicates the administration of the party because in the body, lower-level leaders can be appointed into an elevated position without going through the election process. In addition, the body only reinforces the image that PAS is an overtly religious party as opposed to a national party that caters to the needs of all Malaysians. Furthermore, discussions and decision-making process of the Majlis Syura Ulama are not transparent. Building on these shortcomings, Mujahid went on to propose two changes. First, that the name of the body should be changed to Majlis Perundingan Parti (Party Consultative Council), and second, the membership of the body should be opened to non-*ulama* (Mujahid 2012, pp. 117–23).

Occupied with promoting aspirations for the party, the progressives completely overlooked the importance of organizing themselves as a cohesive force within the party. Individuals, holding official posts at various levels, operated independently with minimal coordination. The progressives presumed that their domination of the central committee and recent acceptance of their suggestions by the central leadership, including by Abdul Hadi Awang, meant that the party agreed with them. Most importantly, despite being aware that some of their

suggestions were radically different from what PAS is familiar with (Salahuddin 2017), the progressives dismissed the need to persuade PAS' grassroot members in a more strategic and holistic way. The top-down disposition and operations led them to assume that the acceptance of their ideas by the top leadership ascertain the acceptance of subsequent layers of the party. This assumption was their biggest oversight. In reality, the grassroots of the party remained conservative. The conservatives are far more structured when it comes to ideological indoctrination. They organized themselves into various units and agencies within the formal bureaucracies of the party. Over time, all spaces to engage with the party's grassroots were controlled by the conservatives who focused more on traditional issues, such as the need to implement the *hudud* law and to ensure Malays and Muslims will always have political control. Although the progressives were able to change PAS structurally, their lack of cohesiveness meant that they were unable to engage, let alone change, party members ideologically.

THE RETURN OF THE CONSERVATIVES

The conservatives were actively spreading their message through village mosques and internal events organized by the Dewan Ulama (Ulama Wing) and Dewan Pemuda (Youth Wing). Despite PAS' acceptance of non-Muslims, the conservatives continued to breed doubts about the trustworthiness of non-Muslims. Despite the high-level discussions about the need to reform the Majlis Syura Ulama, the conservatives not only defended the sanctity of the *ulama* and their positions in the party hierarchy, they sacralized it and positioned Abdul Hadi's presidency as the ultimate symbol of the leadership by *ulama*.

Rather than becoming an agent for change for PAS, Mujahid's ideas and initiatives provided a focal point for conservative internal retaliation. The conservatives used Mujahid's ideas as examples of how the progressives would weaken the identity of the party, namely by bringing in non-believers and by weakening the leadership by the Islamic scholars.

The conservatives had an advantage because as religious scholars, they can give talks in village mosques, which they have been doing for decades, giving them longstanding access to PAS members. At a more formal level, on 23 May 2009, the conservatives organized a major national conference to celebrate the Silver Jubilee of the Kepimpinan Ulama, despite being two years late (the *ulama* took over the leadership in 1982). During the conference, it was apparent that all speakers were using the platform to argue for the continuation of leadership by *ulama*, and more importantly, for the rejection of anyone who challenge the status quo or, more specifically, Abdul Hadi's leadership.

The conference took place just two weeks before the party's *Muktamar* (annual general meeting), which saw a fierce contest for all posts except the presidency. Of particular importance was the contest for deputy president. The conservative Deputy President Nasharuddin Mat Isa[5] was challenged by two progressive leaders, Mohamad Sabu and Husham Musa. The conservatives went all out to defend Nasharuddin and other conservative leaders who were contesting. Their persistent campaign and the Silver Jubilee conference worked. Nasharuddin won the party election. As noted by Farish (2014*b*, p. 201), the 2009 Muktamar was a "game changer in PAS' own internal politics as it led to the marginalisation of the modernist-reformists of the party, and the momentary return of the Ulama faction instead". However, Farish was mistaken because, as we

shall see later, the return of the *ulama* faction is not momentary. Notwithstanding, the stage was now set for a more public contestation between the two groups.

The PAS Muktamar in 2011 and 2013 widened the rift between the progressives and the conservatives. The conservatives persistently worked in the background to increase their support, using various official and unofficial party channels to spread their views and to campaign against the progressives. The final draw was at the Muktamar from 4 to 6 June 2015 in Kuala Selangor. The tensions that started during the 2009 Muktamar escalated into a complete removal of the progressives from the central leadership in 2015. The conservatives dominated the 2015 Muktamar, openly challenging, and at times even insulting, the progressives in their speeches, accusing them as traitors to the real Islamist cause. I was present at that Muktamar, and witnessed how the progressives were visibly shaken by the conservatives' behaviour. The progressives sidelined cohesion in their quest to change PAS' worldview, and lost to the more systematic and persistent conservatives.

The conservatives were well prepared for the 2015 Muktamar. Their campaign was well coordinated, working nationwide under the guise of normal party activities organized by the various party structures that they control. At the Muktamar, they distributed a list of the candidates contesting on the conservative ticket, and actively urged delegates to vote for those names en bloc. The conservatives did not shy away from any opportunities given to gain support for the removal of the progressives from PAS' central leadership. The progressives, on the other hand, were unprepared for the onslaught. They neglected the lower layers of the party, and lacked a coherent campaign strategy. They did not even institutionalize their presence more than in the central

committee. The progressives' oversight eventually cost them their positions and influence over the party, and as a result, PAS returned to its conservative roots.

THE PAS, RETURNED

Granted, PAS is a party aiming to create an Islamic state and implement the Shariah law. However, it is too simplistic a description of one of the most successful Islamist party in Southeast Asia. Shariah implementation is just one of its multiple struggles. Broadly, PAS envisions an Islamic state from a Malay conservative worldview. Since the late 1940s, particularly in 1951 when PAS was formed, the party's aspirations have evolved. Under the guidance of Haji Ahmad Fuad, head of UMNO's Religious Affairs Bureau who simultaneously held the post of PAS' first President, Malay conservatism was the *raison d'etre* and founding ideology of the party. Burhanuddin Al-Helmy became PAS' third President and he added collectivism into the mould. This was followed by the fifth President Yusof Rawa who institutionalized a form of authoritarian governance into the party, albeit behind an "Islamic" façade of Kepimpinan Ulama (Leadership by Ulama). Today, PAS is a mixture of all these ideologies, with the conservative and collectivist elements remaining at its core. It is now a party that is managed by a group of unelected religious elites in the Majlis Syura Ulama who claim to be accountable only to God, and whose authority is also derived from God.

Several observers have argued that PAS was, at some point, a progressive party because of the rise of the progressives within the party ranks (Mujahid 2009; Dzulkefly 2012; Farish 2014*b*). On hindsight, such opinions can now be concluded as incorrect.

These observers fall into the same trap the progressives themselves suffered from—they assume that by looking at the grasstop, they can describe the grassroots. The majority of PAS members remain conservative. Despite structural reforms within the party, the members never changed their worldviews.

The conservatives merely tolerated the progressives for a short while. They even "used"— for want of a better word—the progressives to engage non-Muslims and urban voters. This created an opportunistic, albeit short, period where PAS was able to command support from both rural and urban voters, as well as from both Muslims and non-Muslims voters. This was the era when some observers said that a "new PAS [is] in the lounge suit and dinner jacket" (Farish 2014*b*). However, throughout that period, the conservatives remained dominant in the party and they were firmly in control of PAS through the Majlis Syura Ulama, the Dewan Ulama, and almost all other party machineries at the state and divisional layers. The progressives wrongly assumed that they were making revolutionary and concrete changes in the party when, in fact, their influence was superficial and tactical adjustments were only made at the top. In 2015, the conservatives' tolerance reached its limit, and they took decisive actions against the progressives.

Presently, PAS is now back to its original nature: a conservative and collectivist Malay party with a powerful authoritarian centre. This was reaffirmed in the party election in their Muktamar in April 2017 when all central committee posts were won by conservative faces.

A NEW PROGRESSIVE ISLAMIST PARTY

Having failed in their attempt to make PAS embrace modern progressive ideas, all progressive PAS leaders left the party

en masse and made a bold decision to form a new political party called Amanah. Officially launched on 16 September 2015, Amanah stakes a claim to be the torchbearer of the legacies of PAS leaders whom they label as being progressive, namely Yusof Rawa, Fadzil Noor and for Mursyidul Am (Spiritual Leader) Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat. This new party places emphasis on principles such as inclusiveness, good governance, and harmonious coalition politics.

Of particular interest to Amanah are the ideals and visions of the late Nik Abdul Aziz whom, as Mursyidul Am of PAS, staunchly defended the progressives when they were under scrutiny from 2008 to 2015. So strong was their admiration that when they were going through the options for the name of their new party, one of the suggestions was to call it "Parti Nik Aziz" (Mohd Anuar 2017). However, the proposal was rejected on the basis that no party in Malaysia has ever been named after a person. Former vice president of PAS, Husam Musa, upon joining Amanah on 31 August 2016, further stated, "If Nik Aziz was still alive, he would join me … because what is being championed by PAS now has deviated from what he championed …"[6] (Husam 2016).

Amanah leaders also differentiate themselves from PAS by highlighting subtly that they do not adopt the harsh *takfiri* approach. A subtle approach on this matter is usually adopted, as they do not want to openly accuse PAS of being a *takfiri* party. For instance, the chairman of Amanah's Expert Advisory Council Ahmad Awang (2017) once stated that Nik Abdul Aziz has never "uttered words similar to what has been uttered by a PAS leader from Terengganu that has been popularised … as the 'Amanat Haji Hadi'".[7] Ahmad was referring to a speech given by Abdul Hadi in 1982, when he alluded that supporting UMNO is akin to supporting *kuffar*. By taking this line of attack, and by

relating to the Amanat Haji Hadi indirectly, Ahmad, and Amanah in general, are ingeniously implying that PAS is now led by a radical *takfiri* leader who must not be given the opportunity to hold power in multiracial and multireligious Malaysia.

The progressives have also used their ideals to shape the new party's structure. In their founding constitution, among others, membership was to be opened to all regardless of race and religion; that the party champions good governance, moderation, and openness. The championing of equality for women was even included as one of their purposes. In terms of organizational arrangement, the Iranian revolution-inspired model that was brought into Malaysia's mainstream politics by Yusof Rawa is still abided, albeit with a twist, to improve accountability. Similar to PAS' Majlis Syura Ulama, Amanah has an Expert Advisory Council or Majlis Penasihat Pakar (Parti Amanah Negara 2016). Unlike PAS, however, Amanah's Expert Advisory Council only has an advisory role and they are not given the power to supplant the elected central committee members. Perhaps learning from their experience in PAS when Abdul Hadi bypassed the central committee and appealed directly to the Majlis Syura Ulama, Amanah chose to provide a safeguard to ensure better checks-and-balances. Only five out of the fifteen seats in the Expert Advisory Council are reserved for those with Islamic expertise, the other ten are set aside for those with other expertise.

In a study on the new party, Maszlee Malik interviewed more than 100 Amanah national and state leaders soon after its establishment and his findings confirmed that Amanah's strategy and position remains to be that of an Islamist party, one "that is not PAS". Amanah holds the opinion that PAS has become too conservative and may have even been penetrated by those who subscribe to extremist ideas. According to Maszlee,

> the primary concerns of the party are derived from their appreciation of the concept of Maqasid al-Shari'ah (the higher objectives of Islamic Law). Their aim is to attain the well-being of the citizens by upholding the principles of justice, rule of law, freedom and good governance (Maszlee, 3 May 2017).

Amanah does not see Shariah as narrowly confined to the adoption of *hudud* law, instead, in the wider sense of ensuring a corruption-free government and the well-being of all regardless of faith and ethnicity. While locally they are inspired by the thinking of Nik Abdul Aziz, internationally, they are influenced by the writings of the leader of Tunisia's Ennahda movement, Rached Ghannouchi (Maszlee 2017).

The influence of Ghannouchi is noteworthy. I was in Ghannouchi's monthly "circle" (*usrah*) over a two-year period from 1994 to 1995, when Ghannouchi was living in exile in England and I was also living there. Since that period, Ghannouchi has been calling for Islamists to change tact and adopt a strategy that is more policy-driven, inclusive and less legalistic. Ghannouchi firmly clarified his thoughts more recently when he wrote that "Ennahda is now best understood not as an Islamist movement but as a party of Muslim democrats. We seek to create solutions to the day-to-day problems that Tunisians face rather than preach about the hereafter" (Ghannouchi 2016). This idea is being built upon by several Amanah leaders, especially the party's strategy director, Dzulkefly Ahmad.

Dzulkefly believes that the first conservative group of political Islam activists—he calls them "Gen-1 activists"—in Malaysia failed in their quest to revive the Islamic state. As a result, political Islamism is experiencing a generational change led by "Gen-2 activists" who hold a markedly different worldview and ideology. While the Gen-1 activists are stuck

in the conservative, legalistic, and exclusivist paradigm, the Gen-2 activists believe that to deal with modern-day challenges of a multiracial society requires an inclusive approach that acknowledges the need to present convincing arguments, including in a secular way, to win a democratic debate. In other words, the Gen-2 activists strive to show the applicability and the relevance of Islamic political ideals through good policy propositions rather than simplistically attributing certain actions to the will of God. Strategic and rational thinking are emphasized over what religious scholars call "blind obedience" (Dzulkefly 2016).

CAN PROGRESSIVE ISLAMISM SUSTAIN ITSELF?

The challenge for Amanah is not just to develop a coherent and clear philosophy followed by policy proposals matching that worldview. An equally big challenge is to ensure the sustainability of the party and the progressive ideology in the long term. As a political party, the progressives challenge the much more established PAS who has dominated the political Islam sphere in Malaysia for six decades. At its infancy, Amanah's main strategy is focused on attracting PAS members and voters to defect into their folds or at least vote for them. This strategy of persuading the more progressive PAS members and supporters to join Amanah is most effective, but also very risky. In Malaysian electoral contests, whenever two or more candidates challenge a candidate from the ruling UMNO-led coalition, it is more likely that the latter will win because the opposition votes are split. Thus, if Amanah were to contest in a constituency where PAS is already challenging UMNO, it is more likely that Amanah's entry will boost UMNO's chances of winning. If this were to happen, in the majority of seats

contested by Amanah, they risk being routed from national politics. Without representatives in the federal parliament, their ability to survive in the long term is questionable.

Therefore, when it comes to the progressive Islamist ideology, the parallel discourse taking place in the wider public is equally important. Regardless of whether Amanah succeeds in their electoral contests, there is a palpable increase in interest in progressive Islamist ideas among the public today. New actors, the vast majority of whom are not openly affiliated to any political party, are fast gaining recognition as public intellectuals. They are regularly cited when discussing Islam in today's Malaysia. Oft-cited individuals, among others, include Maszlee Malik (Associate Professor at the International Islamic University Malaysia), Muhamad Rozaime Ramle (Senior Lecturer at Sultan Idris Education University), Mohd Asri Zainul Abidin (Mufti of the northern state of Perlis), Hasrizal Abdul Jamil (Director at Khalifah Model School), and Mohammad Redzuan Othman (Vice Chancellor of Universiti Selangor).

Several organizations are playing their roles too; the most active ones are the independent Islamic Renaissance Front (IRF) and the Selangor state government-sponsored Institut Darul Ehsan (IDE). These organizations host regular events and publish original and translated books in Malay, which is a very important move to spread progressive ideas among the traditionally conservative Malay audience. The amount of publications has increased significantly with the entry of new publishers, such as Ilham Books as well as many other smaller publishing houses. Working more at the international level, there is also the Istanbul Network for Liberty, which was originally founded in Istanbul in 2011, but has had its head office in Kuala Lumpur following its registration as a Malaysian foundation in 2016.

CONCLUSION

The new dynamics involving the progressive Islamist public intellectuals as well as the various organizations and publishing houses mark a new step in the evolution of political Islam in Malaysia. The field is now more clearly divided between the conservatives and the progressives. Since both are no longer bound by the discipline of being in the same party, they are able to debate their differences more vigorously. As a result, Malaysian Muslims who are committed to political Islamist ideas now have to think about these differences when choosing their platforms. Those who subscribe to conservative Islamism now know that their political vehicle is PAS, while those who are progressive can opt for Amanah. The two will continue to carve out their own followings, however the immediate risk to Amanah remains because their failure to capture at least some victory in the polls will threaten their long-term survival.

Nevertheless, regardless of Amanah's electoral achievements, the survival of progressive ideas is unlikely to be dependent solely on one political party. The splitting of PAS has sparked growing interest in Islamist progressive ideas on a wider scale, and more discourses are now taking place publicly at all layers of society and through various platforms. Progressive Islamist civil society organizations are also becoming more vocal. The contestation that once existed only within PAS has now become a national debate between many more groups. Even if Amanah were to fail electorally, progressive Islamist ideas will likely continue to grow in the country.

Notes

1. Farish Noor has written extensively on these developments and readers who would like to explore the evolution in greater depth

are encouraged to visit his writings. In particular, Farish Noor's two books *Islam Embedded: The Historical Development of the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party PAS 1951–2003* (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Sociological Research Institute, 2014*a*); and *The Malaysian Islamic Party PAS 1951–2013: Islamism in a Mottled Nation* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2014*b*).

2. Referring to Turkey's Recep Tayyib Erdogan.
3. *Kerajaan Beramanah, Adil dan Bersih: Ke Arah Negara Berkebajikan*.
4. *Negara Berkebajikan: PAS' Offer*.
5. His Western educational background initially earned Nasharuddin Mat Isa a reputation as a progressive. But if his writings and speeches were carefully examined, it would become clear that he has always been a conservative.
6. Translated from: "Kalau Tok Guru (Nik Abdul Aziz) masih ada, Tok Guru akan Bersama saya … kerana apa yang dibawa oleh PAS sekarang lari daripada perjuangan Tok Guru Nik Aziz".
7. Translated from: "mengatakan seperti kata-kata yang pernah diucapkan oleh seorang pimpinan PAS dari Terengganu yang dipopularkan … sebagai 'amanat Tok Guru Haji Hadi'".

References

Ahmad Awang. Speech delivered at Seminar on the thoughts of Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat (Seminar Pemikiran Tuan Guru Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat), organized by Parti Amanah Negara at the Kuala Lumpur and Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall, 9 April 2017.

Dzulkefly Ahmad. "PAS and its 'Benevolent Nation' Concept", 9 June 2012. Available at <https://drdzul.com/2012/06/09/pas-and-its-benevolent-nation-concept/> (accessed 29 March 2017).

———. "Membangun Pemikiran Dinamis Generasi Kedua Politikal Islam". In *Generasi Kedua Politikcal Islam: Wacana Baru Gerakan Islam Jilid 1*, edited by Maszlee Malik and Zulkifli Hasan. Petaling Jaya: Ilham Books, 2016, pp. 15–65.

Farish A. Noor. *Islam Embedded: The Historical Development of the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party PAS 1951–2003*. Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Sociological Research Institute, 2014*a*.

———. *The Malaysian Islamic Party PAS 1951–2013: Islamism in a Mottled Nation*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2014*b*.

Ghannouchi, Rached. "From Political Islam to Muslim Democracy: The Ennahda Party and the Future of Tunisia". *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2016. Available at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/tunisia/political-islam-muslim-democracy> (accessed 29 March 2017).

Husam Musa. "Interview by KiniTV", 30 August 2016. Available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01SrHOgZTBg> (accessed 10 April 2017).

Maszlee Malik. "From Political Islam to Democrat Muslim: A Case Study of Rashid Ghannouchi's Influence on ABIM, IKRAM, AMANAH and DAP". *Intellectual Discourse* 25, no. 1 (2017): 21–53.

———. Interview by author (Author, Interviewer). 3 May 2017.

Mohd Anuar Mohd Tahir. Secretary General of Parti Amanah Negara. 9 April 2017.

Mujahid Yusof. *Wajah Baru Politik Malaysia*. Petaling Jaya: Anbakri Publika Sdn Bhd, 2009.

———. *Menuju PAS Baru: Krisis, Peluang dan Dinamisme*, 2nd ed. Kuala Lumpur: The Malaysian Insider, 2011.

———. *Rejuvenasi PAS: Idea, Realiti, Aplikasi*. Shah Alam: Ilham Centre, 2012.

———. PAS Central Committee Member (2005–15). 15 April 2017.

Parti Amanah Negara. *Constitution of Parti Amanah Negara*. 2016.

Salahuddin Ayub. Vice President of PAS (2009–15). 16 April 2017.

Wan Saiful Wan Jan. *Parti Amanah Negara in Johor: Birth, Prospects, Challenges*. Trends in Southeast Asia, no. 9. Singapore: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, 2017.

Chapter 3

COMPETING DISCOURSES AMONG MALAYSIAN MUFTIS: STILL A CASE OF ARABIZATION?

Norshahril Saat

INTRODUCTION[1]

Recent writings on Malaysia's religious elite show that the group as a whole is becoming more conservative, authoritarian and exclusive (Farish 2005; Norani, Zainah, and Zaitun 2005). By religious elite, I refer to Muslims who are trained in the religious sciences and they include muftis (state-appointed persons with religious authority), *ulama* (religious scholars), popular preachers, religious teachers and religious bureaucrats. The behaviour of the elite is necessarily a reflection of how the masses practise Islam. Of greater concern is that academics and human rights activists have associated the elite with the puritan version of "Middle East" Islam, namely Wahhabism/ Salafism (to be discussed later). For example, Marina Mahathir, a gender rights activist, opined that Malaysia is undergoing an Arabization of Islam because the way the Malays dress, behave, and think no longer reflect Malay identity.[2] She claims that Malay women under the age of fifty no longer know how to tie the *baju kurung* (Malay costume). Similarly, Norani, Zainah and Zaitun make similar observations about

the adoption of Islamic or Arabic-style dressing and lifestyle, which is displacing indigenous identity with that of the Arabs (Norani, Zainah, and Zaitun 2005, p. 80). Academic Syed Farid Alatas also argues that extremist ideas from the Middle East, which he refers to as Salafism, have influenced the *ulama*'s way of thinking and behaviour.[3] At a forum, he stated that the Malays show a lack of self-confidence in believing that they become more authentic Muslims through copying Arabs.[4] The Sultan of Johor, Ibrahim Iskandar, also joined in to criticize the Malays for imitating the Arabs. He declared, "If there are some of you who wish to be an Arab and practise Arab culture, and do not wish to follow our Malay customs and traditions, that is up to you. I also welcome you to live in Saudi Arabia."[5]

To be sure, the behaviour of the religious elite, including the muftis, contradicts the way Malaysian Prime Ministers Abdullah Badawi (2003–9) and Najib Razak (2009–present) had sought to portray the country's brand of Islam: that Malaysia practises Islam Hadhari (progressive and civilizational Islam) and Islam Wasatiyyah (moderate Islam). The Abdullah government promoted ten principles which defined his soft and moderate approach to Islam and governance. The ten values include: faith and piety in Allah; a just and trustworthy government; a free and independent people; a vigorous pursuit and mastery of knowledge; a balanced and comprehensive economic development; a good quality of life for the people; protecting the rights of minority groups and women; cultural and moral integrity; safeguarding of natural resources and the environment; and strong defence capabilities (Abdullah 2006). However, Islam Hadhari is less spoken about since Abdullah stepped down from office in 2009. Under the Najib government, the slogan Islam Wasatiyyah is being hyped-up as the tenets of his administration.

Recent controversies involving the religious elite, such as book bans, the persecution of religious minorities (for example, the Shias), and the prevention of non-Muslims from using the word *Allah* for God, do not help Malaysia maintain an image of Muslim moderation. In fact since 2014, the Najib administration has been courting Islamic opposition party, PAS, into its fold, and the cooperation sought to strengthen Shariah laws in the country which other opposition parties argue is a step back from moderation. Prime Minister Najib supported PAS' call to review ACT 355, which means raising the current punishments for Shariah offences from three years' jail, RM5,000 (S$1,600) fine, and six lashes of the cane to thirty years' jail, RM100,000 (S$317,000) fine, and 100 lashes. Najib could not have agreed to PAS' proposal without inputs from his party, as well as religious bureaucrats. Public caning for Shariah offences is a common practice in some Middle East countries such as Saudi Arabia.

To what extent has Middle Eastern Islam crept into the Malaysian Islamic discourse? Does linking the elite's exclusivist attitudes with the Middle East begin on the correct premise in the first instance? This chapter agrees that Malaysian Muslims are indeed becoming more conservative and that the behaviour of their religious elite has contributed to this. Also, it posits that Middle Eastern influence, particularly Wahhabi/Salafi ideology, on elite and societal behaviour cannot be discounted. The general traits of Wahhabi/Salafi ideology, long associated with Saudi Arabia, include the banning of veneration of saints, visitations of graves of saints, and celebrating the Prophet's birthday, which are commonly practised in Malay society. However, it is also argued here that the influence of Middle Eastern Islam on Malaysia is a multifaceted one. While there is an increasing number among the religious elite who reflect

elements of Wahhabi/Salafi ideology, there are also many (such as Muslim Brotherhood sympathizers) who are influenced by revivalist ideas that have been popular since the 1970s, and by Sufism (interpreted as mysticism or as a devotional/spiritual orientation). These variants interact with local beliefs and Islamic orientations, reflecting the heterogeneity of the religious elite as a social group, even as they may be largely conservative.

On the one hand, one can blame the Middle East for the elite's conservatism: they continue to receive their training in universities in the Middle East; and there is greater promotion of Wahhabi/Salafi ideology by the Saudi Arabian government funded by petro-dollars. Globalization has also allowed greater exchange of ideas between the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Yet, it would be a mistake to discount the role of the dominant Malay party, the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) and the Malay rulers, who with their continuing patronage over the *ulama*, in shaping the latter's political and religious behaviour. The dynamics of this do not reflect a significant break from feudal thinking. For example, there is still a deep fear of authority in general, a strong emphasis on rituals and mysticism, and little regard for universal Islamic values such as equality (Shaharuddin 1988). Thus, crediting the Middle East alone for the country's conservative bent ignores the historical, institutional, and political conditions under which the *ulama* functions.

Highlighting the religious and political behaviour of some muftis (chief *ulama* of the Malaysian states)—such as Harussani Zakaria (Perak state); Dr Mohd Asri Zainul Abidin (Perlis state); Yusof Ahmad (Negeri Sembilan state) and Tahrir Samsudin (Johor)—entertain several interesting combinations of thought. Although the four muftis as case studies may not represent

Malaysian society at large, they are enough to demonstrate the complex nature of Malaysian Islam. One interesting finding from this comparison is that not all so-called Wahhabis/Salafis are extreme, even though they may show that tendency in aspects of rituals and in jurisprudence. Conversely, followers of competing ideologies to Wahhabism/Salafism are also clearly guilty of exclusivism. In general, Malaysian muftis are generally conservative in their religious discourse, and adopt an unquestioning and literal stance towards religious texts, and this is a lasting by-product of the Islamic resurgence movement of the 1970s (Norshahril 2014).

PERCEPTIONS OF MIDDLE EAST IMPACT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Scholars, human rights activists, and observers are worried that Malaysia is becoming Salafi and Islamist. Though the terms "Salafism" and "Islamism" contain many meanings, they are referred to as a puritanical orientation of Islam which is different from Southeast Asian Islam. Majority of the scholars are critical of Malaysian *ulama* for behaving like their Middle Eastern counterparts. The terms used to describe the Malaysian *ulama* are "Talibanization" and "Salafism". Alatas described the religious officials' heavy-handedness on the Shias as an act only conducted by Salafis. He pointed out the teachings of Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab, the founder of Wahhabism, penetrated the Malays psyche:

> Salafism is the most important extremist orientation of Islam. Generally understood to be a literalist, strict, and puritanical approach to Islam, Salafism promotes intolerance of Muslims with different viewpoints, which sometimes results in their designation as *takfir*, or even excommunication.[6]

In the same vein, Mohamed Nawab addressed the rise of Salafism within UMNO. Salafi *ulama* are interested to serve UMNO because of the similarities of interests: UMNO attempts to boost its Islamic image and the *ulama* strives to have greater reach at both state and societal levels. The Salafi *ulama* felt that the best way to promote their ideology is to work within UMNO circles.[7]

However, Alatas also pointed out the positive influence from the Middle East on Islamic thought: namely the role of Sufism. The Sufis, who emphasized spiritual and less legalistic approach to Islam, were the people who brought Islam into Southeast Asia. After 9/11, the West also pointed out that Sufism represents moderate Islam and should be encouraged as a counter-terrorism measure. Generally, Sufism constitutes a major element of Malaysian Muslims thinking, and this affected their rituals. For instance, Malays in Malaysia engage in celebrations of the prophet's birthday, visits to graves of prominent *ulama* or saints, communal feasting, which modernists consider innovations or un-Islamic. Alatas opined that Sufi tradition is important in curtaining extremist influence. He said, "The Sufi way is not an aspect or part of Islam but is the core of Islam itself. In fact, Sufism is as old as Islam itself."[8] Nonetheless, as this chapter demonstrates, individuals who claimed to be Sufis can also be exclusivists at the same time.

While scholars have generally pointed out the Middle East impact in Southeast Asia as broadly Salafism and Sufism, with the former seen as extreme and the latter moderate, little have been discussed about the impact of Muslim Brotherhood in this region. The lack of discussion of the Muslim Brotherhood ideas is understandable because they affect the gatekeepers of the religion, namely the Malaysian *ulama*. In more recent times, the influence of the Egyptian-based Islamic Brotherhood

gained momentum in Southeast Asia, including Malaysia. The movement's ideologue, Yusof al-Qaradawi, is very popular among Malaysian *ulama*. His works are cited and could not be criticized. Qaradawi's *fatwas* are influential especially with students who studied in Malaysian campuses and were involved in the Islamic resurgence movement in the 1970s and beyond. Malaysian students who studied in Al-Azhar were also influenced by the thinking of the Muslim Brotherhood. This is not to say that the movement is homogeneous as some factions within the movement are more progressive compared to others.

EMPOWERMENT OF *ULAMA* DURING THE ISLAMIC RESURGENCE

In the 1970s, Malaysia witnessed the rise of piety among the Muslims. Scholars have described the phenomenon as the Islamic resurgence movement or the *dakwah*. Civil society groups, Muslim societies in campuses, and political parties were the primary drivers of the movement, and although these groups had different constituents and were competing with one another, they had one common goal: to further Islamize the Malaysian state and society in line with the Quran and Sunnah (the sayings and actions of the Prophet Muhammad). They sought to introduce an alternative Islamic way of life which they claimed was all-encompassing. They problematized every aspect of governance then which they reckoned were remnants of Malaysia's colonial past. Some pursued, *inter alia*, to introduce new laws that were Shariah compatible; to create institutions in the name of religion; and to reform the education system to include more religiously sanctioned subjects.

The resurgence groups have questioned the ruling party's (UMNO) commitment to Islam. There was significant pressure from the resurgence to create a new Islamic order in Malaysia, because they are committed to the notion that Islam is *Ad-Deen*, a way of life. The demands made by the movement were so strong that the Prime Minister then, Dr Mahathir Mohamed, had to ride on the wave of Islamization and made it part of his government's agenda. Mahathir's approach to Islamization included elements of cooptation, institution building and coercion. To appease the movement, he set up Islamic institutions and invited critics and sympathizers to join them. He provided platforms for key resurgence leaders to cooperate with the government in the name of development with Islam. Known to many, one of Mahathir's biggest catch was to invite Anwar Ibrahim, a key actor of the movement, to join UMNO. Anwar later rose up the ranks of the party to become the Deputy Prime Minister. Mahathir also set up Islamic Centre, and allowed the national television to air the call to prayer, *azan*. Allowing the call for prayers on national television is practised in many Middle Eastern Islamic countries. Under Mahathir, Islamic banks were formed, and it was also under his government that huge mosques were built. The Mahathir government also enlarged the Islamic bureaucracy at the federal level, especially the powers of JAKIM (Department of Islamic Development in Malaysia). This institution acted as the secretariat to the JKF-MKI (National Fatwa Committee for the Federal National Islamic Council) which are represented by the all state muftis and other *ulama* in the country.

Malaysia today is witnessing the post-Islamic resurgence period. The religious elite who were actively promoting the Islamic alternative to Malaysian political and social life, and empowered by the Mahathir regime, currently form the leadership

strata of Malaysian society. Some entered politics through UMNO; while others head the religious bureaucracy, hold the position of muftis, and remain active in mosques (as independent preachers) and civil society. Some of these elites were schooled in Malaysian universities, including the International Islamic University of Malaysia which was formed during Mahathir's reign. But a handful studied in Middle Eastern universities such as Al-Azhar (Egypt), Medina University (Saudi Arabia), and Yarmouk University (Jordan). There are also instances in which the non-religious students who went to UK to do professional degrees (engineering, law, and IT) and while in Europe, they interacted with other Malaysian and international Muslim students promoting the same discourse as the resurgence. These returning graduates influenced the thinking of Malaysian society at large. While those returning from Al-Azhar generally fit in well with the Malaysian religious discourse, there have been fears that those returning from Saudi Arabia are influenced by Wahhabi-Salafi ideas, which is the state-sanctioned ideology of the Middle East state. Wahhabi-Salafi ideas are generally not in-sync with the way Islam is practised in the Malay world. Two centuries of contestations between the Wahhabi-Salafi proponents and the so-called traditionalist Sufis had not weakened the influence of the latter. This strengthens the argument of the chapter over the concern that Wahhabi-Salafi discourse is changing Malaysian Islamic landscape because Malaysian muftis are generally traditionalists.

THE HETEROGENEITY OF THE WAHHABISM/SALAFISM

As mentioned above, academics warn about the rise of Wahhabism/Salafism among the Malay masses. However, such

blanket blame being placed on Wahhabism/Salafism in explaining exclusivist attitudes among members of the Malay elite should be cautioned against, and for two good reasons: first, there are instances of members of the elite who are attracted to Wahabbism/Salafism but who at the same time demonstrate clear respect for a diversity of views; and second, they can also be victims of exclusivism practised by competing groups.

One case worthy of study is Dr Mohd Asri Zainul Abidin (known as Maza by his followers), who was appointed Perlis Mufti in 2006. He left the post after two years in office, but in 2015, was reappointed to the position. He is popular among the young and is very visible on social media, runs a blog, *Minda Tajdid*, and has published many books on Islam.

In general, Mohd Asri's critiques consider his views as conforming to Wahhabism/Salafism, even though he is uncomfortable with the label. However, during his first stint as Perlis Mufti, he published books that reflected Wahhabi/Salafi concerns: that were anti-mazhab (a school of jurisprudence); critical of hadith (the sayings of the Prophet) fabrications; and condemned Sufi practices. He considered these not to be in line with "pure" Islam, and urged Muslims to return to Islam's true teachings. The sources he cited are also often referred to by those conforming to the Wahhabi/Salafi school of thought, such as Ibnu Taimiyah (b.1263–d.1328) and Ibnu Qayyim al Jauziyah (b.1292–d.1350). Mohd Asri continues to write books and deliver sermons condemning Shi'ism. His anti-Shia sermons are also widely circulated in social media, particularly on YouTube. He continues to hold this position against Shi'ism even though several prominent Malaysian leaders have signed the Aman Declaration, which upholds both Shi'ism and Sunnism as mainstream Islam. See Table 3.1 for a list of his books expressing the themes mentioned above, all published by Karya Bestari.

TABLE 3.1
List of Some Books by Mohd Asri

Title	Year
Menilai Tarikat dan Kesufian dengan Syariat Allah	2004
Bidaáh Hasanah: Istilah yang disalah fahami	2005
Arus Tajdid: Fikrah Merentasi Jemaah	2007
Hadith Palsu: Kesan Terhadap Imej Islam	2007
Fanatik Mazhab: Kesan kepada pemikiran umat	2007

While Mohd Asri may be conservative on many aspects of religious rituals, he is receptive of alternative opinions. Some of his views on women's rights, religious freedom, and religious worship are largely recognized to be progressive. This debunks the view some scholars have about the nexus between Wahhabism, violence and ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria). He also urges Malaysian Muslims not to accept the Shafie school as the only source of law, but to be more receptive of other schools of jurisprudence. This position departs from the one advocated by the *ulama* in the Nusantara region, which largely adopts the Shafie school of jurisprudence.

Many in the National Fatwa Committee (JKF-MKI) do not agree with his thinking on many issues, and Mohd Asri admits that there were often times when he had had unpleasant encounters with other *ulama*. He recounted how seniority matters in JKF-MKI meetings, which to some extent, marginalizes young muftis such as himself:

> In the JKF-MKI, there is no equality. In the meetings, they are not happy with my ideas, even though they are based on sound religious arguments… Some of my evidences and arguments are ignored because the members argue based on seniority of the muftis.[9]

Disagreements between Mohd Asri and other muftis have often been played out publicly. Muftis and religious bureaucrats in other states have attempted to prevent Mohd Asri from speaking in their states, and in 2009, he was detained by religious officials for preaching in Selangor without permission and proper accreditation from the religious authorities there. This was despite him being a mufti himself.

The case of Mohd Asri demonstrates two points. First, one can be labelled a Salafi/Wahhabi in outlook, particularly on matters concerning faith and rituals, without undergoing religious training in Saudi Arabia, the country known to uphold that ideology most prominently. Second, a Wahhabi/Salafi can be progressive on many issues not concerning religious rituals, even more so than the traditionalists and Sufis (to be discussed shortly). Mohd Asri received most of his religious training in Malaysia despite being labelled as Salafi/Wahhabi. He graduated with a Bachelor's degree in Arabic from Jordan University, a Master's degree in Islamic Studies from the Malaysian Science University (USM), and a Doctoral degree from the International Islamic University of Malaysia (Azman et al. 2008, p. 65). He is particularly critical of mysticism, a dominant religious orientation of Malaysian Malays which pays scant attention to modern scientific knowledge.

OTHER ACTORS DEFINING MALAYSIA'S RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE

Without a doubt, the Middle East has in recent times had an impact on religious discourse in the Malay world. Many Malaysian students has studied in Middle Eastern universities,

such as Al-Azhar in Egypt; Medina University in Saudi Arabia; and Yarmouk University in Jordan. On return, these students understandably tend to refer to their Middle Eastern mentors and to interpret Malaysian matters according to the situation in the Middle East (Zainul Abidin and Norshahril 2016, pp. 239–42). Yet, focussing too much on the Middle Eastern influence diverts our attention away from the local and regional factors that also shape the thinking of the Malaysian Muslim elite. For example, in religious affairs, the Malay rulers have the prerogative to decide who gets appointed to the states' religious councils and who becomes the mufti. The Malay rulers determine the members of the religious councils, and have the final word on whether religious rulings get published in the state gazette. The following paragraphs demonstrate how UMNO and Malay rulers continue to remain neutral towards exclusivist attitudes of the religious elite.

The case study of Harussani Zakaria, the mufti of Perak, reflects how one can garner personal power and prolonged stay in the religious bureaucracy by being close to the Malay ruler. He has been serving as the Perak mufti since 1985. The Sultan of Perak had over the years conferred many titles and state honours on him. In 2008, Harussani was named Tokoh Maal Hijrah 1430 (Maal Hijrah Person of the Year), a prestigious recognition awarded to Muslims for their contributions to Malaysia. In 2009, he became a "Tan Sri", a title that only seventy-five individuals in Malaysia can hold at any one time. These awards were in addition to many he had received much earlier in his career.[10] The Perak royal family has thus retained Harussani's services for three decades despite him only having a diploma in Islamic education, and even though Malaysia produces hundreds of Islamic Studies graduates and PhD holders every year whose qualifications can replace him.

Having been so long in service, and having protection from the Perak royal family, Harussani has had the freedom to express his views without fear of retribution from the state or from UMNO. Harussani admittedly stated:

> The government mainly pointed out the cases [that requires a religious ruling], and my job is to issue a *fatwa*. I have never been forced to adopt the position of the government. I have never been influenced by the government. If I say it is permissible and the Sultan says it is okay, then we gazette the *fatwa*. This is law.[11]

This is true enough. As the mufti of Perak for over almost thirty years, Harussani has indeed expressed his conservative ideas publicly without any sanction or expression of disapproval from the state. He has issued controversial statements through the mainstream media—including the Utusan Malaysia—that has embarrassed the state. During the Abdullah Badawi government, many of his remarks ran counter to the government line. On 8 July 2006, Harussani made the unsubstantiated remark that 100,000 Muslims in Malaysia had become apostates. This elicited responses from both Muslims and non-Muslims alike (Liow 2009). Even though no evidence was cited, YADIM's patron, Mohd Nakhaie Ahmad, later echoed this point.[12] Harussani's views on apostasy have helped shape public opinion about Christian proselytization and evangelicalism, and his alarmist overtone is likely to have deepened mistrust between Muslims and non-Muslims. Several Islamic non-governmental organizations such as ISMA (Ikatan Muslimin Malaysia or Malaysia Muslim Network) and ABIM have since publicly pressured the federal government to ban all efforts to convert Muslims out of Islam.

Despite occasional disagreements with the ruling party, Harussani's views suggest he wants to keep the status quo for as long as possible. In 2009, Harussani resolutely defended the Sultan of Perak at the height of the Perak constitutional crisis. This crisis was precipitated by three Pakatan Rakyat (PR) state assemblymen leaving their party to become independents who in effect would support the Barisan Nasional (BN). The Perak Sultan allowed the BN to take over the Perak government from PR, leading to PR claiming that the Sultan's move was unconstitutional. Harussani was quick to defend the Sultan, declaring those who criticized the Perak Sultan to be *menderhaka* or treacherous.[13] The Sultan's actions were furthermore met with demonstrations, and he was accused of having overstepped his role as a constitutional monarch. In response to the protests, Harussani remarked:

> The Malays do not defy the Sultans. As Malays, they (demonstrators) should not be cursing, swearing, and destroying other people's property as Malay culture is refined. How can we say we are struggling for Islam when we behave in such an un-Islamic way?[14]

What lay behind Harussani's resolute stand in support of the monarchy on this occasion? One can perhaps point to Saudi clerics and their quietist approach towards the Saudi monarchy that in return allowed the clerics space to be guardians of religious matters. However, Harussani never received his religious training from any Middle Eastern university. Instead, he graduated with a diploma from Malaya Islamic College.

Under the purview of Harussani, the Perak religious council tolerates religious rituals which Wahhabis/Salafis would consider as "innovations" and un-Islamic. In other words, while Harussani is conservative in his views on women, Shias, and

liberal Islam, for example, he is not concerned about Islamic innovations. In 2015, Harussani declared that gymnastics is not for Muslim women because they are required to wear costumes that do not meet Islamic guidelines.[15] He made this remark about the Malaysian gymnast Farah Ann, who won a gold medal at the 2015 SEA Games in Singapore. Harussani is one case of a Muslim leader who is exclusive and intolerant on religious matters without being influenced by Wahhabism/Salafism, and without receiving any training from the Middle East. By contrast, Harussani's loyalty to the Perak Sultan shows strong traits that are reminiscent of the feudal past of Malay culture and that have continued into present religious discourses.

EXCLUSIVIST ACROSS IDEOLOGIES

Exclusivism is undoubtedly becoming a dominant orientation in Malaysia today. Yet, what most analysts fail to observe is that exclusivism cuts across theological divides. While the Wahhabi/Salafi school may clearly be promoting exclusivism, such is also the case among certain Sufi groups. The paragraphs below demonstrate how muftis of the states of Negeri Sembilan and Johor exhibit an exclusive orientation despite being Sufi oriented.

Muftis in Negeri Sembilan are generally known for their tendency to hold views stemming from Sufism, which in theory are apolitical, moderate, and benign. Sufis claim to promote a soft brand of Islam which emphasizes spirituality and rituals. The state's third mufti, Mohd Mustadza Ahmad, a graduate of Al-Azhar University, is a follower of the Ahmadiyah-Idrissiyah tariqah, a Sufi school. The mufti department provides a list of tariqahs on its website, and the first on the list is unsurprisingly Al-Ahmadiyah al-Idrisiah al-rashidiah al-dandarawiah, whose

leader is the former mufti himself. Out of the nine tariqahs that can practise in the state, only one was omitted from the list: Tariqah Khidiriah.[16] The reason why this sect is banned is because its leader, Shamsuddin Abdul Rahman, claimed to have dreamt meeting Prophet Khidir. He purports having had this dream in 1987, when he was twenty-eight years old.

Where the muftis of Negeri Sembilan received their religious training from is rather revealing. The state's first mufti, Ahmad Mohd Said (1950–64) studied in Malaysia, and later in Mecca. He was in Mecca in the 1920s, at a time when Wahhabism/Salafism was gaining influence in a emergent state known today as Saudi Arabia. Yet, Mohd Said was not influenced by the Wahhabi/Salafi ideology. Similarly, Hasan Said, the mufti between 1969 and 1987, also received his training in the Middle East, but spent most of his time teaching in Malaysia. Mohd Murtadza Ahmad, Negeri Sembilan's third mufti, did his studies at Al-Azhar University, and became a leader of the tariqah movement. The current mufti also received his religious education from the same university, and he is also against Wahhabism/Salafism. This suggests that local institutions, more than Middle Eastern ones, played a key role in shaping the religious worldview of members of the religious elite in Malaysia. The Negeri Sembilan muftis are examples of how religious training in the Middle East had little or no impact on their thinking.

Be that as it may, despite being Sufis, several of Negeri Sembilan's muftis show signs of intolerance and exclusivism. In early 2015, the Negeri Sembilan religious council declared Wahhabism to be contradictory of the Sunni school of thought. The present Negeri Sembilan mufti, Mohd Yusof Ahmad, proclaimed that Malaysians should adopt the Shafie school of jurisprudence and should not be misled into accepting Wahhabism. His reasons are as follows:

> The decision by the Negeri Sembilan *fatwa* committee holds that Wahhabi teachings contradict the Sunni school of thought because the Shafie school does not prohibit Muslims from reciting prayers after their *solat* (five daily prayers), reciting prayers at cemeteries to the deceased (*talkin*), and reciting Quran on Friday nights. Wahhabi teachings are different from all these.[17]

In 2014, Mufti Mohd Yusof Ahmad was unhappy with the Federal Court of Appeal's judgement to allow three transgender Muslim men—Muhammad Juzaili Mohd Khamis, Shukor Jani, and Wan Kay—to dress as women. Section 66 of the Negeri Sembilan Shariah Criminal Code 1992 forbids Muslims from dressing as the opposite gender and those who do face up to six months' imprisonment, a fine of up to RM1,000, or both. The three men had been arrested several times for breaking the religious law in Negeri Sembilan, and in October 2012, the High Court told them to obey the Negeri Sembilan laws since Islam was a state matter. However, in November 2014, the Court of Appeal ruled it unconstitutional to prevent the men from dressing the way they wished, as the Constitution protects minority rights. Mohd Yusof disagreed with the Court of Appeal, declaring that the judgement was against Islam.[18] The Islamic Religious Department appealed at the country's highest court, the Federal Court, which in August 2015, reversed the verdict of the Court of Appeal. This created an uproar from human rights groups, both locally and internationally.[19] Defending his views, Mufti Mohd Yusof said, "I stand by the Shariah Court in the state [Negeri Sembilan]. These laws are crafted to uphold Islam more than anything else. Laws in the state are based on Islam, Quran, and Hadith."[20]

Datuk Tahrir Samsudin, the current Johor mufti, exhibits *kaum tua* thinking in many ways, and as with his predecessors,

he is also sympathetic to Sufism. During my interview with him, Datuk Tahrir defended the tariqah groups in Johor, even though the religious department is keeping a close eye on them for departing from "true" Islamic teachings.[21] In fact, the mufti emphasizes his commitment to promoting tariqah groups in the state. He does not deny that Salafi-Wahhabi ideas are gaining traction in Malaysia, especially when these are propagated through the social media, but considers Johor the bastion of the Sunni tradition. He admits though, that the arrival of Salafism-Wahhabism has led to some disunity in Johor.

The mufti also says that Johor *ulama* feels that since they inherited their religious traditions from pious Muslim scholars, they can never be misguided in upholding Sufism.[22] In April 2016, he presented a paper pointing out that Johor *ulama* should follow the methods of the earlier Johor mufti, Datuk Syed Alwi Tahir al-Haddad, when issuing a *fatwa*, although this did not mean that the new *fatwa* should not differ from al-Haddad's.[23] Syed Alwi was the mufti between 1941–34 and 1947–61, and wrote many *fatwa*s condemning Wahhabism and the modernists.

The dominance of the *kaum tua* orientation is also seen in the publications of Johor's Islamic Religious Council. The Mufti Department of Johor runs an e-book series that is downloadable by the public. These contain anti-Salafi-Wahhabi ideas, as the discussion below on two of these publications demonstrates.[24] The first e-book is entitled *Sambutan Maulidur Rasul Bidáh Dhalalah?* (Celebration of the Prophet Muhammad's Birthday: A Forbidden Innovation?), written by Haji Jainal Al-Jauhari, Chief Executive of the Islamic Religious Council of Johor. The book was vetted by Nooh Gadut, the former mufti (Haji Jainal Al-Jauhari 2008). In essence, it attacks the Salafi-Wahhabi position that celebrating Prophet Muhammad's birthday is an

innovation and un-Islamic. Jainal argues that the practice is allowed by the Sunni school of jurisprudence (Ahli Sunnah wal Jamaah), which is the only school allowed in Malaysia. He underscores how such celebrations could bring the religious community closer to the teachings of the Prophet. He claims that the celebration is an expression of happiness over the birth of the Prophet, and it has been practised by savants of the past, for example, during the rule of Salahuddin Al-Ayubi between 1171 and 1193. The celebration normally includes reciting verses from the Quran and singing praises to the Prophet, and would often end with a feast. The common practice in Malaysia is for a *maulid* to be accompanied by a procession. The book also points out that the celebration is Islamic and should be encouraged because it can unite Muslims and strengthen their faith.

Another e-book that reflects the mufti's Sufist thinking is written by Muhammad Fuad, entitled *Kepentingan Tariqah Dan Tasawwuf* (The Importance of Tariqah and Islamic Spirituality) (Muhammad Fuad 2008). The tariqah is a Sufi order that mainly teaches spirituality (*tasawwuf*) through *zikr* (chanting verses from the Quran or repeating praises to the Prophet). There are many such Sufi orders in Malaysia, including the Naqshbandiyah and Ahmadiyah Idrisiah. These are headed by *murshids* (spiritual leaders) and their followers pledge allegiance to their masters before becoming part of the group (*bai'ah*). Some tariqah groups promote mysticism, spirituality and metaphysics, practices that are also frowned upon by the Salafis-Wahhabis for the same reasons they are against the celebrating of the Prophet's birthday, i.e. that they are not found in the Quran and that these groups therefore practise innovations. The book mainly supports the existence of tariqah groups in Johor because these are within the spirit of the religion and are in accordance with the teachings of the Prophet.

Two other e-books warn Johor Muslims of the Shia and the liberal Islam "threat", and mirror the general trend among Malaysian religious elite that Shi'ism is a deviant ideology and that liberalism is a threat to Islam (Wan Adli 2012). They call on those who harbour these trends of thought to repent. In truth, Sunni Muslims in many parts of the world have lived peacefully alongside the Shias. Moreover, many *ulama* around the world, including those in Indonesia, have pointed out that Shi'ism should be seen as part of mainstream Islam (Norshahril 2014).

CONCLUSION

To sum up, the study of religious extremism in Malaysia should extend beyond its present focus on Wahhabism/Salafism. What Malaysians need to be wary of is the exclusive attitude towards the faith in general: defensiveness of particular ideas, authoritarian attitudes in approaching diversity, and relegating alternative voices as being liberal or deviant. The exclusivist attitude towards religion does not derive from the Middle East solely, but from local factors as well. It is found across different theological orientations, be this Wahhabi/Salafi, Sufi, or traditionalist.

As this chapter demonstrates, the patronage of Malay rulers remains key in defining the political behaviour of some Malaysian muftis. It would seem that Salafi/Wahhabi thinking is more marginal to Malaysian society than what many scholars suggest.[25] The majority of Malaysian muftis remain Sufis and conservative, just like the Perak and Negeri Sembilan muftis. The Selangor religious council, for instance, defends Sufi practices frowned upon by Wahhabis/Salafis, and the opinions of religious councils are backed by the Malay rulers, who are constitutionally the custodians of Islam in each state.[26] Yet, as mentioned,

the Selangor authorities have prevented Dr Mohd Asri from speaking because he holds a different theological viewpoint. Recently, the Pahang mufti, Abdul Rahman Osman, has been issuing exclusivist remarks towards the DAP (Democratic Action Party). He declared the party as *kafir harbi* (non-believers who can be slain) for opposing Islamic laws. He was also quoted to say that working with the party is a sin in Islam.[27] Again, such exclusive views are not related to Wahhabi/Salafi thought, because in 2014, the Pahang Religious Council has banned Wahhabism/Salafism from being preached in the state.[28] The grounds for the ban is that the ideology brings disunity among Malaysian Muslims.

The way forward should be for Malaysian Muslims to be critical of any form of exclusive attitude in the religious discourse, rather than to single out particular religious doctrines. An exclusivist is an exclusivist, regardless of whether he is a Wahhabi/Salafi, Shia, Sufi, Sunni or a self-declared liberal. A common space for debate on religious ideas and values is needed. As much as one can be critical of Wahhabism/Salafism for promoting conservatism and exclusivism, one must also be critical of attempts that declare Wahhabis/Salafis as deviants, which some Sufi groups do.

Notes

1. Some parts of this chapter have been published as an *ISEAS Perspective*, see Norshahril Saat, "Exclusivist Attitudes in Malaysian Islam have Multifarious Roots", *ISEAS Perspective*, no. 39 (5 July 2016); and *Trends in Southeast Asia*, see Norshahril Saat, *Johor Remains the Bastion of Kaum Tua*, Trends in Southeast Asia, no. 1 (Singapore: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, 2017). This chapter is mainly an extension of these publications.

2. Boo Su-Lyn, "Marina Mahathir: Malaysia Undergoing 'Arab Colonialism'", *Malay Mail Online*, 23 May 2015, available at <http://www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/marina-mahathir-malaysia-undergoing-arab-colonialism> (accessed 9 November 2015).
3. Syed Farid Alatas, "Battle Against Extremism Within Islam", *The Straits Times*, 5 April 2014.
4. Syed Jaymal Zahiid, "Forum Explores Creeping 'Arabisation' Among Malays", *Malay Mail Online*, 24 May 2016, available at <http://m.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/forum-explores-creeping-arabisation-among-malays> (accessed 25 May 2016).
5. *Today*, "Stop Aping Arabs, Johore Sultan tells Malays", 24 March 2016, available at <http://m.todayonline.com/world/asia/stop-aping-arabs-johor-sultan-tells-malays> (accessed 25 May 2016).
6. Syed Farid Alatas, "Salafism and the Persecution of Shiítes in Malaysia", Middle East Institute, 30 July 2014, available at <http://www.mei.edu/content/map/salafism-and-persecution-shi%E2%80%98ites-malaysia> (accessed 9 November 2015).
7. Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman, "Salafi Ulama in UMNO: Political Convergence or Expediency?", *Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Afairs* 36, no. 2 (2004): 206–31.
8. Syed Farid Alatas, "Salafism and the Threat to Peace", 20 April 2014, available at <http://www.themalaymailonline.com/what-you-think/article/salafism-and-the-threat-to-peace-syed-farid-alatas> (accessed 9 November 2015).
9. Interview with Mohd Asri, Mufti of Perlis, 21 April 2013.
10. Azman Ab Rahman, Zahari Mahad Musa, Nik Sahida Nik Saleh, and Adel M. Abdul Aziz, *Biografi Mufti-Mufti Malaysia* (Negeri Sembilan: USIM, 2008), p. 62.
11. Interview with Harussani Zakaria, Mufti of Perak, 7 May 2013.
12. *myMetro*, "Gejala murtad tinggi", 27 July 2008.
13. *Utusan Malaysia*, "Tidak taat pada Raja adalah derhaka—Mufti", 7 February 2009.

14. *Bernama*, "Act that Goes Against Islamic Culture and Islam Teachings", 6 February 2009.
15. Wan Syamsul Amly, "Isu Farah Ann: 'Gimnastik bukan untuk wanita Islam' – Mufti Perak", *Astro Awani*, 13 June 2015, available at <http://www.astroawani.com/berita-malaysia/isu-farah-ann-gimnastik-bukan-untuk-wanita-islam-mufti-perak-62368> (accessed 13 June 2016).
16. Jabatan Mufti Negeri Sembilan, available at <http://www.muftins.gov.my/index.php/arkib2/tareqat-tasauwuf/161-tarekat-tassawuf-berdaftar> (accessed 16 September 2015).
17. Syafiq Salleh, "Wahhabi bercanggah dengan aliran Mazhab Syafie – Mufti Negeri Sembilan", 2 March 2015, available at <http://ikimfm.my/wahhabi-bercanggah-dengan-aliran-mazhab-syafie-mufti-negeri-sembilan/> (accessed 17 September 2015).
18. *The Malaysian Insider*, "Isu lelaki berpakaian wanita, Mufti NS pertikai keputusan tidak berasaskan Islam", 8 November 2014, available at <http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/bahasa/article/isu-lelaki-berpakaian-wanita-mufti-ns-pertikai-keputusan-tidak-berasaskan-i> (accessed 3 November 2015).
19. *Reuters*, "Malaysia Court Upholds Ban on Cross Dressing Transgender Muslims", 8 October 2015, available at <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/10/08/us-malaysia-verdict-crossdressing-idUSKCN0S21CE20151008> (accessed 3 November 2015).
20. *Astro Awani*, "Mufti Negeri Sembilan pertahankan undang-undanmg digina Mahkamah Shariah Negeri", 8 November 2014, available at <http://www.astroawani.com/berita-malaysia/mufti-negeri-sembilan-pertahankan-undang-undang-diguna-mahkamah-shariah-negeri-47960> (accessed 11 November 2015).
21. Interview with Sahibus Samahah Datuk Hj Mohd Tahrir Bin Dato' Kiyai Hj Samsuddin, 23 October 2016.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid. Datuk Tahrir disagrees with al-Haddad's *fatwa* on some issues.
24. See Jabatan Mufti Negeri Johor website, available at <http://Mufti.johor.gov.my/v3/muatturun>.

25. Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid, "ISIS in Southeast Asia: Internalized Wahhabism is a Major Factor", Middle East Institute, 18 May 2016, available at <http://www.mei.edu/content/map/isis-southeast-asia-internalized-wahhabism-major-factor> (accessed 25 May 2016).
26. Jabatan Mufti Negeri Selangor, "Soal Jawab Agama", available at <http://www.muftiselangor.gov.my/ms/akidah> (accessed 27 June 2016).
27. *The Straits Times*, "Pahang Mufti Criticised for 'Explosive' Remarks", 26 June 2016.
28. Jabatan Mufti Negeri Pahang, available at <http://mufti.pahang.gov.my/index.php/2012-12-11-06-41-06/2012-12-11-06-44-13/2012-12-11-06-44-58/2014/97-tegahan-dan-larangan-menyebarkan-ajaran-salafiah-wahabiah-dan-seumpamanya-di-negeri-pahang> (accessed 27 June 2016).

References

Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. *Islam Hadhari: A Model Approach for Development and Progress*. Selangor: MPH Publishing Sdn Bhd, 2006.

Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid. "ISIS in Southeast Asia: Internalized Wahhabism is a Major Factor". Middle East Institute, 18 May 2016. Available at <http://www.mei.edu/content/map/isis-southeast-asia-internalized-wahhabism-major-factor> (accessed 25 May 2016).

Astro Awani. "Mufti Negeri Sembilan pertahankan undang-undanmg digina Mahkamah Shariah Negeri", 8 November 2014. Available at <http://www.astroawani.com/berita-malaysia/mufti-negeri-sembilan-pertahankan-undang-undang-diguna-mahkamah-shariah-negeri-47960> (accessed 11 November 2015).

———. "Isu Farah Ann: 'Gimnastik bukan untuk wanita Islam' – Mufti Perak", 13 June 2015. Available at <http://www.astroawani.com/berita-malaysia/isu-farah-ann-gimnastik-bukan-untuk-wanita-islam-mufti-perak-62368> (accessed 13 June 2016).

Azman, Ab Rahman, Zahari Mahad Musa, Nik Sahida Nik Saleh, and Adel M. Abdul Aziz. *Biografi Mufti-Mufti Malaysia*. Negeri Sembilan: USIM, 2008.

Bernama. "Act that Goes Against Islamic Culture and Islam Teachings", 6 February 2009.

Boo Su-Lyn. "Marina Mahathir: Malaysia Undergoing 'Arab Colonialism'". *Malay Mail Online*, 23 May 2015. Available at <http://www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/marina-mahathir-malaysia-undergoing-arab-colonialism> (accessed 9 November 2015).

Farish A. Noor. *From Majapahit to Putrajaya: Searching for Another Malaysia*. Kuala Lumpur: Silverfish Books, 2005.

Haji Jainal Al-Jauhari. *Sambutan Maulidur Rasul Bid'ah Dhalalah?* Johor: Majlis Agama Islam Negeri Johor, 2008.

Jabatan Mufti Negeri Johor. Available at <http://Mufti.johor.gov.my/v3/muatturun> (acccessed 27 June 2016).

Jabatan Mufti Negeri Pahang. Available at <http://mufti.pahang.gov.my/index.php/2012-12-11-06-41-06/2012-12-11-06-44-13/2012-12-11-06-44-58/2014/97-tegahan-dan-larangan-menyebarkan-ajaran-salafiah-wahabiah-dan-seumpamanya-di-negeri-pahang> (accessed 27 June 2016).

Jabatan Mufti Negeri Selangor. "Soal Jawab Agama". Available at <http://www.muftiselangor.gov.my/ms/akidah> (accessed 27 June 2016).

Jabatan Mufti Negeri Sembilan. Available at <http://www.muftins.gov.my/index.php/arkib2/tareqat-tasauwuf/161-tarekat-tassawuf-berdaftar> (accessed 16 September 2015).

Jainal Sakiban. *Kebatilan Akidah Syi'ah*. Johor: Majlis Agama Islam Johor, 2012.

Liow, Joseph Chinyong. *Piety and Politics: Islamism in Contemporary Malaysia*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

Malaysian Insider. "Isu lelaki berpakaian wanita, Mufti NS pertikai keputusan tidak berasaskan Islam", 8 November 2014. Available at <http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/bahasa/article/isu-lelaki-

berpakaian-wanita-mufti-ns-pertikai-keputusan-tidak-berasaskan-i> (accessed 3 November 2015).

Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman. "Salafi Ulama in UMNO: Political Convergence or Expediency?". *Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs* 36, no. 2 (2004): 206–31.

Muhammad Fuad bin Kamaludin Al-Maliki. *Kepentingan Tariqahdan Tasawwuf*. Johor: Majlis Agama Islam Negeri Johor, 2008.

myMetro. "Gejala murtad tinggi", 27 July 2008.

Norani Othman, Zainah Anwar, and Zaitun Mohamed Kasim. "Malaysia: Islamization, Muslim Politics and State Authoritarianism". In *Muslim Women and the Challenges of Islamic Extremism*, edited by Norani Othman. Kuala Lumpur: Sisters in Islam, 2005, pp. 78–108.

Norshahril Saat. "'Deviant' Muslims the Plight of Shias in Contemporary Malaysia". In *Religious Diversity in Muslim-majority States in Southeast Asia: Areas of Toleration and Conflict*, edited by Bernhard Platzdasch and Johan Saravanamuttu. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2014.

———. "Exclusivist Attitudes in Malaysian Islam have Multifarious Roots". *ISEAS Perspective*, no. 39 (5 July 2016).

———. *Johor Remains the Bastion of Kaum Tua*. Trends in Southeast Asia, no. 1. Singapore: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, 2017.

Reuters. "Malaysia Court Upholds Ban on Cross Dressing Transgender Muslims", 8 October 2015. Available at <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/10/08/us-malaysia-verdict-crossdressing-idUSKCN0S21CE20151008> (accessed 3 November 2015).

Shaharuddin Maaruf. *Malay Ideas of Development: From Feudal Lord to Capitalist*. Singapore: Times Book International, 1988.

Straits Times. "Pahang Mufti Criticised for 'Explosive' Remarks", 26 June 2016.

Syafiq Salleh. "Wahhabi bercanggah dengan aliran Mazhab Syafie – Mufti Negeri Sembilan", 2 March 2015. Available at <http://ikimfm.my/wahhabi-bercanggah-dengan-aliran-mazhab-syafie-mufti-negeri-sembilan/> (accessed 17 September 2015).

Syed Farid Alatas. "Battle Against Extremism Within Islam". *The Straits Times*, 5 April 2014.

———. "Salafism and the Threat to Peace", 20 April 2014. Available at <http://www.themalaymailonline.com/what-you-think/article/salafism-and-the-threat-to-peace-syed-farid-alatas> (accessed 9 November 2015).

———. "Salafism and the Persecution of Shiítes in Malaysia". Middle East Institute, 30 July 2014. Available at <http://www.mei.edu/content/map/salafism-and-persecution-shi%E2%80%98ites-malaysia> (accessed 9 November 2015).

Syed Jaymal Zahiid. "Forum Explores Creeping 'Arabisation' Among Malays". *Malay Mail Online*, 24 May 2016. Available at <http://m.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/forum-explores-creeping-arabisation-among-malays> (accessed 25 May 2016).

Today. "Stop Aping Arabs, Johore Sultan tells Malays", 24 March 2016. Available at <http://m.todayonline.com/world/asia/stop-aping-arabs-johor-sultan-tells-malays> (accessed 25 May 2016).

Utusan Malaysia. "Tidak taat pada Raja adalah derhaka—Mufti", 7 February 2009.

Wan Adli Wan Ramli. *Bahaya Liberalisme dan Pluralisme Agama Terhadap Akidah Belia Muslim*. Johor: Majlis Agama Islam Johor, 2012.

Zainul Abidin Rasheed and Norshahril Saat. "Moderate Islam in Singapore – In Conversation with Habib Syed Hassan Al Attas". In *Majulah: 50 Years of Malay/Muslim Community in Singapore*, edited by Zainul Abidin Rasheed and Norshahril Saat. Singapore: World Scientific, 2016, pp. 239–42.

Interviews

Interview with Mohd Asri, Mufti of Perlis, 21 April 2013.

Interview with Harussani Zakaria, the Mufti of Perak, 7 May 2013.

Interview with Sahibus Samahah Datuk Hj Mohd Tahrir, 23 October 2016.

Chapter 4

THE RIYAL AND RINGGIT OF PETRO-ISLAM: INVESTING SALAFISM IN EDUCATION

Mohd Faizal Musa

> Quietist Salafis, advocating loyalty to Muslim rulers and critical of both jihadis and the Muslim Brothers, have been depicted as Saudi exports in a number of contexts. They have maintained strong connections with Saudi state religious institutions and received significant funding through the patronage networks of prominent Saudi clerics, i.e. 'Abd al-'Aziz bin Baz, Muhammad al-'Uthaymin and Salih al-Fawzan. The Islamic University of Medina has long been considered as the most prominent teaching institute of this branch of Salafism. Rabi' al-Madkhali, who was affiliated to the Islamic University until the mid-2000s, has emerged as the most influential and yet uncompromising figure of quietist Salafism. While not being at the core of the Saudi state's religious apparatus, he has managed to gain followers around the world, including Europe. The Internet has rapidly become a prominent tool for broadcasting this religious doctrine beyond the borders of Saudi Arabia (Bonnefoy 2013, p. 2).

In 1961, many students from Malaya (before it was named Malaysia) enrolled into the newly established Islamic University of Madinah (Saudi Arabia) to pursue an Islamic studies degree.

Fifty years later, more than 500 Malaysians have graduated from this university (Mohammed 2014). Scholars have argued that the Islamic University of Madinah is the primary exporter of Wahhabi ideology, and has produced Salafi-inclined theologians, who later promoted the ideology throughout the world. This chapter examines the extent of Saudi involvement in Malaysia's religous education. It argues that the Saudis have pumped in huge amounts of resources, and this comes at a cost to the country's religious discourse: the promotion of Wahhabi-Salafi ideas, which are puritan, and not in-sync with how Islam is understood in Malay society for centuries. To examine this Wahhabi Islam influence on Malaysian religious discourse I will apply the forensic theology approach. This approach will be elaborated later.

Among the famous graduates from the Islamic University of Madinah are Azwira Abd Aziz, currently Head of the Al-Quran and Sunnah Department in the National University of Malaysia, and Fathul Bari Mat Jahya, an executive committee member in UMNO's youth wing (*Malaysiakini* 2009; Al-Ghari 2011*b*, pp. 139–40; Bernama 2013*a*).[1] Other than the Islamic University of Madinah, there are also Malaysian students studying in Umm al-Qura University in Mecca, King Saud University, and Al-Imam Muhammad ibn Saud Islamic University in Riyadh.

Malaysia's current administration upholds considerable amount of respect for Saudi graduates. Prime Minister Najib Razak praised Malaysian students in Saudi by stating that "When you return to Malaysia, you will be able to widen and strengthen Islam, including the Islamic institutions. This is the government's and my fervent wish." Saudi Arabian Malaysian Students' Association President, Ameer Ikhwan Zaini,

proclaimed the organization's alignment with the government: "It is counterproductive for students to hate the government" (Bernama 2013*b*).

Historically, the Saudis were also involved in the setting up of the International Islamic University of Malaysia or IIUM. The university was established in 1983 with the support of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In fact, the site for the campus was also subjected to Saudi Arabia's approval. The Malaysian Parliamentary Hansard revealed that Saudi Arabia's opinion was necessary to determine the location of IIUM, which was originally situated in Bukit Fraser, Pahang (Husain 1983, pp. 1823–24). Saudi Arabia consistently donates money to IIUM, and the largest donation was in 2000, amounting to RM2 million, given by Sultan Ibn Abdul Aziz, the Saudi Minister of Defence then. He was also conferred an honorary doctorate in Political Science. From 1988 to 1999, Abdel Hameed Abu Sulayman, a Saudi citizen, became the Rector of IIUM, and since its establishment, the Saudi ambassador in Malaysia has become a permanent member of the university's governing board (Yaakop and Idris, undated).

Other than the IIUM, PERKIM (Muslim Welfare Organization of Malaysia), a missionary organization for new converts, also benefited from Saudi funding:

> Two Malaysian institutions have received special attention from the Saudis, PERKIM, one of the country's major missionary organizations, and the International Islamic University [Malaysia] (IIUM). In the mid-seventies, the Saudis donated RM232,209 to PERKIM. In 1981 it was announced that US781,907 had been given, including RM593,109 to the Regional Islamic Dakwah Council for Southeast Asia and the Pacific or RISEAP (RM297,619 from Rabtat al alam al Islami and RM295,490

> from the Saudi government), RM178,809 for PERKIM's refugee division, and RM10,000 from two Saudi philanthropists (Von der Mehden 1993, p. 18).

Saudi oil money is also allocated for National University of Malaysia (UKM), with a RM180 million loan in 1974, RM183 million from Saudi Fund for Development for development projects in 1976, RM400 million for Malaysia's fourth five-year plan in 1982, and RM132 million for Penang port and the East-West Highway in 1986 (Von der Mehden 1993, pp. 32–33). Other generous contributions from Saudi Arabia were delivered to religious and public institutions—the Islamic College of Klang received RM52,316.89 in 1976; the Department of Welfare Society in Kelantan received RM18,000.00 in 1977; the University of Science in Malaysia received an amount of RM921,719.78 in 1979; the National University of Malaysia received RM643,000 in the same year; the Trengganu Islamic Foundation received RM660,000 in 1980; and the State of Kelantan received RM5 million in 1980 (Yaakop and Idris, updated, p. 18). In 2013, Saudi Arabia was Malaysia's 19th largest commercial trade partner and the 16th largest importer. Malaysian exports to Saudi Arabia was US$1.086 billion (4.07 billion Saudi Riyal) in the same year (Bernama 2014*b*).

THE FLOURISH OF PETRO-ISLAM AND MEDIU

The growing influence of Wahhabism in Malaysia is very much related to Saudi Arabia's Pan-Islamism. In 2007, academic Fouad Ajami coined the term "Petro-Islam" to refer to the expansion of the Wahhabi brand of Islam with funding from Saudi oil money (Ajami 2007). Petro-Islam has dramatically changed the face of Islam all over the world, including in Southeast Asia and Malaysia in particular.

How does financial aid and oil money from Saudi Arabia help Petro-Islam to flourish? Asmady Idris, from the University Malaysia of Sabah (UNIMAS), shows how financial aid or oil money from Saudi Arabia has successfuly led Malaysia to ignore the rise of Wahhabism exported by the Kingdom through the education, business and welfare sectors (Yaakop and Idris, undated, p. 9). For example, in the 40th Special Conference of the Fatwa Committee of the National Council for Islamic Religious Affairs Malaysia convened in 1996 to discuss the status of Shia in Malaysia, the committee agreed that Wahhabi Islam was not deviant in contrast to Shia Islam. Thus, unlike Shi'ism, Wahhabi Islam has never been banned or outlawed in Malaysia (Mas'od 2013). Because of this, Wahhabi Islam has been given a lot of spaces and chances to grow, unlike other versions of Islam.

The formation of Al-Madinah International University or MEDIU in the state of Selangor serves as another evidence of the flourishing of Petro-Islam. JAKIM has acknowledged MEDIU as an Islamic university (MEDIU 2009*a*), and it is also accredited by the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) of Jeddah as one of its member universities. In 2011, MEDIU announced it was granting scholarships worth RM32 million (Idris 2011). Since 2007, MEDIU, based in Shah Alam, has been actively recruiting preachers and activists, with strong and close ties to Saudi Arabia.

Officials and academics from Saudi Arabia constantly pay MEDIU a visit when they come to Malaysia, reflecting close ties between institutions of higher learning in Saudi Arabia with MEDIU, even though the latter is not a branch of the Islamic University of Madinah. For example, on 16 March 2015, a delegation of scholarship students from the Islamic University of Madinah visited MEDIU. The Dean of Student Affairs,

Dr Hussein Sharif Al Abdali, and the agent Dean of Student Affairs, Dr Fahad Al-Ahmad, led the "goodwill visit aimed to view on the University's progress and its achievements, being one of the leading online educational institutions in Malaysia" (MEDIU 2015*a*). In March 2015, MEDIU also hosted visits by Professor Dr Lutfillah Maula Khawjah, Lecturer of Aqidah from Umm al-Qura University, Mecca. Professor Dr Lutfillah was accompanied by some students on Saudi scholarship currently studying in various universities in Malaysia. MEDIU's CEO, Professor Dr Mohammad Khalifa Al-Tamimi, announced a "framework of cooperation between MEDIU and Umm al-Qura University" (MEDIU 2015*b*). MEDIU also hosted a delegation from Al-Imam Muhammad ibn Saud Islamic University from 16 to 18 February 2015. The delegation was led by Dr Abdullah bin Abdulaziz al-Sabti, Deputy Dean for Distance Education, who was accompanied by Dr Ahmed bin Saleh Al-Sudais, Deputy Dean of Abroad Branches, Dr Ahmed bin Khalid Al Mjna, Deputy Dean of Admission, Registration and Student Affairs, and Dr Abdul Ilah bin Saud, Assistant Director of Examination and Questions Board (MEDIU 2015*c*). Taking into consideration that MEDIU denies any hidden agenda or propagating Wahhabi Islam from within, these frequent visits from top Saudi figures are surely not just mere visits (Abu Bakar 2016).

MEDIU also welcomed visits from Saudi Arabia's religious or moral police. General Yusuf Said Al Asiriy, Deputy Chief of Masjid Nabawi (The Prophet's Mosque) Police, visited MEDIU to "see the latest achievements and to seek potential future collaboration between the two parties in the future" (MEDIU 2015*d*). Among honoured guests of MEDIU was Sheikh Suleiman Alsalumi, Director of the Islamic Da'wah & Guidance Center in Mecca, who visited on 31 December 2014. The Islamic Da'wah & Guidance Center, Mecca, is:

> ...a charitable organization dedicated to raising awareness among Muslims and non-Muslims through its publications on Islam in general and the cultural aspects. The center's main objective is to convey the message to maintain obedience to Allah and His Messenger, as well as to create awareness among non-Muslims, introduce Islam and invite them to dive in and also to maintain fraternal relations among Muslims (MEDIU 2015*e*).

Sheikh Abdul Muhsin Al-Qaasim, imam of the the Prophet's Mosque in Madinah, also visited MEDIU on 18 December 2014 (MEDIU 2014*a*). Following which, a delegation from the Saudi Development Bank visited MEDIU on 19 February 2015. The delegation was led by Sheikh Sulayman, Senior Advisor of the Saudi Development Bank (MEDIU 2015*f*). These frequent visits are indicative that there are, arguably, possible ideological bridges and cooperation between MEDIU and Saudi Arabia.

MEDIU also frequently hosts visits by people from local religious establishments and vice versa. For example, MEDIU made an official visit to the office of the Religious Adviser to Malaysia's Prime Minister, Dr Abdullah Md. Zin, in the Prime Minister's Office, Putrajaya, on 19 November 2014 (MEDIU 2014*b*), and MEDIU received a delegation from the Islamic Outreach Association (Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia or ABIM) and the National Mosque of Kuala Lumpur on 17 December 2009 (MEDIU 2009*b*). Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, the former Prime Minister of Malaysia, visited MEDIU on 16 February 2011 (MEDIU 2011*a*). A few weeks later, on 2 March 2011, Malaysia's longest-serving Prime Minister of Malaysia, Mahathir Mohamad, was in MEDIU (MEDIU 2011*b*). The late Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat, former Chief Minister of Kelantan, accompanied by Dr Halimah Ali, Chairman for Standing Committee for Education, Higher Education and Human Capital Development of the Selangor State Executive Council, were in MEDIU on

29 March 2011 (MEDIU 2011*c*). It is important to note that Abdullah, Mahathir and Nik Abdul Aziz are influential figures in society, and their visits to the university calm any forms of resentment from certain quarters critical of Wahhabism. At the same time, their visits add legitimacy to the university. During his visit to MEDIU, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi counterargued allegations "made by bloggers" that MEDIU was promoting Wahhabism (Bernama 2011). In defense of MEDIU, during his term as Prime Minister, Abdullah praised MEDIU for promoting Wahhabism and for seeing through the graduation of 3,000 students from ninety nations since its operation.

DOES MEDIU REALLY PROMOTE WAHHABISM?

In this chapter, I use the forensic theology approach to examine whether allegations that MEDIU is promoting Wahhabism is true. This approach is prevalent to "identify the behavioral pattern and certain adherents' ways of thinking to the sect thought, and true or wrong ideology of certain religious taught in its appropriateness" (Akhmad 2011). For example, a forensic theologian can identify whether a person is a Wahhabi supporter simply by observing his anti-Sufi antics, just as how a person influenced by Salafism is prone to promote anti-Shia views. Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703–92), the founder of Wahhabism, and his followers, were responsible for aggressive military attacks against Shia adherents. In 1801, Wahhabi extremists raided Karbala and Najaf, the Shia centre of learning.[2] In fact, the hatred towards Shias was a common theme shared by the early Wahhabis of Saudi Arabia, which was later upheld by ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) terrorists.

To unlock the huge ideological setting of MEDIU's formation, an examination of the university's curriculum is crucial. There

is a need to examine the assigned readings for the subject of hadith (collection of Prophet Muhammad's deeds, statements, and concessions) or the science of studying hadith (for example how to authenticate a hadith and how rulings can be deduced from it). There will also be a need to analyse references in *fiqh* (science of source methodology of Islamic jurisprudence) and *tafsir* or exegesis (the science of interpretating Al-Quran). Most importantly, one must look at the references for Islamic creed or theology. This approach is an increasingly popular method in Europe to determine the sources of militancy. Although this is not a definitive approach, in many conditions, it is sufficient for providing some insights:

> The analyst is engaged in a new and increasingly important aspect of the fight against terrorism—one that might be called forensic theology. Authenticating terrorist documents is just one of its uses. It can also help identify perpetrators, and targets for surveillance, sometimes far more effectively than conventional intelligence practices. Its greatest potential, however, may be strategic: with theologians at the center of the battle, forensic theology may help us pinpoint the groups that present the greatest threat (Grey 2004, pp. 44–47).

Forensic theology has been applied in the study of religious education. For instance, Inayah Rohmaniyah applies forensic theology to examine Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), an organization founded in 2002 (Rohmaniyah 2014). In 2004, the Ministry of Religious Affairs introduced a legislation to promote gender equality. However, the draft caused a huge stir when radical organizations, including the one led by Abu Bakar Basyir, strongly rejected it. MMI also opposed the move. It is noteworthy that Basyir was once strongly associated with MMI as the leader of the Ahlul Halli Wal 'Aqdi's divison (the righteous

decision makers). Basyir from Solo, Indonesia, was the founder of the infamous terror organization, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). Mohd Mizan (2009), in his doctorate thesis "The Thirteen Radical Groups" noted how Wahhabi Islam influenced the mind of Abu Bakar Basyir and his followers.

Furthermore, Rohmaniyah stated how the MMI women's wing suggested that women were "the queens who manage the household", and therefore should participate in society building from closed doors. Careers and degrees should not be pursued over responsibilities as mothers and wives, and modernity and socializing between genders would certainly cause instability in society. A close inspection shows that MMI relies heavily on and refers to the works of Solih bin Fauzan al-Fauzan, a well-known Wahhabi cleric. In one of his translated books, al-Fauzan argues that "only sick Westernized Muslims" let their women leave homes to be "partners in business" with men (al-Fauzan 2005, p. 23). Interestingly, al-Fauzan's works on Islamic Creed and Dakwah (Foundation and Methodology of Dakwah) are used as textbooks in MEDIU.[3] Islamic Creed and Usul Dakwah are instruments for inviting people, both Muslims and non-Muslims, to the religion. Al-Fauzan's ideas and arguments are problematic, and for MEDIU to use his works as sources for these subjects related to the worship of Allah and to educate the people about the Prophet Muhammad is surprising.

For the study of Islamic Credo, MEDIU recommended works by Muhammad bin Solih al-Uthaimin as textbooks.[4] Al-Uthaimin is a Salafi author whose works have been banned by the Interior Ministry of Tajikistan since 2015, following the decision of the Supreme Court of Tajikistan on 8 December 2014 to formally label the banned Salafi group as an extremist organization. The court also banned the Salafi website and printed materials. The website of the interior ministry states

that Wahhabist literature propagates "ideas of the outlawed Salafi group" and poses a "potential threat to national security" (Asia-Plus 2015). Islamic Credo offered by MEDIU emphasizes on the practices of the Salafi branch of the Sunni sect and is, in fact, incongruent with the Sunni 'Asya'irah and Maturidiyyah theologies widely practised in Malaysia.[5] Islamic Credo taught in MEDIU's masters programme emphasizes the theological categorizations proposed by Sheikh Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the founder of Wahhabism.[6]

TERRORISM, WAHHABI LITERATURE AND SCHOLARS

In November and December 1979, the Grand Mosque in Mecca came under seige by extremist insurgents, led by Juhayman al-Otaybi, calling for the overthrow of the House of Saud. The seige would not have happened without the help of students studying theology from the Islamic University of Madinah (Lacey 2009, p. 9). Al-Otaybi was a member of the radicalized group, *al-Jama'ah al-Salafiyyah al-Muhtasibah*, claiming that mainstream Islam including Saudi Wahhabism had been corrupted, contaminated and misinterpreted. Al-Otaybi was inspired by, among others, a preacher in the Prophet's mosque named Abu Bakr al-Jazairi (Gray 2014, p. 123), and had extensive contact with him. Although the revolt and any other further ideas of revolt against the House of Saud were abandoned, this revolt laid the groundwork for a new wave of extremism that made headlines in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Gray 2014). It is noteworthy that a work by al-Jazairi is one of the two references used in the subject of Tafsir or Islamic Exegesis in MEDIU offered under the Bachelor of Islamic Sciences (Honours) in Da'wah and Usuluddin.[7] Al-Jazairi, famous for his

anti-Sufi stand, is also the most referred author for Tafsir, from the foundation to the advanced levels.[8]

Another cleric who inspired *al-Jama'ah al-Salafiyyah al-Muhtasibah* was Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani (d. 1999), an Albanian hadith scholar who received his education in Saudi Arabia before moving to Syria during the 1960s and later to Jordan. Although Albani ardently promoted non-political activism, his works and ideas influenced Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and Umar Abu Qatadah of the jihadi Wahhabi network (Wiktorowicz 2006). Evidently, Albani's ideas had the potential to spawn into more dangerous and extreme ones. In fact, his rejection of political activism could have been a mechanical tool for disaster that imbues his proponents with anti-democracy ideas. Albani also viewed secular political institutions with suspicion. He criticized elections and parliaments, writing that:

> "every Muslim raised with a sound Islamic upbringing knows that elections and parliaments are not Islamic systems. But many who have had an Islamic upbringing mistakenly believe that the parliament is like the Islamic (concept of) consultation, and this is most certainly not the case…and so we can say that the parliament is not founded upon the Quran and the sunna." Elsewhere, he condemns Muslim participation in Arab parliaments because "the ends do not justify the means," since (the idea of) entering parliament to achieve reform is fiction…. since most of those in parliament are not Islamic (in their ways) (Olidort 2015, p. 17).

According to Curtis R. Ryan, Albani was often referred to as the "quietist Salafist", who was among scholars who influenced the *takfiri* (Muslims who excommunicate other Muslims) Jordanian Salafi Movement that declared the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan

as unbelievers (Ryan 2010, p. 299). Albani's works are among the references for subjects offered by MEDIU, especially those related to hadith.[9] Strangely enough, prime references from the Sunni school of thought are not sufficiently highlighted in the reference lists. For example, Sahih Bukhari of Muhammad al-Bukhari, Sahih Muslim of Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj, Sunan al-Sughra of Al-Nasa'i, Sunan Abu Dawud of Abu Dawood, Sunan al-Tirmidhi of Al-Tirmidhi, Sunan Ibn Majah of Ibn Majah, or Sunan al-Darimi of al-Darimi, Al-Muwatta of Malik ibn Anas, and Musnad Ahmad ibn Hanbal of Ahmad ibn Hanbal are notably missing.

Albani was also intellectually unethical. In the year 1407 Hijri, when asked for a *fatwa* on Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, he denounced Khomeini whilst citing the famous lies about Shi'ism that persist today—that Khomeini claimed two companions of the Prophet Muhammad as unbelievers or apostates.[10] However, in actual fact, Albani's *fatwa* on Khomeini is based on *tahrif* or a distorted and altered translation of Khomeni's *Kasyful Asrar* done by a Wahhabi cleric, Muhammad al Bandar, and a foreword by Muhammad Ahmad al Khatib, a Saudi graduate. A Jordanian lawyer, Ahmad Husin Yaacob, later discovered this and published his findings.[11] Obviously, Albani, quietist or not, is another ordinary Wahhabist, and his works have the potential to instigate conflict and are sufficient to motivate terrorism, in this case, against the Shias.

It is important to understand that the ideologies of militant groups, such as ISIS, share many views of Saudi Arabia's Wahhabism. Even Sheikh Adel al-Kalbani, a leading Saudi cleric and former imam of the Grand Mosque in Mecca, pointed out that there is communion between them: "We follow the same thought [as IS] but apply it in a refined way. They draw their

ideas from what is written in our own books, from our own principles. We do not criticise the thought on which it (IS) is based" (*Middle East Eye* 2016; *Integrity UK* 2016; *Free Malaysia Today* 2014).

These are the words of the influential cleric during an interview with the Dubai-based channel MBC, and he agreed that the ideological origin of ISIS is indeed from Salafism. In fact, the *New York Times* reported in 2009 that al-Kalbani met Osama bin Laden and other militants in the 1980s: "During the 1980s he met Osama bin Laden and Abdullah Azzam, a leader of the jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan. He initially sympathized with their radical position and anger toward the West" (Worth 2009).

Kalbani is also famous for his extreme stand on Shias. His *takfir* view that excommunicates other Muslims incites sectarianism and is denounced by many:

> No one should forget the spite expressed by the leader of the congregation at the Grand Mosque (Masjid-ul-Haraam) in Mecca, Adel Al Kalbani, which shocked even his interviewer on BBC Arabic Television in May 2009 when he declared that all Shia Muslims were apostate, unbelievers, and as such should be hunted down and killed. Knowing that Al Kalbani was appointed to his position by the King himself, one can only surmise that the cleric was merely expressing the state's sentiment and forthcoming policy against all Shia Muslims, whether within or outside the borders of the Kingdom. Al Kalbani suggested that all Saudi Shia should be forced to leave the Kingdom, "as for repatriating the Shia, we can possibly discuss it" (Shakdam 2014).

Although banned in the United Kingdom for his extreme edict, Sheikh Adel al-Kalbani was honoured during his visit to Malaysia in 2014 (*Crescent-online* 2013). On 6 November 2014, he was

invited to give short sermons at the Federal Territory Mosque in Kuala Lumpur and Abu Bakar as-Siddiq Mosque in Bangsar (Masjid Wilayah Persekutuan 2014; Masjid Saidina Abu Bakar As Siddiq 2014). The next day, he gave the Friday sermon at the Sultan Haji Ahmad Shah Mosque of the International Islamic Universiti Malaysia and visited The New Straits Times Press headquarters for a media interview (Hassan 2014; IIUM SHAS Mosque 2015).

Al-Kalbani's extreme views on Shi'ism run parallel with anti-Shia propagation in MEDIU curriculum under module GUSU5113—The Syiah Batiniyyah and Khawarij Sects. The module is a testament to the bold hatred directed towards other legitimate sects within Islam.[12] Similarly, the extreme Wahhabi organization based in Indonesia, Jemaah Islamiyah, who call themselves "Salafus Soleh" or righteous predecessors of the Prophet Muhammad, are known for regarding other sects within Islam, including the Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah and Shias, as deviant.

Recently, MEDIU came under investigation by the Malaysian authorities when two of its students were arrested in December 2016 for allegedly planning a militant attack on an international school in Kuala Lumpur. While stressing that MEDIU was not a hotbed of terrorism, Nur Jazlan Mohamed, the Malaysian Deputy Home Minister, noted that its students were targets for terrorist recruitment due to the high foreign student population, mostly from Nigeria, Bangladesh and Indonesia (Palansamy 2016).

CONCLUSION

The link between Wahhabism and extremism has led Malaysian traditionalists belonging to the Sunni school of thought to

question why MEDIU, heavily linked with Saudi Arabia, is given so much freedom to operate in Malaysia (Abu Syafiq 2011; Al-Ghari 2011*b*; Khazanah 2011). In fact, the transborder propagation of Wahhabi ideas embedded in online courses offered by MEDIU is highly noticeable. Chris Chaplin from the Department of Sociology, University of Cambridge, in his PhD thesis on the Wahhabi movement in post-Suharto Indonesia, explains how MEDIU plays its own role in fortifying Wahhabism in Indonesia even after relocating to Shah Alam, Malaysia:

> Quantitatively, however, the number of persons able to study in Saudi Arabia remains small and so for those wishing to continue their religious studies but unable to go abroad, the online Al-Madinah International University (MEDIU) provides a "virtual" alternative. Originally founded in Madinah in 2004, the university has been relocated to Shah Alam, Selangor, Malaysia and received official accreditation from the Malaysian government in 2007. At present, MEDIU provides a variety of degrees up to doctoral level in both Arabic and English through online classes and test centers located across the globe. Accreditation by the Malaysian government may create the impression that MEDIU is part of some wider "global" phenomenon, but this is far from the case. Saudi shareholders and academics remain both in financial and managerial control as all seven shareholders and five of the seven board members originate from the kingdom. Nevertheless, for Salafis throughout Yogyakarta, the institution provides an important "virtual" place of study (Chaplin 2014, p. 225).

The case raised by Chaplin above shows how lax the Malaysian government has been in handling Wahhabism. It is important to stress here that my application of forensic theology does not mean that I am implying MEDIU is a terror cell. Forensic

theology merely serves as a means of "ideological surveillance" (Hassan 2012, p. 364), and in the context of this chapter, to map the ideas and to point out Wahhabist influence in Malaysia.

In 2016, in the wake of the arrest of the two MEDIU students for suspected militancy, the director of the Malaysian counter-terrorism unit, Ayob Khan Mydin Pitchay, noted that part of MEDIU's syllabus, especially Islamic Creed in its Islamic Studies course, apparently promoted extremism: "Certain topics were related to militant ideologies. The university has been advised to alter their syllabus and teachings, but we found some of it remained the same—even after assuring us that they would make amendments" (*Today* 2016).

It is rather reassuring that the Malaysian authorities have begun to acknowledge the elephant in the room. Nonetheless, the larger issue remains the cause of extremism and militancy—the ideology itself. Wahhabism is an obvious threat and much prudence is needed in handling this movement.

Notes

1. Mat Zin, who claimed that Azwira Abd Aziz was a closeted Wahhabist, was sued by the latter for RM1 million. However the Malaysian court rejected the suit and ordered Azwira to focus on his lecturing job.
2. The bloodshed has touched many historians and writers from various Islamic backgrounds. For instance see Ehsanul Karim, *Muslims History and Civilization: Modern Day View of its Histories and Mysteries* (Canada: Pragmatic Publishings, 2007), p. 796. Also see H.A. As Segaf, *As Salafiyyah al Wahhabiyyah* (Beirut: Dar al Imam ar Rawwas, 1992), p. 20. For a Shia perspective, see J. Sobhani, *Wahabism*, translated by J. Dorrani (Tehran: Naba' Organization, 1996), p. 16. In fact, Saudi's account also stated the same tragic

incident. See Uthman Ibn Abd Allah Ibn Bishr, *Unwan Al-majd Fi Tarikh Najd* (Riyadh: Maktabah Darat al-Malik Abdul Aziz, 1982), p. 257.

3. MQA-02/A8821. Solih bin Fauzan al-Fauzan, *al-Irshad ila Sahih al-`Itiqad wa al-Radd `ala Ahl al-Shirk wa al-Iljad*, 2011, p. 213. Also in MQA/PA 0766. Solih bin Fauzan al-Fauzan, *al-Irshad ila Sahih al-`Itiqad wa al-Radd `ala Ahl al-Shirk wa al-Ilhad*, 2013, p. 261. MEDIU's syllabus mentioned here is obtained from the Malaysian Qualifications Agency (or MQA). MQA is a statutory body in Malaysia set up under the Malaysian Qualifications Act 2007 to accredit academic programmes of post secondary or higher educational institutions and to facilitate the accreditation and articulation of qualifications. MQA has full rights to question the curriculum of any higher learning institution operating in Malaysia.
4. MQA/PA 0768. Muhammad bin Solih al-Uthaimin, *Sharh Kashf al-Shubhat. Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyyah*, 2013, p. 119.
5. MQA. *Report on Bachelor of Islamic Science in Dakwah and Usuluddin of al Madinah International University*. MQA/A 8821, p. 3. This report notes that MEDIU claims the contents of its Islamic Credo subject to be those of the Ahlus Sunnah creed and this reminds us of how Wahhabists in Perlis refer to themselves as "Ahlus Sunnah Perlis". Referring to Wahhabist as Ahlus Sunnah does not mean they belong to the Sunni school of thought. MQA itself makes this distinction between Ahlus Sunnah and Sunni schools of thought in its criticism of Islamic Credo 5 in MEDIU's online course. According to the report, MEDIU's description of the subject as "detailing methodologies of Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah and the deviant sects" is negative and biased. That there is also a course specifically on Deviant Sects with three hours credit with little details about it also arose the suspicions of MQA. It is not known, however, whether this report is taken seriously by MEDIU.

6. MQA, *Report on Master in Aqidah of al Madinah International University*. MQA/FA 0770, p. 7.
7. MQA/PA 0766. Abu Bakr al-Jazairi, *Aysar al-Tafasir li Kalam al-Aliy al-Kabir*, 2013, p. 140. Also refer to MQA/PA 0768. Abu Bakr al-Jazairi, *Aysar al-Tafasir li Kalam al-Aliy al-Kabir*, 2013, p. 144. See MQA/PA 0768. Abu Bakr al-Jazairi, *Aysar al-Tafasir li Kalam al-Aliy al-Kabir*, 2013, p. 251; MQA/PA 0768. Abu Bakr al-Jazairi, *Aysar al-Tafasir li Kalam al-Aliy al-Kabir*, 2013, p. 279.
8. Al Jazairi wrote *Ila al-Tasawwuf ya `Ibad Allah*. See G.F. Haddad, "Al-Jazairi: The Harmer of the Prophet (SAWS)", in *The Biographies of the Elite Lives of the Scholars, Imams and Hadith Masters*, by Zulfiqar Ayub, undated, available at <http://www.sunnah.org/history/Innovators/al_jazairi.htm> (accessed 17 November 2015).
9. MQA/PA 0768. Muhammad Nasir al-Albani, *Wujub al-Akhaz bi Hadis al-Ahad fi al-Aqidah. Dar al-Salafiyyah*, 2013, p. 65.
10. M.K. Al-Hashimi, *Aqaid al Syiah* (no publisher and place, 1988), p. 292.
11. Ahmad Husin Yaacob, "al-Ifta' al-Diniy al-Siasi Baina al Sazajah wal Irtijal. Akhbar al-Liwa'", *Jordan*, no. 978 (29 January 1992). Further details can be found in the same newspaper no. 981.
12. MQA. *Report on Master in Aqidah of al Madinah International University*. MQA/FA 0770, p. 7.

References

Abu Bakar, Adam. "Universiti al Madinah Nafi Ajar Fahaman Radikal", 21 December 2016. Available at <http://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/bahasa/2016/12/21/universiti-al-madinah-nafi-ajar-fahaman-radikal/> (accessed 5 October 2017).

Abu Syafiq. "Bahaya MEDIU Kepada Umat Islam Di Malaysia", 27 October 2011. Available at <http://abu-syafiq.blogspot.my/2011/10/bahaya-mediu-kepada-umat-islam-di.html> (accessed 27 January 2016).

Ajami, Fouad. "With Us or Against Us". *The New York Times*, 7 January 2007. Available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/07/books/review/ajami.html?_r=0> (accessed 29 January 2015).

Akhmad, Syaefudin Ali. "Forensic Theology: A Breakthrough in Resolving Religious Conflicts in Indonesia (An Initial Concept)", 2011. Available at <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/236952634_Forensic_Theology_A_Breakthrough_in_Resolving_Religious_Conflicts_in_Indonesia_An_Initial_Concept> (accessed 14 December 2016).

al-Fauzan, S. Fauzan. *Fiqh mukminat: Upaya shari'ah menjaga keamanan, martabat, dan kemuliaan wanita*. Jogjakarta: Wihdah Press, 2005.

Al-Ghari, Zamihan Mat Zin. "MEDIU. Rekrut Pelampau Wahabi? AWAS!", 7 February 2011*a*. Available at <http://al-ghari.blogspot.my/2011/02/mediurekrut-pelampau-wahabi-awas.html> (accessed 27 January 2016).

———. *Siapa Sebenarnya Wahhabiy?* Puchong: Kemah Enterprise, 2011*b*.

Al-Hashimi, M.K. *Aqaid al Syiah*. No publisher and place, 1988.

Asia-Plus. "The List of Salafi Literature Banned in Tajikistan", 1 July 2015. Available at <http://news.tj/en/news/list-salafi-literature-banned-tajikistan> (accessed 17 January 2015).

Bernama. "Dakwaan Mediu Rekrut Pelampau Wahabi Andaian Tidak Baik". *Utusan Malaysia*, 16 February 2011. Available at <http://ww1.utusan.com.my/utusan/info.asp?y=2011&dt=0216&pub=Utusan_Malaysia&sec=Terkini&pg=bt_24.htm> (accessed 17 January 2015).

———. "Mahkamah Tolak Saman RM1J Pensyarah Isu Wahhabi". *Sinar Harian*, 11 October 2013*a*. Available at <http://www.sinarharian.com.my/tanya-dr-nizar/mahkamah-tolak-saman-rm1j-pensyarah-isu-wahhabi-1.211003> (accessed 12 October 2013).

———. "Najib Received as Guest of Saudi Arabian Govt". *Borneo Post*, 23 December 2013*b*. Available at <http://www.theborneopost.com/2013/12/23/najib-received-as-guest-of-saudi-arabian-govt/#ixzz3VAn1VPZE> (accessed 26 November 2013).

———. "Fitnah: Mahkamah Rayuan Tolak Rayuan Pensyarah UKM". *Kosmo Online*, 21 October 2014*a*. Available at <http://www.kosmo.com.my/kosmo/content.asp?y=2014&dt=1021&pub=Kosmo&sec=Terkini&pg=bt_26.htm> (accessed 19 December 2014).

———. "M'sia–Saudi Arabia Bilateral Trade on the Rise". *The Malaysian Times*, 29 August 2014*b*. Available at <http://www.themalaysiantimes.com.my/msia-saudi-arabia-bilateral-trade-on-the-rise/> (accessed 29 August 2014).

Bonnefoy, Laurent. "Saudi Arabia and the Expansion of Salafism". *Policy Brief*. Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, September 2013.

Chaplin, Chris. "Imagining the Land of the Two Holy Mosques: The Social and Doctrinal Importance of Saudi Arabia in Indonesian Salafi Discourse". *ASEAS – Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies* 7, no. 2 (2014): 217–36.

Crescent-online. "Saudi Hate Preacher Denied Entry into Britain", 22 December 2013. Available at <http://www.crescent-online.net/2013/12/saudi-hate-preacher-denied-entry-into-britain-wwwcrescent-onlinenet-4191-articles.html> (accessed 27 January 2016).

Free Malaysia Today. "Saudis Say Clergy Responsible for Spread of IS", 7 October 2014. Available at <http://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2014/10/07/saudis-say-clergy-responsible-for-spread-of-is/> (accessed 29 January 2016).

Gray, Matthew. *Global Security Watch—Saudi Arabia*. California: Praeger, 2014.

Grey, Stephen. "Follow the Mullahs". *Atlantic Monthly* (November 2004). Available at <http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/prem/200411/grey> (accessed 8 April 2015).

Haddad, G.F. "Al-Jazairi: The Harmer of the Prophet (SAWS)". In *The Biographies of the Elite Lives of the Scholars, Imams and Hadith Masters*, by Zulfiqar Ayub. Undated. Available at <http://www.sunnah.org/history/Innovators/al_jazairi.htm> (accessed 17 November 2015).

Hassan, Muhammad Haniff bin. "Key Considerations in Counter-ideological Work Against Terrorist Ideology". In *Terrorism Studies: A Reader*, edited by John Horgan and Kurt Braddock. New York: Routledge, 2012.

Hassan, Muhammad Saufi. "Rai Khilaf Kupas Isu". *Harian Metro*, 7 November 2014. Available at <http://www.hmetro.com.my/node/7170> (accessed 27 January 2016).

Husain, A.R. *Parliamentary Debates* 1, no. 16 (6 January 1983).

Idris, Abdul Razak. "Mediu Tawar Biasiswa RM32 Juta". *Utusan Malaysia*, 2 February 2011. Available at <http://ww1.utusan.com.my/utusan/info.asp?y=2011&dt=0202&pub=Utusan_Malaysia&sec=Bicara_Agama&pg=ba_02.htm> (accessed 30 August 2014).

IIUM SHAS Mosque. "IIUM Friday Khutbah 07-11-2014 Sheikh Adil Bin Salim Bin Said Al-Kalbani", 23 April 2015. Available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=REWmvpTwMec> (accessed 27 January 2016).

Integrity UK. "Former Imam of the Grand Mosque in Mecca, Adel Kalbani: Daesh ISIS Have The Same Beliefs As We Do", 27 January 2016. Available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GWORE6OBfhc> (accessed 29 January 2016).

Karim, Ehsanul. *Muslims History and Civilization: Modern Day View of its Histories and Mysteries*. Canada: Pragmatic Publishings, 2007.

Khazanah Salafiyyah. "Awas Kumpulan Sesat Wahhabi Mengambil Kesempatan Untuk Menyesatkan Pelajar Malaysia Dari Al Azhar", 2011. Available at <http://khazanah-salafiyyah.blogspot.my/2011/02/awas-kumpulan-sesat-wahhabi-mengambil.html> (accessed 29 January 2016).

Lacey, Robert. *Inside the Kingdom: Kings, Clerics, Modernists, Terrorists, and the Struggle for Saudi Arabia*. London: Penguin, 2009.

Malaysiakini. "Jais Tolak 7 Penceramah Wahabi", 13 November 2009. Available at <http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/117350> (accessed 13 November 2009).

Masjid Saidina Abu Bakar As Siddiq. "Lawatan Imam Masjidil Haram Sheikh Adel Al Kalbani", 6 November 2014. Available at <http://masjidbangsar.blogspot.my/2014/11/lawatan-imam-masjidil-haram-sheikh-adel.html> (accessed 27 January 2016).

Masjid Wilayah Persekutuan. "Lawatan Mantan Imam Masjidil Haram, Mekah, Sheikh Adel Al Kalbani", 6 November 2014. Available at <http://masjidwilayah.gov.my/v1/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=707:lawatan-mantan-imam-masjidil-haram-mekah-sheikh-adel-al-kalbani&catid=53:lawatan&Itemid=112> (accessed 27 January 2016).

Mas'od, M.A. "Sesatkah Wahabi?" *Al Ustaz* 19 (2013): 30–31.

MEDIU. "MEDIU: Islamic University Listed by JAKIM", 24 November 2009*a*. Available at <http://www.mediu.edu.my/news-articles/jakim_list.html> (accessed 29 August 2014).

———. "Delegation Visit from ABIM", 17 December 2009*b*. Available at <http://www.mediu.edu.my/news-events/visit-abim09.html> (accessed 10 March 2015).

———. "Visit By Tun Abdullah Ahmad Badawi", 16 February 2011*a*. Available at <http://www.mediu.edu.my/news-events/visit-tunabdullah-ahmadbadawi.html> (accessed 10 March 2015).

———. "Courtesy Visit of Tun Dr Mahathir", 2 March 2011*b*. Available at <http://www.mediu.edu.my/news-events/courtesy-visit-of-tun.html> (accessed 10 March 2015).

———. "The Honorable Chief Minister of Kelantan Courtesy Visit to MEDIU", 4 April 2011*c*. Available at <http://www.mediu.edu.my/news-events/the-honorable-chief-minister-of-kelantan-courtesy-visit-to-mediu.html> (accessed 11 March 2015).

———. "Visit By Imam Masjid Nabawi Sheikh Dr Abdul Muhsin Al Qaasim", 18 December 2014*a*. Available at <http://www.mediu.edu.my/news-events/visit-imam-masjid-nabawi-sheikh-dr-abdul-muhsin-al-qaasim.html> (accessed 10 January 2015).

———. "Courtesy Visit to the Office of the Religious Adviser of Prime Minister", 19 November 2014*b*. Available at <http://www.mediu.edu.my/news-events/courtesy-visit-to-the-office-of-the-religious-adviser-of-prime-minister.html> (accessed 10 March 2015).

———. "Student Delegation", 18 March 2015*a*. Available at <http://www.mediu.edu.my/news-events/student-delegation-islamic-university-madinah.html> (accessed 18 March 2015).

———. "Visit By Lutfillah Maula Khawjah", 12 March 2015*b*. Available at <http://www.mediu.edu.my/news-events/visit-by-prof-dr-lutfillah-maula-khawjah.html> (accessed 12 March 2015).

———. "Working Visit Al Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud Islamic University", 23 February 2015*c*. Available at <http://www.mediu.edu.my/news-events/working-visit-al-imam-muhammad-ibn-saud-islamic-university.html> (accessed 1 November 2015).

———. "Visit By Al Ruwadh Education Development Company", 11 March 2015*d*. Available at <http://www.mediu.edu.my/news-events/visit-al-ruwadh-education-development-company.html> (accessed 19 March 2015).

———. "Visit By Islamic D'awah Guidance Center Mecca", 2 January 2015*e*. Available at <http://www.mediu.edu.my/news-events/visit-islamic-dawah-guidance-center-mecca.html> (accessed 10 January 2015).

———. "Visit By Saudi Development Bank", 24 February 2015*f*. Available at <http://www.mediu.edu.my/news-events/visit-by-saudi-development-bank.html> (accessed 8 March 2015).

Middle East Eye. "Leading Saudi Cleric Says IS and Saudi Arabia 'Follow the Same Thought'", 28 January 2016. Available at <http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/top-saudi-cleric-says-and-saudi-arabia-follow-same-thought-626782255#sthash.INDKMMof.dpuf> (accessed 29 January 2016).

Mohammed, Irfan. "Malaysia Honors Students Who Graduated From IUM". *Arab News*, 2 June 2014. Available at <http://www.arabnews.com/news/580746> (accessed 2 July 2014).

Mohd Mizan Aslam. "The Thirteen Radical Groups Preliminary Research in Understanding the Evolution of Militancy in Malaysia". *Jati* 14 (2009): 145–61.

Olidort, Jacob. "The Politics of 'Quietist' Salafism". Analysis Paper No. 18, Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, 2015. Available at <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/02/salafism-quietist-politics-olidort/olidort-final-web-version.pdf> (accessed 17 September 2015).

Palansamy, Yiswaree. "Nur Jazlan: Al-Madinah Students Target of IS Recruiters but Varsity Not Terror Hub". *Malay Mail Online*, 22 December 2016. Available at <http://www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/under-scrutiny-al-madinah-varsity-not-terror-hub-deputy-minister-says#sthash.TYoTm0oH.dpuf> (accessed 28 December 2016).

Rohmaniyah, Inayah. "Women's Negotiation of Status and Space in a Muslim Fundamentalist Movement". In *Gender and Power in Indonesian Islam Leaders, Feminists, Sufis and Pesantren Selves*, edited by Bianca J. Smith and Mark Woodward. New York: Routledge, 2014, pp. 135–54.

Ryan, Curtis R. "Jordan". In *Guide to Islamist Movements*, vol. 2, edited by Barry M. Rubin. New York. M.E. Sharpe, 2010.

Segaf, H.A. As. *As Salafiyyah al Wahhabiyyah*. Beirut: Dar al Imam ar Rawwas, 1992.

Shakdam, Catherine. "Saudi Arabia's Escalating Campaign Against Shia Muslims". *International Policy Digest*, 26 May 2014. Available at <http://intpolicydigest.org/2014/05/26/saudi-arabias-escalating-campaign-shia-muslims/> (accessed 27 January 2016).

Sobhani, J. *Wahabism*, translated by J. Dorrani. Tehran: Naba' Organization, 1996.

Today. "Islamic University Under Probe 'Has History of Promoting Extremism'", 22 December 2016.

Uthman Ibn Abd Allah Ibn Bishr. *Unwan Al-majd Fi Tarikh Najd*. Riyadh: Maktabah Darat al-Malik Abdul Aziz, 1982.

Von der Mehden, Fred R. *Two Worlds of Islam: Interaction between Southeast Asia and the Middle East*. Gainesville, Florida: University Press of Florida, 1993.

Wiktorowicz, Quintan. "Anatomy of the Salafi Movement". *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 29 (2006): 207–39.

Worth, Robert F. "A Black Imam Breaks Ground in Mecca". *New York Times*, 10 April 2009. Available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/11/world/middleeast/11saudi.html?_r=0> (accessed 29 January 2016).

Yaacob, Ahmad Husin. "al-Ifta' al-Diniy al-Siasi Baina al Sazajah wal Irtijal. Akhbar al-Liwa'". *Jordan*, no. 978 (29 January 1992).

Yaakop, Mohd Rizal and Asmady Idris. "Wahabi Doctrine in Malaysia–Saudi Relations", undated. Available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1695742> (accessed 25 December 2011).

SECTION II

Indonesia

Chapter 5

THE MIDDLE EAST INFLUENCE ON THE CONTEMPORARY INDONESIAN "CAMPUS ISLAM"

Yon Machmudi

INTRODUCTION

Before Indonesia's independence in 1945, Muslim elites in the country learned about Islamic reformism through their experience in modern schools, which were heavily influenced by religious renewers in the Middle East. Their enrollment in these schools awakened their political awareness. Similar borrowing of intellectual and political ideas also happened among Muslim student activists in Indonesian campuses today. This phenomenon, which I refer to as "campus Islam" gained traction after the 1998 *reformasi* era. The number of Islamic movements and study groups in university campuses grew, and they thrived not only in Islamic universities, but in secular ones as well. Their growth in many secular campuses can be attributed to the influence of transnational Islamic movements.[1] In fact, these student groups are not merely incorporating ideas from their Middle Eastern counterparts, but are actively involved in the movements' activities (Anwar 2009, p. 350). In Indonesia, Middle East ideologies transmitted through these movements and organizations include Shi'ism (Iran), Ikhwanul

Muslimin (Egypt), Salafi (Saudi), Hizbut Tahrir (Palestine) and Hizmet (Turkey).

I refer to individuals involved in these transnational Islamic groups as "global *santris*" (Machmudi 2008, p. 48). They are defined as devout Muslims who are not only promoting ideas of the Middle East movements and organizations, but are also calibrating and designing their societies to mirror the established movements and organizations there. Conflicts between these new global *santri* movements and Indonesia's mainstream Islamic organizations Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah are bound to happen. To counter these global movements in Indonesia, both NU (traditionalist) and Muhammadiyah (modernist) introduced the terms *Islam Nusantara* and *Islam Berkemajuan* respectively. The purpose of Islam Nusantara is to make the local traditions of the past an essential part of how Islam is understood. On the other hand, Islam Berkemajuan emphasizes on modernity and advancement.

This chapter discusses how several global Islamic movements originating from the Middle East mould contemporary Indonesian Islam, particularly how their Indonesian chapters responded to the political developments in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Syria, and especially the Arab Spring in 2011. Political turmoil in the Middle East have elicited varying responses from these transnational movements in Indonesia which were active in the campuses. Generally, Ikhwanul Muslimin and Hizmet tended to be more accommodative towards local practices, but on the flipside, proponents of Shi'ism, Salafism and Hizbut Tahrir countered the Indonesian brand of Islam. The Shias and Salafis censured many of the religious practices accepted by established Muslim organizations in Indonesia, while Hizbut Tahrir sympathizers rejected Indonesia's national ideology.[2]

SHIA MOVEMENT

Shias have lived peacefully alongside Sunnis for centuries, but a sizeable number of locals became intrigued with Shi'ism after the 1979 Iranian revolution. In 1979, an Iranian Shia cleric, Ayatollah Khomeini, led a revolution to overthrow the Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Young Muslims in Indonesia were inspired by this event because Khomeini, then in his late seventies, could lead a revolution toppling an American and Western-friendly monarch. Muslim students studying in campuses in Jakarta, such as the University of Indonesia, Jakarta Teachers' Training College, Institute of Agriculture Bogor (IPB) and the Institute of Technology Bandung (ITB), were emotionally attracted to the revolution. The students witnessed the crucial moments of the fall of the Shah of Iran. Some went to the Iranian Embassy in Jakarta to get first-hand news on the revolution, which they considered a form of resistance against a secular regime. Some students felt that the Indonesian authorities were piling pressure on them for struggling to glorify Islam, and they made the Iranian revolution a symbol of their struggle. They equated Ayatollah Khomeini's struggle as a struggle for Islam in general, and not only for the Shias (Jones 1980, p. 311).

Since then, pro-Shia Indonesian students became attracted to Iran, and the Iranian embassy in Jakarta maintained constant contact with this group. The Iranian government offered scholarships to Indonesian students, and they were welcomed to study at Iranian universities including the Qum University. Students began to study Shia schools of jurisprudence from Iranian sources, and many students became intrigued by the Shia thought. The first few Indonesians who graduated from Qum included Umar Shahab, Husein Shahab and Ahmad

Baragbah. They then became prominent Shia figures who contributed to the development of Shi'ism in Indonesia (Zulkifli 2013, p. 34).

In 1982, a number of students from secular universities in Jakarta, Bandung and Yogyakarta began studying Shia ideology and philosophy. Opposition from the Suharto government and other mainstream Islamic groups was so strong that the Shia movement in campuses emphasized on promoting the intellectual aspects of Shi'ism rather than Shia jurisprudence *per se*. A significant number of students from ITB and University of Padjajaran Bandung converted to Shi'ism, among them were Ridwan Suhud (a lecturer at ITB), Jalaluddin Rakhmat (a lecturer at Universitas Padjadjaran) and Muhammad al-Baqir Al-Habsy (a student at ITB). Jalaluddin Rakhmat is an important figure in secular campuses in the 1980s who constantly discusses on social justice in Islam. Presumably, through his interactions with the works of Ali Shari'ati's books—a famous Shia intellectual—Jalaluddin became more interested in learning and then developing Shia thought in Indonesia. Shari'ati (1933–77) was a revolutionary Islamic scholar from Iran and was known as one of the 1979 Iranian revolution ideologue. Jalaluddin was inspired by Shari'ati's spirit of Islamic resistance movements including the philosophy of social justice. In the 1980s, Shari'ati's books were popular and widely circulated in secular campuses, sidelining books written by Muslim Brotherhood figures (to be discussed shortly). Jalaluddin translated many of Ali Shari'ati's and Murtadla Mutahhari's (another Shia intellectual) books into the Indonesian language. In fact, he gave a foreword to Shari'ati's book in Indonesia entitled *Intellectual Responsibility in Islam*.[3]

In the 1990s, many students who studied in Iran returned to Indonesia. They included Ustadz Umar of Palembang and Ustadz Hussein Al-Habsyi of East Java. Both began to introduce Shia jurisprudence to Indonesian students, and this, unsurprisingly, caused some uneasiness among Muslim scholars who rejected Shia jurisprudence (*Tempo*, 2 September 2012). The shift of focus from Shia intellectual discourses to matters concerning jurisprudence and doctrines triggered ideological conflicts within the Muslim community in Indonesia who are largely Sunnis.

By and large, Shi'ism did not make much inroads into Indonesia's secular campuses because its followers are more focused on discussing intellectual issues rather than developing cadres. Shi'ism flourished more outside the campuses through *dakwah* activities, religious schools, and religious gatherings. Some Shia sympathizers joined political parties, whereas others focused their activities on *dakwah* and the teaching. The Indonesian government was concerned with certain trends of Shi'ism in Indonesia, particularly those which adopted revolutionary approaches towards politics. Some Shias believed that their main duty is to install the "Imamate" that requires the state to be led by an imam (Al-Balagh Foundation 1992, pp. 138–55). Broadly, Shia groups in Indonesia consist of two groups— Ikatan Jamaah Ahlul Bait Indonesia (IJABI) and Ahlul Bait Indonesia (ABI). The former, which is led by Jalaluddin Rakhmat, adopts a more pluralist and tolerant approach towards diversity, and generally follows the *marja'* (reference) of Ayatollah Sayyed Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah, a Lebanese scholar. The latter, which is led by Habib Hasan Al-Aydrus, is mostly made up of individuals of Arab descent, and they are the descendants of Prophet Muhammad. This group follows the *marja*' of Ayatollah Khomeini.

IKHWANUL MUSLIMIN (MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD)

In Indonesia, the Ikhwanul Muslimin is mostly represented by the Jemaah Tarbiyah group, which later established the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). In 1986, a young activist and Jemaah Tarbiyah founder, Hilmi Aminuddin, returned from his studies in Mecca, and introduced Ikhwanul Muslimin ideas to students. The Jemaah Tarbiyah gained momentum in the 1980s as it shared common interests with the majority of Muslim students in that era. Student activists shunned campus organizations because of the repression of the New Order (Aziz 1995, pp. 3–20). Gradually, the movement began to show greater presence in campuses after it gained control of formal student bodies.

Imaduddin Abdulrahim, a student activist in ITB, was one of the promoters of Ikhwanul Muslimin ideas. In the institute, he established the Lembaga Mujahid Dakwah (LMD) as a vehicle for his *dakwah* activities. As an activist of the Islamic Students' Association (HMI), Imaduddin was known for his critical attitude towards the New Order regime. Facilitated by the activists of the Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council, Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia (DDII), he established numerous Islamic training activities at ITB. His harsh criticism towards Pancasila as Indonesia's national ideology resulted in his arrest and he was accused of subversion (Luthfi 2002, p. 161). Later, through the assistance of M. Natsir, the former Indonesian prime minister, Imaduddin was given the opportunity to study in the United States.

After Imaduddin's arrest, *dakwah* trainings in secular campuses began to decline. In 1986, a Saudi graduate, Hilmi Aminuddin, a pioneer of the Muslim Brotherhood associated with the

Jemaah Tarbiyah movement, came to Indonesia and took over Imaduddin's *dakwah* activities. Another figure of the Tarbiyah movement activities was Abdi Sumaithi, a graduate from the University of Madinah Saudi Arabia. After his return in the 1980s, he translated many books of the Muslim Brotherhood, which was facilitated by the publications unit of DDII. Rakhmad Abdullah was another important figure of the Tarbiyah movement. He was trained in religious knowledge at a traditional *pesantren* in Jakarta, Assyafi'iyah. During his study at Pesantren Assyafi'iyah, he enthusiastically read books written by Muslim Brotherhood writers. He was attracted to Hassan Al-Banna's political Islam propaganda. He recruited many students from the University of Indonesia and many alumni of Mujahid Da'wah. Since the *dakwah* in secular campuses lost Imaduddin, who departed to the United States, Hilmi Aminuddin, Abdi Sumaithi and Rakhmad Abdullah began to continue his teachings in campuses. These three figures were then known as the central figures of PKS.

In contrast to the Shias who received resistence on campuses due to their differences in Islamic jurisprudences, the Tarbiyah movement was attractive to students because the movement's theological and jurisprudential views had a lot in common with the majority of Muslim students. The Tarbiyah movement also did not show any overt political opposition to the regime and focused on building Muslim characters. Gradually, the movement began to gain presence by controlling the formal institutions on campuses, which were abandoned by the students because of the repressive attitudes of the New Order against student activists who had political ties outside the campuses (Machmudi 2008, pp. 107–12).

The Tarbiyah formed a propaganda institution called Lembaga Dakwah Kampus (LDK, Campus Islamic Propaganda

Institute). The 1998 *reformasi* movement was used to consolidate its cadres to strengthen the role of LDK which developed a national network through the Forum Silaturahmi Lembaga Dakwah Kampus (FSLDK, Campus Islamic Propaganda Institute Gathering Forum). Through its first congress in 1998 (held in Malang), FSLDK established the Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia (KAMMI, Indonesian Muslim University Students Union). KAMMI and FSLDK were then involved in the reform movement, and these groups called for Suharto's resignation in 1998 (Machmudi 2008, pp. 107–28). In the same year, the movement established a political party called the Justice Party, which was renamed in 2003 to the Prosperous Justice Party. It is noteworthy that when FSLDK was first established, Hizbut Tahrir also supported the organization, only to withdraw its support when it was declared a political party.

Presently, Tarbiyah activists control student bodies in many renowned campuses, such as the University of Indonesia (UI), Gadjah Mada University (UGM), Institute of Agriculture Bogor (IPB) and Institute of Technology Bandung (ITB). However, during the 2014 general elections, Tarbiyah's influences on campus suffered after some PKS members were allegedly involved in corruption scandals. In order to revive its image, the current leadership of the PKS removed some controversial elites from their positions after the elections.

HIZBUT TAHRIR

The Hizbut Tahrir movement was founded on 14 March 1953 by Shaikh Taqiyuddin an-Nabhani in Palestine.[4] It has spread to more than forty countries in five continents, and this expansion proliferated under the leadership of Shaikh Abdul

Qadim Zallum bin Yusuf bin Abdul Qadim bin Yunus bin Ibrahim, who became leader in 1977. Abdul Qadim began to concentrate on developing the Hizbut Tahrir movement in Southeast Asia and Central Asia (Tholkhah 2002, p. 47).

Hizbut Tahrir was established in Indonesia in 1983 when an Indonesian cleric by the name of Abdullah bin Nuh (known as "Mamak"), invited Shaikh Abdurrahman al-Baghdadi, a Hizbut Tahrir activist who resided in Australia, to Indonesia. Abdullah was an intellect and writer from Cianjur, West Java. During his visit to Australia, he attended a lecture delivered by a Hizbut Tahrir activist about the importance of establishing an Islamic caliphate and struggling against Western hegemony. Subsequently, he invited al-Baghdadi to share his knowledge in Indonesia. The thoughts and ideas of caliphate introduced by al-Baghdadi attracted some students in the 1980s.

Hizbut Tahrir's activists held small *halaqahs* (study circles) to review and understand the ideas of Hizbut Tahrir. Hizbut Tahrir's books, such as *Syahsiyah Islamiyah* (The Islamic Charakter), *Fikrul Islam* (Islamic Thought) and *Nizhamul Islam* (Islamic System) were discussed during these sessions. The IPB became the main base for Hizbut Tahrir activists since it was close to Abdullah's house.

Hizbut Tahrir's activists praised Abdullah bin Nuh for his contribution in introducing Hizbut Tahrir to Indonesia, and through his assistance as a respected Islamic scholar in West Java, the movement spread widely to other campuses outside Bogor, such as Padjadjaran University, Malang Teachers' Training College, Airlangga University and University of Hasanuddin, South Sulawesi (Tholkhah 2002, p. 47). It is interesting to note that Shia groups also claimed Abdullah bin Nuh as one of their activists. According to Zulkifli (2013, p. 350), Abdullah frequently attended Shia rituals held in the Iranian Embassy

in Jakarta. In 1983, he was also invited to the first World Congress of Friday Imams held in Tehran. One of his work, *Risalah Asyura: 10 Muharam* (The Book of the Month of Asyura: 10 of the Muharram), described the story of Husayn bin 'Ali, the third imam and discussed some famous hadith about *ahlul bait* (the family of the Prophet of Muhammad).

In the early phases of its development in Indonesia, Hizbut Tahrir's membership was small because it emphasized on understanding the books written by Hizbut Tahrir's scholars in Arabic language. In its first ten years, only seventeen people were recruited. However, the call for the establishment of caliphate continues to be advocated today, and Hizbut Tahrir claims to have branches in thirty-three provinces, across three hundreds cities in Indonesia, with a strength of about three hundred thousand active members.

Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia has organized its religious activities under the banner of Syabab Hizbut Tahrir. In its call, Hizbut Tahrir clearly emphasizes the importance of re-establishing the Islamic caliphate. One of the steps to achieve this goal is to develop Islamic thoughts called *shira'ul fikri* (the war of thought). In addition, Hizbut Tahrir also uses extra-parliamentary political activities in order to influence government policies such as through mass demonstrations (Kurniawan 2003). The movement's goal is to take over power once the community has understood the basics of Islam very well and acknowledged the caliphate as the best system. Although all activities of Hizbut Tahrir have been peacefully conducted, there is no clear strategy on how they would change the state in peaceful ways. Only one statement provides some indication to its strategy: "in our opinion, the struggle should be in accordance with the system of the Prophet Muhammad, the use of the gun only after the Muslims have had an institution" (*Sabili*, March 2000). Hizbut Tahrir rejects

democracy as the supreme power is in the hands of God and man only applies the rules of God. Therefore, the concept of democracy that puts sovereignty in the hands of the people is deemed contrary to the concept of Islam (Rodhi 2012, p. 301).

SALAFI MOVEMENT

The Salafi movement is usually referred to as the Wahhabi movement (hence the term "Salafi-Wahhabi" is used by some). It was founded by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703–92) in Saudi Arabia. This movement, which adopts a literal reading of the Quran and hadith, is also known as the *muwahhidin*, because its followers main call is the purification of faith from heresy, the strict references to the Quran and Sunnah, and the rejection of innovations (*bid'ah*). Salafi followers are easily recognizable: they grow long beards and wear robes and trousers above their heels. Female followers usually cover their faces with the *cadar* or *niqab* (Prasetyo 2002, pp. 63–64).

The early coming of Salafi groups in Indonesia dates back to the nineteenth century when some returning pilgrims from Mecca arrived at West Sumatra and criticized the local *adat* (cultural) practices and customs. They opposed traditional customs and rituals including opium smoking, drinking alcohol, and chewing of the *sirih* (betel leaves) (Beekman 1988, pp. 154–55). The local chiefs and guardians of local customs did not agree with the *padri's* (term used to describe proponents of Wahhabism) approach. They responded violently, triggering the Padri War of 1821 which lasted until 1837. The Wahhabists were referred to as Padris because they were dressed in white robes, as recommended by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab's teachings. The local chiefs sought help from the Dutch while the Padris rallied support from the orthodox Muslims, who

were under the leadership of Imam Bonjol. Several organizations in Indonesia were influenced by the Wahhabi purification movement, such as Muhammadiyah and Islamic Union (Persatuan Islam). Nevertheless, both Muhammadiyah and Persatuan Islam only adopted the Wahhabi's spirit of purification, and excluded many other forms advocated by the Saudi brand.

The Salafi groups which came asserted their influence in Indonesia in the 1990s following the lead of Salafi scholars from Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. In fact, there were several Middle East scholars whom Indonesian Salafis referred to, such as Shaikh Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani from Jordan (who died in 2001); Shaikh Rabi al-Madkhaly from Medina, Saudi Arabia; and Shaikh Muqbil al-Wadi'iy from Yemen. Shaikh Rabi and Shaikh Muqbil were central figures for Indonesia Salafi movement (Sholahudin 2011, pp. 144–45).

Another significant Salafi propagator was Ja'far Umar Thalib, the founder of Laskar Jihad, which was involved in the Ambon conflict between 1999 and 2000. He started to follow Salafism when he studied at the Institute of Islamic and Arabic Sciences (LIPIA) in Jakarta, and later, he became more involved with the movement during his study stint in Pakistan (1986–87). After completing his studies, he joined the *mujahidin* group in Afghanistan (1987–89), and it was during his participation in this "holy war" that he met the Yemeni Salafi *ulama* Shaikh Muqbil bin Hadi al- Wadi'iy. Ja'far returned to Indonesia in the early 1990s and began preaching Salafi teachings. He argued that Salafism did not only deal with religious issues, but also covered problems facing the Muslim world.

Other figures who brought contemporary Salafism to Indonesia were Yazid Abdul Qadir Jawwaz from Bogor, Abdul Hakim Abdat from Jakarta, Muhammad Omar As-sewed and

Ahmad Fais Asifuddin from Solo, and Abu Nida from Yogyakarta (Sholahudin 2011, pp. 144–45).

As with other Islamic movements, the Salafi group also faced internal divisions. Conflicting views among Salafi scholars in Saudi Arabia in responding to the 1990 Gulf War caused this split. In that episode, the Saudi King invited American troops to join the Gulf War, allowing the United States to build a military base in Saudi Arabia. This move became a point of contention. Saudi Salafi clerics were divided into those who rejected the King's policy on the one hand, and those who agreed with him on the other hand. The split eventually resulted in two streams of Salafism: the cultural Salafi and the political Salafi. The cultural Salafi is later known as the "Salafi *Yamani*" while the political one is called "Salafi *Haraki*". Jafar Umar Thalib was a political Salafi, while Muhammad As-sewed was a cultural Salafi. The latter founded Ahlusunnah Wal Jama'ah Communication Forum (FKAWJ).

The different attitudes of Salafi groups in Indonesia can be generally seen in the problems associated with *hajr mubtadi* (isolation of the heretics). The Yamani group prohibits its members from communicating with Muslims who practise heresy and innovation, while the *Haraki* group allows its members to maintain cordial relations with the *ahlul bid'ah* (people who practise innovations in religion). NU often became the target of the isolation of the former. The cultural Salafis have very clear views regarding *syirik* and *bid'ah*, and they advocate removing inappropriate practices in the form of *tahlil* (prayers for the deceased) and *maulid* (celebration of the Prophet's birthday). The Yamani group tends to be very strict in practising religious doctrines and rituals, but on politics, they are moderate and want to preserve the status quo.

Regarding political issues, the cultural group firmly rejects all things related to politics, and even considers elections *bid'ah*. Elections is regarded as *bid'ah* because it was not practised by the Prophet Muhammad. According to this group, it is better to follow the government of the day rather than the democratic process. Conversely, the Haraki group assumes that politics is a matter of practising *ijtihadiyah*, and Muslims should follow the process because it brings benefits to modern politics. The attitude of the Salafi Haraki group is similar to the Tarbiyah movement but different from Hizbut Tahrir. Although both Salafi Haraki and the Tarbiyah Movement have at times disagreed over religious issues, but on politics, they seemed to agree.

The Salafi Yamani's view of other Islamic groups movements is also very distinct. They are told not to interact with Muslims who practise heresy and polytheism, and imposed very rigid responses to those who commit heresy. However, the Haraki group is usually more flexible in taking this stance. Salafi Yamani has criticized the Ikhwanul Muslimin because of the latter's political activities and associations with some Sufi activites. The Ikhwanul Muslimin are even referred to as the *Ikhwanul Muflisin* (the losers).

Both Salafi Yamani's and Salafi Haraki's reach in secular campuses are shallow. They are not interested in recruiting students, instead, they focus on the support of the masses. Their strategies involved establishing religious educational institutions around campuses.

THE HIZMET MOVEMENT

The influence of Turkish movements in contemporary Indonesia came second to Salafi's. Although the relationship

between the Malay world and Turkey existed since AD 150–160, it began to grow only in the twenty-first century. Turkish movements first began with Hizmet, also known as the Gulen movement, and its emergence in Indonesia came as late as 1994. It set up international schools affiliated with the Pacific Nations Social and Economic Development Association (PASIAD). Some of the Turkish schools established by the Hizmet network in Indonesia include: the Pribadi High School in Depok, West Java; the Semesta Billingual Boarding School in Semarang; Kharisma Bangsa School in Tangerang, Banten; Fatih Bilingual School in Aceh; and Sragen Bilingual Boarding School in Central Java (Cetin 2013, pp. 233–304).

Besides Hizmet, other Turkish groups active in university campuses are facilitated by the Nur Semesta Foundation. The group established the *dershane* (shelter, which is derived from two words: *ders* means "lessons" and *hane* means "a place to stay"). *Dershane* was indeed a shelter designed for Islamic studies university students. In these *dershanes*, students are taught to read the Quran, Islamic jurisprudence, and the *Risalah i Nur,* which are works written by a famous Turkish scholar, Bediuzamman Said Nursi. Said Nursi's books such as *Panduan Pemuda* (The Guidence for the Youth), *Al-Lamaat* (Signs) and *Al-Kalimat* (The Word) become obligatory reading materials. Some *dershanes* were established in Ciputat, near the campus of the State Islamic University (UIN) in Jakarta; in Depok, near the University of Indonesia; and in Makassar, near the Hasanuddin University. In addition, another traditional Turkish movement affiliated with the Sulaimaniyyah group also emerged in Indonesia. Through an organization called United Islamic Cultural Center of Indonesia (UICCI), it has established twenty-one Quran schools throughout Indonesia.

Hizmet pioneered inter-civilization dialogue, and it forms networks of intellects from various religions to conduct activities in the Asia-Pacific forum. Targetting intellectuals, the Hizmet group also set up Gulen Chair in UIN Jakarta. However, the recent conflict between the leader of the Turkish AKP (Justice and Development Party), Racep Tayyib Erdogan, and the leader of Movement Gulen, Fethullah Gulen, also affected many of its Indonesian followers. To curb Hizmet's influence, the Turkish government introduced the Turkiye Burslari Scholarship to rival those offered by Hizmet. The relationship between the Gulen movement and other Turkish movements, in particular with the ruling government of AKP, deteriorated after a failed military coup in July 2016. Hizmet was accused of mastermining the coup. Some of the Gulen-associated foundations, including schools and universities were shut down, and its organization was referred to as the Fetullah Terrorist Organization (FETO). Indonesian Muslims were divided on the coup in Turkey, and many still believed that Hizmet is innocent. In order to prevent Hizmet's influence in Indonesia, the Turkish government asked the Indonesian government to close all schools affiliated with the Gulen movement. However, the Indonesian government rejected the Turkish government's request, stating that all schools have been registered under the Indonesian law, and are not necessary related to the Gulen (Fahrudin, 29 July 2016).

RESPONSES TO THE 2011 ARAB SPRING

How the university students responded to events in the Middle East reflects their heterogeneity. One example would be the differences in the way they conceive of the 2011 Arab Spring. To be sure, debates on the Arab Spring in Indonesia depended on how the parent movements in the Middle East read the

situation. In Indonesia, campus groups had conflictual views, and these were played out in the social media.

The Shia groups were generally excited about the Arab Spring because the revolution affected their ideological rival Sunni-led regimes. They considered the Arab Spring as the opportunity to replace these regimes in power, which were allies of Saudi Arabia and the United States. In fact, they hoped the Arab Spring would continue in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries. Meanwhile, support by the Iranian government towards the oppositions in Bahrain and Yemen were also appreciated by the Shia groups in Indonesia. And on the Yemeni civil war, they explicitly rejected Saudi Arabia intervention. The Shia groups in Indonesia continue to criticize the role of Saudi and the United States in Egypt. The Shia activists, nevertheless, displayed strong support for Syrian regimes through social media.

The Tarbiyah group largely supported the Arab Spring because changes that occur in the Middle East would bring about political openness for other groups to join the political process, including the Ikhwanul Muslimin. Tarbiyah activists supported the Mohamed Morsi government and strongly condemned the military coup carried out by Abdel Fatah El-Sisi in 2013. When El-Sisi visited Indonesia in September 2015, students affiliated with the Tarbiyah group criticized the visit, describing the Egyptian military ruler as authoritarian. The Tarbiyah group also criticized Saudi Arabia's support for El-Sisi. However, they also supported Saudi Arabia in the fight against the Haothi rebel and simultaneously denounced Bashar Assad, whom they deemed as brutal.

The Salafi groups that normally do not want to be involved in politics began appearing on social media, describing the Arab Spring as undesirable because it brought uncertainty and

disunity to the region. In essence, they wanted to keep the status quo. However, they were critical towards the Shia, insighting the injustice of the Shia regime towards the Sunnis. They also supported the campaign to oust Bashar Assad. Thus, in the case of the Saudi military intervention in Yemen, they defended the Saudis, considering that it had performed a holy mission of fighting the Shias and Iranians.

Hizbut Tahrir generally supported the Arab Spring, but were not as enthusiastic as the other groups. They felt that the rebellion did not alter the United States and Western global hegemony. It wanted the Arab Spring to introduce Islamic state models to Arab countries. However, it was sceptical of the Muslim Brotherhood because it seemed to make many compromises about the democratic model. Hizbut Tahrir was upset when the Muslim Brotherhood campaigned against opposition groups in Syria which wanted to establish an Islamic state to replace the Bashar Assad regime. Despite making Islamic state its primary goal, Hizbut Tahrir did not support Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi who declared himself the caliph of ISIS. Al-Baghdadi's Islamic state model was not the ideal caliphate Hizbut Tahrir was promoting. Hizbut Tahrir also criticized the role of the Turkish government in Syria since Turkey had close political ties with the United States.

Politically, the Hizmet in Indonesia tends to remain neutral and avoid any political issues. It focuses more on the development of civilization, strengthening intellectual activities through education, preaching, and promoting interfaith dialogues. The Turks were keen to position themselves as promoters of moderate Islam and not get enbroiled in Middle East politics. They only respond to issues concerning the Turkish role in the Middle East.

CONCLUSION

The dynamics within Islamic movements in the Middle East affected Indonesian Islam through their chapters. The already diverse religious public sphere in Indonesia has turned more fragmented resulting from the ongoing rivalries among Islamic interest groups in the Middle East. In fact, the current frictions between the Sunnis and Shias have polarized Indonesian Muslims even more, and this division was played out in campuses.

The pivotal point for Indonesian Muslims now is how they can tolerate these differences, ensuring that groups upholding different ideologies can co-exist. Indonesia's experience of bringing diverse groups together is key in creating peace and harmony among Islamic movements. Truly, the presence of Islamic movements has enriched the contemporary Islamic expressions in Indonesia. However, their existence has also created new problems because these Middle East movements have not made enough efforts to adapt to the Indonesian context. They could have streamlined their efforts and worked closely with mainstream Islamic organizations in Indonesia which had for decades acted as the voice of moderation in the country. As it stands, every movement tries to promote their interests and perspectives on the Middle East. The issue of the Arab Spring is one of the many examples on how these different influences from the Middle East movements have deepened hostilities in Indonesian society today.

Notes

1. However, the emergence of campus Islam has existed long before Indonesia achieved independence. During the colonial period, there were already Islamic study circles in Dutch-founded schools and colleges (Noer 1982, p. 133). These groups provided religious training

for Muslim students outside schooling hours. One such circle, the Islamic Study Club, which was later renamed Jong Islamieten Bond (JIB), gave birth to modern Islamic elites. These Islamic study clubs shared many common traits with Islamic movements that grew rapidly in secular campuses during the New Order period (1966–98).

2. It is imperative the understanding of the nature of all movements is clarified in order to avoid misunderstandings, particularly pertaining to responses to the issues of radicalism (Qodir 2014, p. 22).
3. A publisher in Yogyakarta later translated another Shia book entitled *Fatima is Fatima* (Zulkifli 2013, p. 52).
4. His full name is Shaikh Taqiyuddin bin Mustafa bin Ibrahim bin Ismail bin Yusuf an-Nabhani. He came from the tribe of Bani Nabhan, an Arab Bedouin tribe in Palestine from the northern city of Hayfa in Palestine.

References

Al-Balagh Foundation. *Ahlul-Bait*. Tehran: Ahl ul-Bait World Assembly, 1992.

Anwar, Muhammad Syafi'I. "Political Islam in Post-Soeharto Indonesia: The Contest between 'Radical-Conservative Islam' and 'Progressive-Liberal Islam'". In *Southeast Asia and the Middle East: Islam, Movement, and the Longue Duree*, edited by Eric Tagliacozzo. Singapore: NUS Press, 2009.

Aziz, Abdul. "Meraih Kesempatan dalam Situasi Mengambang: Studi Kasus Kelompok Keagamaan Mahasiswa Univesitas Indonesia". *Penamas* 20 (1995).

Beekman, E.M. *Fugitive Dreams: An Antology of Dutch Colonial Literature*. Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1988.

Cetin, Muhammed. *Pencerahan Gulen: Gerakan Sosial Tiada Batas*. Depok: UI Press, 2013.

Fahrudin, R. "Turki Minta Indonesia Tutup 9 Sekolah Terkait Fethullah Gulen, Ini Respons Mendikbud". *Kompas*, 29 July 2016.

Jones, Sidney R. "It Can't Happen Here: A Post-Khomeini Look at Indonesian Islam". *Asian Survey* 20, no. 3 (March 1980): 311–23.

Kurniawan, Hendra. "Realitas Gerakan Hizbut Tahrir di Indonesia: Wacana Hegemonik dan Praksis Ideologi". Master thesis, University of Indonesia, 2003.

Lufhfi, AM. "Gerakan Dakwah di Indonesia". In *Bang Imad Pemikiran dan Gerakan Dakwah*. Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 2002, pp. 158–63.

Machmudi, Yon. *Islamising Indonesia: The Rise of Jemaah Tarbiyah and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)*. Canberra: ANU E-Press, 2008.

Noer, Deliar. *Gerakan Moderen Islam di Indonesia 1900–1942*. Jakarta: LP3S, 1982.

"4 Periode Penyebaran Syiah di Indonesia". *Tempo*, 2 September 2012.

Prasetyo, Eko. *Membela Agama Tuhan*: *Potret Gerakan Islam dalam Pusaran Konflik Global*. Yogyakarta: Insist Press, 2002.

Qodir, Zuly. *Radikalisme Agama di Indonesia*. Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2014.

Rodhi, Muhammad Muhsin. *Tsaqofah dan Metode Hizbut Tahrir dalam Mendirikan Negara Khilafah Islamiyah*. Depok: Rosyidiyatul Ummah, 2012.

Sabili, March 2000.

Setiadi, Ozi. "Dakwah dan Civil Society: Analisis Pergerakan Hizmet dalam Perspektif Teori Organisasi", 2012.

Sholahudin. *NII Sampai JII: Salafy Jihadisme di Indonesia*. Jakarta: Komunitas Bambu, 2011.

"Strategi Khilafah Hizbut Tahrir". *Sabili*, March 2000.

Tempo, 2 September 2012.

Tholkhah, Imam and Choirul Fuad Yusuf, eds. *Gerakan Islam Kontemporer di Era reformasi*. Jakarta: Badan Litbang Agama, 2002.

Zulkifli. *The Struggle of the Shi'is in Indonesia*. Canberra: ANU E-Press, 2013.

Chapter 6

CONTEMPORARY MIDDLE EASTERN ISLAMIC THOUGHT AND ITS TRANSMISSION IN INDONESIA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT

Azhar Ibrahim

INTRODUCTION

Transmission of ideas from the Middle East to Southeast Asia has been ongoing for centuries through various agencies and mediums. Notably, translations of religious texts and devotional works became important facets of Islamization of the Malay world. Today, such transmission continues beyond the conventional theological, legal and mystical aspects of Islam. Translation works add to the already expansive critical Islamic discourse in Indonesia. Variants of Islamic discourse from the Middle East, including contributions by diaspora Middle Eastern writers living in the Euro-American metropolis, have entered the Indonesian scene via translation and adaptation works. They range from writings of prominent and established *ulama* (Islamic religious scholars), to revivalist Islamist, reformist, liberal, and leftist-leaning Muslim writers.

This chapter first highlights the historical transmission of Islam into Southeast Asia. Here, the role of religio-cultural transmitters, such as the *ulama* and missionaries, was vital in translating Arabic works into Indonesian languages and disseminating them. The chapter then examines the significance of these translated Arabic works in Indonesia's Islamic discourse. It then highlights how the dominance of works with fundamentalist bend could give a false impression of their popularity. By contrast, one should also underscore the presence of critical Islamic works—written by leading Muslim liberals and reformists—which have been translated into *Bahasa* Indonesia from its Arabic sources. These critical works are instrumental in facilitating and enhancing the critical Islamic discourse in Indonesia.

TRANSMISSION OF ISLAMIC KNOWLEDGE IN HISTORY

Transmissions of Islamic knowledge in the past were primarily made possible in two forms: direct transmission by the *ulama*; and through translations of Arabic works to local languages of classical Islamic texts or *kitab kuning* (Azyumardi 2004). Islamization was given further boost with the efforts in translating Islamic works originally in Arabic into Malay, Javanese, Sundanese and all other languages in the region (Riddel 2001). Arabic works pertaining to doctrinal creed and law were translated and adapted into the Malay/Javanese language, while the nexus between the local *ulama* with those in the Middle East, along with local authorities, were instrumental in deepening the process of Islamization in the region (Burhanudin 2012). The evolution of *kitab kuning*, which are primarily the religious tracts, were the product of this

translation, adaptation and revision (Hamid 1997). The *kitab kuning* are still in use in Indonesian *pesantrens*, although new tracts are added over time (van Bruinnessen 1999).

Historically, we can document key concepts from the Arabic-Islamic world that entered the Malay-Indonesian vocabulary. At the turn of the twentieth century, Arabic words entered the Malay (later to be Indonesian) vocabulary, such as *masyarakat* (society), *siasah* (politics), *iktisad* (economy), *tawarikh* (history), *ikhtisar* (summary), *tadbir* (administer), *mahkamah* (court), and *madrasah* (religious school).[1] In the later decades, the words include *madani* (civility), *maslahat* (common good), *insaniyah* (humanity), *ad-deen* (religion), *tasawur* (worldview), *manhaj* (methodology), *wasatiyah* (middle ground), *kaffah* (comprehensive), *musawah* (egalitarianism), *muzakarah* (convention), *tadarus* (seminar), and *usrah* (reading circle).[2] Many more have been incorporated into the local language, some gaining more currency than others. Translation brings more than conceptual corpus, but also includes perspectives that resonate into the local context, needs, and conditions, real or imagined. In the past, Arabic works translated into the Malay/Javanese language primarily pertained to Islamic doctrine, jurisprudence and mysticism. Today, translation include other subject matters such as politics, education, gender and economy.

INDONESIA: A CONTESTED DISCURSIVE SITE

Muslim groups in the Middle East and the region have looked to Indonesia to disseminate their ideas because it is the most populous Muslim nation. In the past, there were the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwanul Muslimin) and Ahmadiyah circles who

established their presence in Indonesia. Today, more groups are emerging and consolidating their influence, such as Hizbut Tahrir (Middle East); Jamaat Tabligh (Indo-Pakistan); Shi'ism (Iran); Darul Arqam (Malaysia); Said Nursi and Fethullah Gulen (Turkey); Wahhabism (Saudi Arabia); International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT) (American-based Muslim academic circle), as well as global Sufi brotherhood, such as the New York-based Naqshbandiyah tareqat. There are also those from Hadramaut (South Yemen), which has long established links with the Malay world. Post-Islamic revolution era saw Iranian Shi'ism's increasing presence in the region, and Shia-inspired works in Indonesian is commonly available in mainstream media. Establishing and maintaining their presence would be a strategic move to entrench their ideas in the region. One important dimension of such presence is to make available their literatures on Indonesian discursive and socio-cultural scene. The availability of these literatures is only possible with translated works in *Bahasa* Indonesia, published and distributed throughout the archipelagic nation.

Active translation efforts could be explained by a number of factors. First, the Indonesian intellectual milieu has for decades been shaped by the Islamic discourse originating from the Middle East. Second, the size of the Indonesian Islamic discourse is growing with its increasing readership and book culture. Interest in Islamic matters among the Indonesian public is attributed to the increasing literacy and public education, the growth of the middle class, and the demands for books relating to Islamic discourse in various genres. Third, the demand for Islamic works is spurred by internal dynamics, rather than motivated largely by external incentives and motivations. The Indonesian reading public is primarily

monolingual, thus there is demand for works to be translated into their language. Fourth, the credibility and dynamism of the Islamic works/writers that entice demand from Indonesian audience and book publishers. Fifth, the agency factor of translators and editors, who are mostly interested individuals and/or publishers who see the publication-potential of the works. In the case of Indonesia, names such as A Hasjmy, Hamka (Haji Abdul Malik Karim Amrullah), Ali Audah, Bey Ariffin are at the forefront in introducing Arabic culture and religious thought into the Indonesian language. These personalities resemble cultural brokers who are instrumental in the efforts to transmit and introduce Islamic Arabic thought into the Indonesian religious, intellectual and cultural landscapes (Salim 2012).

Most importantly, these translations are made possible because in Indonesia there is a sizeable *pesantren* and madrasah (Islamic studies school) cohort educated in Arabic/English, whose mastery of the language permits them to translate Arabic/English works into the Indonesian language. The interest in translation is also propelled by publishing houses such as LKiS, Lentera, Mizan, Gema Insani, Pustaka Pelajar, and Penerbit Erlangga, which are interested to advance certain discourse. Translated publications are made possible by their editorial teams who also see the importance of translated works made available to the Indonesian audience. A few decades ago (in the 1950s) publishers such as Bulan Bintang and Al-Maarif were the dominant players. In the post-*reformasi* period, discursive spaces were more available, plugging Indonesians into the larger Islamic discourse; from the hardliner Islamists to the sufi mysticism and critical Islamic discourse.

CONTEMPORARY TRENDS

Islamization is still an entrenching process in the Muslim-majority maritime Southeast Asia. My interest is not primarily to document the volumes and the types of works that have been translated because such a discussion requires a lengthy study. My main concern is to get insights into the impact of these translations towards Indonesian intellectual and religious discourse. Translations that are presently ongoing speak volumes about the openness of the Indonesian Islamic discourse in receiving ideas and works from various ideologies. Translation of works does not only reflect Indonesians' linguistic agility and openness, but also conceptual receptivity, especially when concepts are introduced in local idioms. Translation allows for an extension of concepts and expressions, making languages more versatile, responsive and creative in their usage and terminologies. Carrying on this pace alongside the expansion of readership (which in turn depends on the size of the middle class), will be a promising development for Indonesian Islamic discourse.

Translated works available in the Indonesian market today are not translated randomly, neither are they chosen because of commercial considerations. I argue that the interest lies in a number of factors, such as the intellectual taste of the editorial team of publishing houses and their interest in introducing these works to Indonesian readers. Moreover, it is the reading community that determines the viability and growth of these translated works. In other words, the dominant religious orientation of the community dictates the types of works translated and distributed. For instance, through a general library survey, humanistic classical works in Arabic (*adab* genre) are few in numbers as compared to the theocentric

and legal-centric Islamic works from the medieval period. Thus, the works of al-Mawardi, Ibn Taimiyyah, Ibn Qayyim al-Jauzi, Ibn Hazm, Al-Ghazalli, Ibn Arabi are commonly found, as compared to works by al-Jahiz, al-Biruni, Ibn Miskawahy, al-Farabi, and Ibn Tufayl.[3] As expected, the market for books aligned with orthodox Sunni beliefs mean that publishers put more premium on publishing them as compared to works by Muslim humanists, philosophers and scientists.

The readership profile of these translated works is also an important determinant to what gets published. It is naïve to say that these Islamic Middle Eastern works are only being read by the *ulama* and santris, although works by traditional religious scholars are mostly of their interest. The general Indonesian public, who have no access to Arabic and even English works, form the bulk of the readership, in particular those in institutions of higher learning and in religious seminaries (*pesantren* and madrasah). The readership population is also propelled by the increasing number of Indonesians studying abroad, both in the Middle East and Euro-American universities, including those in Australia.

The translation of a body of works by a particular writer brings about the interest to study his ideas or at least compilation of his intellectual biography. This is the case for Mohammed Arkoun (Putro 1988; Ruslani 2000; Baedhowi 2008), Hassan Hanafi (Nurhakim 2003; Hamzah 2013), and Fazlur Rahman, although the latter may not be grouped under Middle Eastern Islamic thinker (Burhani 2013). Moreover, online postings on these scholars,[4] and partial translations of their works in printed journals, show the extent their ideas are discussed and introduced to the Indonesian public (Arkoun 1990; 1994*a*). Several leading figures of Indonesian Islamic discourse took

the lead in introducing and commenting on these thinkers: Nurcholish Madjid and Amin Abdullah, for instance, wrote a few introductions on Fazlur Rahman and Mohammed Arkoun, respectively.

The policy of sending Indonesian Islamic scholars overseas, alongside a broad-based Islamic studies at the local level, means that there will always be a constant demand for published works in Islamic thought, theology, laws, and philosophy, leading to proactive acquisitions of translated materials. Nevertheless, one cannot discount the fact that there are foreign interests in promoting a certain discourse in Indonesia, as it is already the largest Muslim nation in the world. Hence, it is not surprising that Saudi funding could have well promoted certain translation of Wahhabi-inspired works into the Indonesian language, while the Iranians are doing the same promoting Shia books. Likewise, NGO's funding from Western countries could have sponsored the translation or publication of works by liberal Muslim writers, inasmuch as the Turkish's Fethullah Gulen would promote Said Nursi's ideas in Indonesia.

Generally these translated works can be grouped into seven main categories: (a) literary and devotional works; (b) theology/legal/rituals; (c) revivalist/Islamist discourse; (d) reformist; (e) liberal and critical Islamology; (f) Islamic mysticism; (g) Shia works; and others. Such bibliographic surveys warrant critical assessment of these works where certain affinities to some themes or issues could well suggest a persisting discourse at a particular period of time, or those fermenting ones in the future. It will be interesting to trace how these translated works are complemented by works of Indonesian writers/scholars who study/introduce those

writers whose works have been translated. This, in turn, generates a wider readership. The following discussion is certainly not exhaustive, although I recognize the need to compile a comprehensive bibliographic list which could give us some ideas on the interest and receptivity in the Indonesian Islamic discourse, a project which I hope to accomplish in future.

WORKS WITH FUNDAMENTALIST BEND

By way of comparison, the Indonesian scene has witnessed not only a greater variety of Arabic works being translated, the numbers of reformist/progressive works deciphered are also increasing. However, works of mainstream orthodoxy remain dominant, often in line with the traditionalists and revivalists affiliations.[5] Indeed, the increasing number of translated works from Arabic into Indonesian, especially works with a fundamentalist bend, such as Ikhawul Muslim and Hizbut Tahrir, were motivated by the internal dynamics in Indonesian politics, where Islamist groups have been more vocal. The confrontationist Islamist challenge against the Indonesia secular state has become acute in recent years (Ridwan 2008). Fundamentalist or exclusivist Islamism, straddling between traditionalist conservatism and revivalist Islamism, further poses a serious ideological challenge to Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, the two largest Muslim organizations in the country (Rahmat 2002).

The rise of political Islam can explain the varieties of works with a revivalist posture—subscribing to the ideas of Islamic state and imposition of Shariah law—that have been translated into Indonesian, including those originally written by Indonesians. A larger presence of fundamentalist/Islamist

translated works could mean greater appropriation of perspectives/concepts in the local scene. If remain unchecked, these thoughts will dominate eventually. Fundamentalist works would over time occupy the semantic/discursive fields, of which in the absence of critical perspectives (from the neo-traditionalists and liberals/progressives), would become the mainstay in the religious discourse.[6] Generally, revivalist Muslim activists based on the famous Institut Teknologi Bandung (ITB), demonstrate their affinities to Middle Eastern Islamists/revivalists, and are more inclined to read and disseminate the works of Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists (Al-Turabi 2003), not unlike those *dakwah* revivalist circles in Malaysia.

To be sure, dogmatic thrust contained in these translated works would only generate further dogmatism, rather than inspire or spur creative and critical works in the local scene. Such works therefore could not give rise to another level of higher discourse, except the repetition of tired clichés and rhetoric tirade against the "enemies of Islam". However, one thing for certain is that with the increasing number of religious works from the Middle Eastern Wahhabi scholars translated into Indonesian, it has enticed the critical response not only from the progressive groups, but also amongst the traditionalist Sunni groups, which are now openly dissociating themselves from the fanaticism of the Wahhabi-Salafist (Shihabuddin 2013).

PROGRESSIVE THINKERS

The post-*reformasi* period saw a plethora of Islamic discourse in Indonesia, especially the emergence of critical Islamic scholarship put forward by leading thinkers from the Middle East. Among these scholars whose works have been translated

into Indonesian from its Arabic original are: Hassan Hanafi (2000; 2003; 2004; 2005; 2007*a*; 2007*b*; 2015*a*; 2015*b*), Abed al-Jabiri (2000; 2003*a*; 2003*b*), Nasr Abu Zaid (2002; 2003; 2004; 2012), Adonis (2007), Muhammad Syahrur (2002; 2003), Mohammed Arkoun (1999; 2003), Muhammad Said al-Ashmawi (2004; 2005), Jamal al-Banna (1997; 2004; 2006; 2010), Jaudat Sa'id (2002*a*; 2002*b*), Farag Fouda (2008), Shalahuddin Jursyi (2000), Hasan Sho'ub (1997), Muhammad as-Shadiqi (2003), Muhammad Salman Ghanim (2004), Sayyid Mahmud al-Qimmi (2004), Khalil Abdul Karim (2002), Ali Harb (2004), and few others (Al Raysuni and Jamal Barut 2002; Ramadan Al-Buti and Tizini 2002).

Moreover, critical works by Ali Syariati, Edward Said, Bassam Tibi, Mohammed Arkoun, Abdullahi An-Naim, Asghar Ali Engineer, Farid Escak, Khalid Abou Fadl, Fatima Mernissi, Aminah Wadud, Asma Barlas, Tariq Ramadan, Nader Hashemi, Issa J Boulatta, Abdou Filali-Ansary and a few others, which have been translated into Indonesian from its English and French editions, add to the corpus of critical Islamic writings for the Indonesian audience. In the earlier decades, it was Muhammad Iqbal (Iqbal 1966), Syed Ameer Ali (Ameer Ali 1966), and Syed Hossein Nasr, whose various works were already translated into *Bahasa* Indonesia.

In the early decades of the twentieth century right up to after World War II, Egyptian reformists received considerable attention from Indonesian reformists, such as Sheikh Muhammad Abduh (Abduh 1963; 1968; 1970), Taha Husain (Husain 1985; 1986), Ahmad Amin (Amin 1975) and Abbas Mahmud Aqqad (Aqqad 1989; 2002). Works by scholars of that era are still being translated and published into Indonesian, such as Rasyid Ridha (Rasyid Ridha 2005), Abdul al-Raziq, and Mahmud Shaltut (Shalut 1988; 1994). The works of Muhammad

Abduh still attract attention in the Indonesian readership until today (Abduh 1998; 2005). Rasyid Ridha's ideas have been instrumental reference amongst Muhammadiyah reformist circles (Muhaimin 2000).

In fact, Abduh's reformism held much influence over Indonesian reformists and scholars/writers, such as Hamka, Ali Audah, and Harun Nasution. The latter wrote a tract on Abduh's ideas, titled *Muhammad Abduh dan Teologi Rasional Mu'tazilah* (Nasution 1987). The generation that was exposed to Abduh's reformism was soon replaced by a more sophisticated scholarship led by Nurcholish Madjid and Ahmad Syafii Maarif, who were both students of Fazlur Rahman when they took their doctoral studies at the University of Chicago. By the late 1990s, critical Islamic discourse received impetus as more Middle Eastern scholars and thinkers came on the scene. This coincided with the home-grown Indonesian Islamic discourse that was laid foundation by Harun Nasution, Nurcholish Madjid, Abdurrahman Wahid, Amien Rais, Masdar Masudi, Jalaluddin Rakhmat, Dawam Rahardjo, Djohan Effendi, Mansour Fakih, Moeslim Abdurrahman, Amin Abdullah, Abdul Munir Mulkhan, Kamoruddin Hidayat, Quraish Shihab, Azyumardi Azra, Nasaruddin Umar, Said Aqil Siradj and many more. Amin Abdullah, in particular, has been forthcoming in introducing the thoughts of Hassan Hanafi and Arkoun to the Indonesian audience.

Two prominent Islamic reformist thinkers, although not from the Middle East, namely Pakistan-born Fazlur Rahman (resided in the United States) and Algerian-born Mohammed Arkoun (resided in France) (Arkoun 1994*b*; 1996*a*; 1996*b*; 1997; 1998; 2000), received enormous attention among the younger and progressive Indonesian Islamic discourse. Today, there are various studies on Fazlur Rahman's ideas, followed by

Arkoun in Indonesian scholarship, including academic theses. Although largely synoptic and biographical, it nevertheless suggests the wider reception of these two thinkers in the Indonesian discourse. Apart from Nurcholish Madjid, who was instrumental in propagating the ideas of mentor in Chicago, there are few other specific studies on Fazlur Rahman's ideas by Indonesians, which in turn entrenched the reformistic perspectives into the local corpus. Johan Meuleman (1996) and Amin Abdullah are amongst the pioneering scholars to introduce Arkoun's idea to the Indonesian audience, followed by specific studies by Baedhowi (Baedhowi 2008; 2009), Ruslani (Ruslani 2000), and Suadi Putro (Putro 1998). In recent years, with the euphoria for the establishment of Islamic law, Abdullahi an-Naim's works have attracted much attention.

From the Arab world, four figures are prominent: Hassan Hanafi, Abed al-Jabiri, Nasr Abu Zaid, and Muhammad Syahrur. Almost all their works have been translated into Indonesian, and various books have been written on their ideas by Indonesian scholars, thus bringing attention to the larger reading public. Hassan Hanafi's *Kiri Islam* (*al-Yasar al-Islami*) was reinforced by the translation of Kazuo Shimogi's (1993) *The Islamic Left and Dr Hassan Hanafi's Thought* (1988) and five books introducing Hanafi's thought by four Indonesian scholars (Saenong 2002; Nurhakim 2003; Wahyudi 2007*a*; 2007*b*; Hamzah 2013). In 2015, two volumes of Hassan Hanafi's works, published by LKiS, are made available in Indonesian (Hanafi 2015*a*; 2015*b*). Perhaps Hanafi's eclectic approach of blending reformist ideas with those of social science and philosophy resonates very much with the Indonesian reformists' affiliation. It is not too far fetch to say that Hanafi's ideas have inspired Indonesia writers to take up the formulation of *teologi pembebasan* (liberation theology).

Abed al-Jabiri's ideas, in particular, attracted those with a *pesantren* background who could relate to the need to re-examine the *turath* (classical tradition). Rumadi's study on *Post Tradisionalisme Islam* (2008) is one example. Ahmad Baso and Mujiburrahman who translated Jabiri's works have written a few articles on the latter's ideas (Baso 2002; Mujiburrahman 2001; 2008). Nasr Hamid Abu Zaid's critical hermeneutics has been appropriated in several discussions, with a specific monograph published by Moch Nur Ichwan on Zayd's hermeneutical theory in interpreting the Quran (Ichwan 2003). Within the Yogyakarta Islamic Studies circle, where several of his works have been published (Syahrur 2002; 2003; 2004; 2007; 2010), Muhammad Syahrur's works have received notable attention (Burhanuddin 2003), while a few specific studies on his ideas have been made (Zaki Mubarok 2007; 2007), with one interesting comparative study of Shahrur's *tafsir* methodology to those of Fazlur Rahman's (Mustaqim 2010).

Over the years, all these translated works, accompanied by its biographical commentaries and studies have integrally fused with the Indonesian Islamic discourse, some gaining more currency than others. Notably, Fazlur Rahman's and Arkoun's ideas seem to be more commonly referred to in the writings of the younger Indonesians. Overall, these scholars and writers, in varying degrees, provide the critical perspectives that many leading Indonesian Muslim thinkers have drawn upon, or at least referred to. Their progressive and critical ideas are very important in enhancing the Indonesian reformist and progressive discourse, alongside all other translations on contemporary Islamic discourse as well as those from the social sciences, social philosophy, social psychology and critical literacy.

Today, a long list of younger scholars and activists can be cited. They have grouped themselves into circles, namely Paramadina, Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL), Jaringan Intelektual Muda Muhamaddiyah (JIMM), Lapensdam, Wahid Institute, Maarif Institute, and a few other organizations. In particular, younger writers/scholars from the NU's circle are seen as the most active group in these translating and transmission efforts. Members of Jakarta-based JIL, who come mostly from Jakarta as well as Yogyakarta, have been most active in engaging critical dissection of Islamic thought, especially in response to the vociferous Islamist and revivalist circles who have been very vocal in refuting the present status quo, including their continuing assault on NU's ideological and intellectual stance (Riyadi 2007). The NU's endeavour of Islam Kultural, especially under Gus Dur, has provided a conducive space for intellectualization and localization of Indonesian Islamic discourse. The NU is a *jamaah*, known to be conservative, interestingly giving rise to the progressive circle (van Bruinessen 2004). All these developments may not have been possible if the Indonesian Islamic discourse remained insular, as already demonstrated in the kind of conservatism and stagnancy in the Islamic discourse of the neighbouring Malaysia, Brunei and Singapore.

CONCLUSION

Translated works have positive impacts in expanding and diversifying the Indonesian discursive realms. These works—be it from the conservative or progressive blocs—have allowed for the transmission and entrenchment of Islamic ideas in Indonesia, alongside spurring the development of the local Indonesian Islamic discourse. Translations of works by Erich

Fromm and Paulo Freire have allowed their ideas to be commonly cited and discussed in the Indonesian academic and cultural discourses. Interestingly, works by Frantz Fanon, Gordon Allport and Cornel West, which are yet to be translated into Indonesian, are relatively unknown in the Indonesian discourse. In fact, these translations demonstrate a kind of intellectual vigour and openness, thus contributing towards the qualitative and quantitative enhancement of the Indonesian Islamic discourse.

While some would contend that Indonesian discourse has been plugged into the larger global Islamic discourse (Azyumardi 2002), it is mainly a one-direction flow. Critical Indonesian Islamic works have yet to be translated into other languages, nor are they recognized or sought after in other places outside the region. Nevertheless, we must be able to see that these translation efforts, regardless of the intellectual/ideological slant, are part of the struggle to occupy the local discursive realms. If the Salafist/Wahhabi are active in promoting and translating their works into Indonesian,[7] this can also be said of critical works written by the progressive-reformists and their followers.

Therefore, the translation and dissemination efforts of critical and progressive works are imperative in combating the rising tide of hardline Islamism. The availability of translated works, including secondary works in Indonesia, allows for the appropriation of critical ideas, and soon be made known to the larger reading public and the campus community. For instance, LKiS (Pusat Kajian Islam dan Transformasi Sosial),[8] an established publisher based in Jogjakarta, has shown quite an impressive record in publishing critical works on Islamic studies, especially relating to Indonesian discourse. Credible publishers, with a sustained presence and good distribution, and proactive

marketing that ensures the effective circulation of books, are instrumental in the development of a discourse.

By tracing the translation and dissemination of these works from the Middle East (and elsewhere), it will be useful in our attempt to map the discursive realm of the contemporary Indonesian Islam, which has witnessed a dynamic interaction between the endogenous and exogenous discursive ideas. On one hand, the widespread acceptance of progressive and reformist (or liberal to some) works speaks much of the developing nature of the Indonesian discourse. On the other hand, the greater reception of fundamentalist or conservative works from abroad speaks volume of the tumultuous turn of religious conservatism in the republic (van Bruinessen 2013). Indeed, this is the discursive site that many observers have not given ample attention to. To see these translated works as published texts in the Indonesian language is simply naïve. These works are, in fact, constituted as part of the ideological struggle, whose textual presence amongst the readership would determine the accessibility and transmissionability of the works.

In sum, what is significant is that since the 1950s, these translated Islamic works have transformed the Indonesian intellectual and religious landscape. Surely it is simplistic to attribute foreign translated works as the sole impetus of the development of critical and progressive Indonesian discourse. Exogenous ideas could not make impact in the local discursive scene unless endogenous discourses are equally proactive and rigorous in discussing ideas and perspectives. Those translated works could only have relevance if they are taken up creatively and critically in the local discourse.

Most importantly, while there is much to celebrate about the openness in the progressive Indonesian Islamic scholarship, translating and appropriating its ideas, we need to be mindful

that intellectual energy and zeal cannot simply be enamoured by, or worst, being made "captive" of, these exogenous/translated works, albeit its rigour and criticality. While Indonesian scholars and writers should welcome good ideas from anywhere around the globe, it is imperative that they should develop their own discourse, rather than simply remaining at the margins of global Islamic scholarship. Good works can inspire, but creative thinking emerges from concrete contexts, enmeshed by its own intricacies, dynamics and potentials. This can only be attained if there is less reliance on endogenous sources in the process of building the local discourse.

In other words, as long as Indonesian Muslim scholars and writers remain at the level of being captive to exogenous Islamic discourse, it may not spell well for the development of an autonomous discourse. A continuous dependency may not augur well for the development of a truly "Islam Nusantara" or *pribumisasi* of Islamic discourse, to use Gus Dur's parlance. This is a real challenge, but in the Republic's intellectual history, prominent Indonesians, such as Omar Said Cokroaminoto, Kyai Ahmad Dahlan, Kyai Hashim Asy'ari, Hadji Agoes Salim, Hamka, Sjafruddin Prawiranegera, M. Natsir, Gus Dur, Nurcholish Madjid, Mansour Fakih and Moeslim Abrurahman, have demonstrated the significance and primacy of the local context that spur them to initiate and deliberate on issues of exigencies, influencing the lives of the people and the nation. Such endogenous potential is imperative to be enhanced inasmuch as the import of exogenous translation through translation and its transmission would contribute towards a truly autonomous Indonesian Islamic discourse, where "developmental creativity" to use the term by Alatas, becomes the pillar of its intellectual and religious tradition.[9]

Notes

1. A general survey of Raja Ali Haji's Tsmarat al-Muhimmah written in late nineteenth century, as compendium on the ideal statecraft for a sultanate, demonstrates the introduction of several Arabic terms which are today seen as "naturally" part of Malay vocabulary.
2. See also Russell Jones, **"**Arabic Loan-Words in Indonesian: A Check-List of Words of Arabic and Persian Origin in Bahasa Indonesia and Traditional Malay, in the Reformed Spelling" (London: Published simultaneously by the Indonesian Etymological Project and as *Cahier d'Archipel* 2, 1978).
3. The absence of works in Indonesian on Turkish Tanzimat and the reformist Ziya Gokalp, or the Arab Nahdah figures like Rifaat al-Tahtawi, seems rather a strange gap too, although they are mentioned or discussed in passim by some Indonesian writers.
4. Afid Burhanuddin, "Biografi dan Pemikiran Arkoun", 21 September 2013, available at <https://afidburhanuddin.wordpress.com/2013/09/21/biografi-dan-pemikiran-arkoun/>.
5. Reformistic/progressive works are marked by a few characteristics. Amongst others: (a) primacy is given to *akal* and *ijtihad* in matters concerning human affairs and in scriptural interpretations; (b) minimizing the primacy of the *fiqh* tradition in the interpretation of religious/worldly issues; (c) openness to exogenous sources of ideas, perspectives and methodologies; (d) privileging no particular group (namely *ulama*) as the sole interpreter of the Islamic teachings; (e) acknowledging Shariah as divine, although as a paradigmatic ethical, moral and spiritual source, rather than a legalistic document to justify for the creation of an Islamic state and the imposition of Shariah law; (f) medieval legal-theological formulations from the past savants demand reformulation based on the present context; (g) abandoning conceptual corpus of imperial Islam, such as jizyah, dhimmi, and darul-harb/darul Islam which has no relevance for the existing nation states; (h) restoration of classical Islamic humanistic thought (*adab*/

hikmah) to counter the legalistic and literalistic readings on Islamic teachings.

6. The Malaysian scene is a case in point. Fundamentalist translated works are made available by Muslim revivalist activists (such as ABIM, JIM) and Islamic political party (PAS), which primarily came from Muslim Brotherhood and the Maududian Jamaat-i Islam. Such ideas were disseminated over published translated works and through the *usrah* circles.
7. This includes the Saudi sponsored Quranic translation into Bahasa Indonesia.
8. See <http://www.lkis.co.id/>.
9. By developmental creativity, Alatas refers to "the efforts to formulate sound and meaningful knowledge in the field of development. It refers to the attainment of peace, justice, welfare, progress, and insight into human living. Its area shall cover the subject of social and economic planning, an analysis of the causes of backwardness, the nature of the ruling elites, the kind of exploitation that prevails, the nature of public consciousness, and whatever other topics are related to development" (Alatas 1981), p. 470.

References

Abduh, Muhammad. *Risalat al-tawhid (Kitab al-Hilal)*, translated by K.H. Firdaus A.N. Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1963.

———. *Djihad*. Bandung: Peladjar, 1968.

———. *Islam dan Kristen: tentang ilmu dan peradaban*, translated by Mahjuddin Sjaf and A. Bakar Usman. Bandung: Diponegoro, 1970.

———. *Tafsir juz 'amma*, translated by Muhammad Bagir. Bandung: Penerbit Mizan, 1998.

———. Islam Ilmu Pengetahuan dan Masyarakat Madani, translated by Haris Fadillah and Muhammad Abqory. [Al-Islam Din al-Ilmi wa al-Madaniyah]. Jakarta: Srigunting, 2005.

Abdul Karim, Khalil. *Hegemoni Quraisy Agama Budaya Kekuasaan*, translated by M. Faisol Fatawi. [Quraisy min al-Qabilah ila ad-Daulah al-Markaziyyah]. Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2002.

Abed al-Jabiri, Muhammad. *Post Tradisionalisme Islam*. Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2000.

———. *Nalar Filsafat & Teologi Islam*, translated by Aksin Wijaya. [Al-Kasyfu 'An Manahij al-Adillah Fi Aqa'id al-Millah: Au Naqdu Ilmi al-Kalam Dliddlan al-Tarsim al-Ideologi Li-al-Aqidah Wa Difa'an an al-Ilmi wa Khurriah al-Ikhtiar fi al-Fikri wa al-Fi'li]. Yogyakarta: IRCiSoD, 2003*a*.

———. *Syura: tradisi partikularitas universalitas (al-Dīmuqrāṭīyah wa-ḥuqūq al-insān)*. Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2003*b*.

———. *Formasi Nalar Arab*, translated by Imam Khoiri. [Takwin al-'Aql al-'Arabi]. Yogyakarta: IRCiSoD, 2003*c*.

Abu Zaid, Nasr Hamid. *Tekstualitas Al-Quran: Kritik terhadap Ulumul Qur'an*, translated by Khoiron Nahdliyyin. [Mafhym an-Nash Dirasah fi Ulum Al-Quran]. Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2002.

———. *Kritik Wacana Agama*, translated by Khoiron Nahdliyyin. [Naqd al-Khithab ad-Dini]. Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2003.

———. *Hermeneutika Inklusif: Mengatasi Problematika Bacaan dan Cara-cara Pentakwilan atas Diskursus Keagamaan*, translated by Muhammad Mansur and Khoiron Nahdliyyin. [Isykaliyat al-Qira'ah wa Aliyyat at-Ta'wil]. Jakarta: ICIP, 2004.

———. *Imam Syafi'i: Moderatisme Eklektisisme Arabisme*, translated by Khoiron Nahdliyyin. [Al-Imam asy-Syafi'I wa Ta'sis al-Aidulujiyat al-Wasathiyah]. Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2012.

Adonis. *Arkeologi Sejarah-Pemikiran Arab-Islam* Volumes 1–4, translated by Khoiron Nahdliyyin. [Ats-tsabut wa al-Mutahawwil: Bahts fi al-Ibda' wa al-Itba 'inda al-Arab (Jilid 1–4)]. Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2007.

Al-Asymawi, Mohammad Said. *Nalar Kritis Syari'ah*, translated by Luthfi Thomafi. [Ushul asy-Syari'ah]. Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2004.

———. *Problematika & Penerapan Syariat Islam dalam Undang-undang*, translated by Saiful Ibad. [al-Syari'ah al-Islamiyah wa al-Qanun al-Mishri]. Jakarta: Gaung Persada Press, 2005.

al-Banna, Jamal. *Manifesto Fiqih Baru* 1–3, translated by Hasibullah Satrawi and Zuhairi Misrawi. [Nahwa Fiqh Jadid al-Sunnah Wa Dauruha fi al-Fiqh 1–3]. Jakarta: Penerbit Erlangga, 1997.

———. *Evolusi Tafsir*, translated by Novriantoni Kahar. [Tafsir al-Quran al-Karim Baina al-Qudama wa al-Muhadditsin]. Jakarta: Qisthi, 2004.

———. *Doktrin Pluralisme dalam al-Quran*, translated by Taufik Damas Lc. [al-Ta'addudiyyah fi al-Mujtama' al-Islamiy]. Jakarta: Menara, 2006.

———. *Al Quran Kitab Pluralis*, translated by Anis M. [Hurriyah Al Fikr wa Al I'tiqad fi Al Islam]. Bantul Yogyakarta: BAROKAH Press, 2010.

Al Raysuni Ahmad and Muhammad Jamal Barut. *Ijtihad antara teks, realitas, dan kemaslahatan sosial*, translated by Ibnu Rusydi and Hayyin Muhdzar. [Al-Ijtihad: al-Nas, al-Waqi'I, al-Maslahah]. Indonesia: Erlangga, 2002.

Al-Turabi, Hasan. *Fiqih Demokratis dari Tradisionalisme Kolektif Menuju Modernisme Populis*, translated by Abdul Haris and Zaimul Am. [Tajdid Al-Fikr Al-Islam]. Bandung: Mizan Media Utama, 2003.

Ameer Ali, Syed. *Api Islam: sedjarah evolusi dan tjita-tjita Islam dengan riwayat hidup Nabi Muhammad S.A.W.*, translated by H.B. Jassin. [The Spirit of Islam]. Djakarta: Pembangunan, 1966.

Amin, Ahmad. *Ethika: ilmu akhlak*, translated by K.H. Farid Ma'ruf. Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1975.

Aqqad, Abbas Mahmud. *Aisyah Shiddiqoh binti Shiddiq: ummul mukminin*, translated by Abdulkadir Mahdamy. Solo: Pustaka Mantiq, 1989.

———. *Kejeniusan Ali Bin Abu Thalib*, translated by Gazirah Abdi Ummah. [Abqariyah al Imam Ali]. Jakarta: Pustaka Azzam, 2002.

Arkoun, Mohammed. "Menuju Pendekatan baru Islam". *Jurnal Ulumul Qur'an*, vol. II, no. 7 (1990).

———. "Metode Kritik Akal Islam". *Jurnal Ulumul Qur'an*, vol. v, no. 6 (1994*a*).

———. *Nalar Islami dan Nalar Modern: Berbagai Tantangan dan Jalan Baru*, translated by Johan H. Meuleman. Jakarta: INIS, 1994*b*.

———. *Rethinking Islam*, translated by Yudian W. Asmin and Lathiful Khuluq. [Rethinking Islam: Common Questions, Uncommon Answers]. Yogyakarta: LPMI, 1996*a*.

———. *Tradisi, Kemodernan dan Metamodernisme*. Yogyakarta: LKiS, 1996*b*.

———. *Berbagai Pembacaan Quran*, translated by Johan H. Meuleman. Jakarta: INIS, 1997.

———. *Kajian Kontemporer: Al-Quran*, translated by Hidayatullah. [Lectures du Coran]. Bandung: Pustaka, 1998.

———. *Membongkar Wacana Hegemonik Dalam Islam dan Post Modernisme*. [Min Faisal Tafriqah ila Fasli al-Maqal Aina al-Fikru al-Islami al-Muasir]. Indonesia: Al Fikr, 1999.

———. *Membedah Pemikiran Islam*, translated by Hidayatullah. [Essais Sur La Pensee Islamique]. Bandung: Pustaka, 2000.

———. *Islam Agama Sekuler*, translated by Sunarto Dema. [Al'Almanah wa al-Din: al-Islam, al-Masih, al-Gharb]. Yogyakarta: Belukar, 2003.

as-Shadiqi, Muhammad. *Membela Tuhan Argumen Filosofis, Teologis dan Ilmiah*, translated by Umar Bukhory, M. Nasiruddin Abbas and H.M. Zoerni. [Al-Hiwar Al Falsafi Bayn Al Ilahiyyin Wa Al MaDiyyin]. Yogyakarta: Qirtas, 2003.

Azyumardi Azra. "Globalization of Indonesian Muslim Discourse: Contemporary Religio-Intellectual Connections Between Indonesia and the Middle East". In *Islam in the Era of Globalization: Muslim Attitudes Towards Modernity and Identity*, edited by Johan Meuleman. New York: Routledge, 2002.

———. *Jaringan Ulama Timur Tengah dan Kepulauan Nusantara Abad XVII dan XVIII*. Jakarta: Kencana, 2004.

Baedhowi. *Humanisme Islam: Kajian Terhadap Pemikiran Filosofis Muhammad Arkoun*. Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2008.

———. *Antropologi Al-Quran*. Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2009.

Baso, Ahmad. "Kritik Nalar al-Jabiri: Sumber, Batas-batas dan Manifestasi". *Teks*, vol. 1, no. 1 (2002).

Burhani, Ahmad Najib. "Transmission of Islamic Reform from the United States to Indonesia: Studying Fazlur Rahman's Legacy through the Works of Ahmad Syafii Maarif". *Indonesia and the Malay World* 41, no. 119 (2013): 29–47.

Burhanuddin. "Artikulasi Teori Batas (Nazariyyah al Hudud) Muhammad Syahrur dalam Pengembangan Epistimologi Hukum Islam di

Indonesia". In *Hermeneutika Alqur'an: Mazhab Yogya*, edited by Sahiron Syamsuddin. Yogyakarta: Penerbit Islamika, 2003.

Burhanuddin, Afid. "Biografi dan Pemikiran Arkoun", [online], 21 September 2013. Available at <https://afidburhanuddin.wordpress.com/2013/09/21/biografi-dan-pemikiran-arkoun/> (accessed 21 September 2013).

Burhanudin, Jajat. *Ulama dan Kekuasaan: Pergumulan Elite Muslim dalam Sejarah Indonesia*. Jakarta: Mizan, 2012.

Fadjar, Abdullah. *Khasanah Islam Indonesia*. Jakarta: The Habibie Center, 2006.

Fouda, Farag. *Kebenaran yang Hilang*, translated by Novriantoni. [Al-Haqiah al-Ghaybah]. Jakarta: Dian Rakyat, 2008.

Hamid, Ismail. "Kitab Jawi: Intellectualizing Literary Tradition". In *Islamic Civilization in the Malay World*, edited by Mohd. Taib Osman. Kuala Lumpur; Istanbul: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, Research Centre for Islamic History, Art and Culture, 1997.

Hamzah. *Teologi Sosial: Telaah Pemikiran Hassan Hanafi*. Yogyakarta: Graha Ilmu, 2013.

Hanafi, Hassan. *Oksidentalisme Sikap Kita Terhadap Tradisi Barat*, translated by M. Najib Buchori. [Muqaddimah fi 'Ilm al'Istighrab]. Yogyakarta: Paramadina, 2000.

———. *Oposisi Pasca Tradisi*, translated by Khoiron Nahdliyyin. [Humum Al-Fikr Al-Watan At-Turas wa al-Asr wa al-Handasah Juz 1 (341–555)]. Yogyakarta: Syarikat Indonesia, 2003.

———. *Islamologi 3 dari Teosentrisme ke Antroposentrisme*, translated by Miftah Faqih. [Dirasat Islamiyyah bab V]. Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2004.

———. *Bongkar Tafsir: Liberalisasi, Revolusi, Hermeneutik*, translated by Jajat Hidayatul Firdaus and Neila Diena Rochman. Jogjakarta: Ar-Ruzz, 2005.

———. *Islamologi 1 dari Statis ke Anarkis*, translated by Miftah Faqih. [Dirasat Islamiyyah l, bab 1 dan 2]. Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2007*a*.

———. *Islamologi 2 dari Rasionalisme ke Empirisme*, translated by Miftah Faqih. [Dirasat Islamiyyah bab 3 dan 4]. Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2007*b*.

———. *Studi Filsafat 1; Pembacaan atas Tradisi Islam Kontemporer*. Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2015*a*.

———. *Studi Filsafat 2; Pembacaan atas Tradisi Barat Modern*. Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2015*b*.

Hanafi, Hassan and Muhammad Abid Al Jabiri. *Membunuh Setan Dunia Meleburkan Timur dan Barat dalam Cakrawala Kritik dan Dialog*, translated by Umar Bukhory. [Hiwar al-Masyriq qa al-Maghrib: Talihi Silsilah al-Rudud wa al-Munaqasat]. Yogyakarta: IRCiSoD, 2003.

Harb, Ali. *Benar Kritik Kebenaran*, translated by Sunarwoto Derma. [Naqd al-Haqiqah]. Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2004.

Husain, Taha. *Hari-hari berlalu*, translated by oleh Ali Audah. [Al-Ayyam]. Jakarta: Pustaka Jaya, 1985.

———. *Dua Tokoh Besar dalam Sejarah Islam: Abu Bakar dan Umar*, translated by Ali Audah. [as-Syaikhan]. Jakarta: Dunia Pustaka Jaya, 1986.

Ichwan, Moch Nur. *Merentas Kesarjanaan Kritis Al-Quran: Teori Hermeneutika Nasr Abu Zaid*. Jakarta: Teraju, 2003.

Iqbal, Muhammad. *Membangun kembali pikiran agama dalam Islam*, translated by Ali Audah, Taufiq Ismail and Goenawan Mohammad. [The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam]. Djakarta: Tintamas, 1966.

Jones, Russell. "Arabic Loan-Words in Indonesian: A Check-List of Words of Arabic and Persian Origin in Bahasa Indonesia and Traditional Malay, in the Reformed Spelling". London: Published simultaneously by the Indonesian Etymological Project and as *Cahier d'Archipel* 2, 1978.

Jursyi, Shalahuddin. *Membumikan Islam Progresif*, translated by M. Aunul Abied Shah. [Al-Islamiyun Al-Taqaddumiyun]. Jakarta: Paramadina, 2000.

Mahmud al-Qimni, Sayyid. *Nabi Ibrahim Titik Temu-Titik Tengkar Agama-agama*, translated by Kamran As'ad Irsyady. [Nabi Ibrahim wa at-Tarikh al-Majhul]. Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2004.

Meuleman, Johan H., ed. *Tradisi, Kemodernan dan Metamodernisme: Memperbincangkan Pemikiran Mohamed Arkoun*. Yogyakarta: LKiS, 1996.

Muhaimin, H. *Pembaharuan Islam: Refleksi Pemikiran Rasyid Rida dan Tokoh-tokoh Muhammadiyah*. Yogyakarta: Pustaka Dinamika, 2000.

Mujiburrahman. "Pengantar Penerjemah". In *Agama, Negara dan Penerapan Syari'ah*, by Muhammad Abid al-Jabiri and translated by Mujiburrahman. Yogyakarta: Fajar Pustaka Baru, 2001.

———. *Mengindonesiakan Islam: Representasi dan Ideologi*. Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2008.

Munip, Abdul. *Transmisi Pengetahuan Timur Tengah ke Indonesia: Studi Tentang Penerjemahan Buku Berbahasa Arab Di Indonesia Periode 1950–2004*. Yogyakarta: UIN Sunan Kalijaga, 2007.

Mustaqim, Abdul. *Epistemologi Tafsir Kontemporer*. Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2010.

Nasution, Harun. *Muhammad Abduh dan Teologi Rasional Mu'tazilah*. Jakarta: UI Press, 1987.

Nurhakim, Mohd. *Islam, Tradisi & Reformasi: "Pragmatisme" Agama dalam Pemikiran Hassan Hanafi*. Malang: Bayumedia and UMM Press, 2003.

Putro, Suadi. *Mohammed Arkoun Tentang Islam dan Modernitas*. Jakarta: Paramadina, 1988.

Rahmat, M. Imdadun. *Arus Baru Islam Radikal: Transmisi Revivalisme Islam Timur Tengah ke Indonesia*. Jakarta: Penerbit Erlangga, 2002.

Ramadan Al-Buti, Muhammad Sa'id and Tayyib Tizini. *Finding Islam Dialog Tradisionalisme-Liberalisme Islam*, translated by Ahmad Mulyadi and Zuhairi Misrawi. [Al-Islam wa al-Asr: Tahadiyyat wa Afaq]. Jakarta: Erlangga, 2002.

Rasyid Ridha, Muhammad. *Tafsir Al-Fatihah Menemukan Hakikat Ibadah*, translated by Tiar Anwar Bachtiar. [Tafsir Al-Fatihah wa Sittu Suwar min Khawatim Al-Quran Al-'Ashr wa Al-Kautsar wa Al-Kafirun wa Al-Ikhlash, wa Al-Mu'awwidzatain]. Bandung: Al-Bayan, 2005.

Riddel, Peter. *Islam and the Malay-Indonesian World: Transmission and Responses*. London: Hurst & Company, 2001.

Ridwan, Nur Khaliq. *Membedah Jaringan Islam Jihadi di Indonesia*. Jakarta: Penerbit Erlangga, 2008.

Riyadi, Ahmad Ali. *Dekonstruksi Tradisi: kaum muda NU merobek tradisi*. Jogjakarta: Ar-Ruzz, 2007.

Rumadi. *Post Tradisionalisme Islam: Wacana Intelektualisme dalam Komunitas NU*. Fahmina Institute, 2008.

Ruslani. *Masyarakat Kitab dan dialog antaragama*. Yogyakarta: Yayasan Bentang Budaya, 2000.

Saenong, IIham B. *Hermeneutika Pembebasan, Metodologi Tafsir Al-Quran Menutut Hassan Hanafi*. Jakarta: Teraju, 2002.

Sa'id, Jaudat. *Meraih Masa Depan Upaya Memperbaiki Diri*, translated by DICTIA. [Hatta Yughayyiru Ma bi-Anfusihim]. Bandung: Pustaka Hidayah, 2002*a*.

———. *Bertindak Menurut Kehendak Ilahi*, translated by Luqman Junaidi. [Al-'Amal Qudrah wa Iradah]. Bandung: Pustaka Hidayah, 2002*b*.

Salim, Hairus. "Indonesian Muslims and Cultural Works". In *Heirs to World Culture: Being Indonesian 1950-1965*, edited by Jennifer Lindsay and Maya H.T. Liem. Leiden: KITLV Press, 2012.

Salman Ghanim, Muhammad. *Kritik Ortodoksi Tafsir Ayat Ibadah Politik dan Feminisme*, translated by Kamran Asad Irsyadi. [Min Haqa'iq Al-Quran]. Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2004.

Shalut, M. *Pesan kepada umat Islam*, translated by Anwar Wahdi Hasi. [Hadza Bayan li Al-nas]. Jakarta: Darul Ulum Press, 1988.

———. *Akidah dan shariah Islam* 1, translated by Fachruddin Hs and Nasharuddin Thaha. [Al Islam Aqidah wa syari'ah]. Jakarta: Bumi Aksara, 1994.

Shihabuddin, A. *Membongkar Kejumudan: menjawab Tuduhan-tuduhan Salafi Wahhabi*. Jakarta: Nourabooks, 2013.

Shimogi, Kazuo. *Kiri Islam: Telaah Kritis Pemikiran Hassan Hanafi*. Yogyakarta: LKiS, 1993.

Sho'ub, Hasan. *Islam dan Revolusi Pemikiran Dialog Kreatif Ketuhanan dan Kemanusiaan*, translated by Mohammad Luqman Hakiem. [Al-Islam wa Tahaddiyatul 'Ashri]. Surabaya: Risalah Gusti, 1997.

Syahrur, Muhammad. *Islam dan Iman Aturan-aturan Pokok*, translated by M. Zaid Su'di. [al-Islam wa al-Iman; Manzumah al-Qiyam]. Yogyakarta: Jendela, 2002.

———. *Tirani Islam Genealogi Masyarakat dan Negara*, translated by Saifuddin Zuhri Qudsy and Badrus Syamsul Fata. [Dirasat Islamiyyah Mu'ashirah fi ad-Daulah wa al-Mujtama']. Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2003.

———. *Prinsip dan Dasar Hermeneutika al-Qur'an Kontemporer*, translated by Sahiron Syamsuddin. Yogyakarta: Elsaq Press, 2004.

———. *Prinsip dan Hermeneutika Hukum Islam Kontemporer*, translated by Sahiron Syamsuddin. Yogyakarta: Elsaq Press, 2007.

———. *Metodologi Fiqh Islam Kontemporer*, translated by Sahiron Syamsuddin and Burhanuddin. [Nahw Ushul Jadidiah lil Fiqh al Islami]. Yogyakarta: Elsaq Press, 2010.

Syarqawi Ismail, A. *Rekonstruksi Konsep Wahyu Muhammad Syahrur*. Yogyakarta: Elsaq Press, 2003.

van Bruinessen, Martin. *Kitab Kuning: Pesantren & Tarekat*. Bandung: Mizan, 1999.

———. "NU: Jamaah Konservatif yang Melahirkan Gerakan Progresif". In *NU Muda Kaum Progresif dan Sekularisme Baru*, by Laode Ida. Jakarta: Erlangga, 2004.

———, ed. *Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam: Explaining the "Conservative Turn"*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2013.

Wahyudi, Yudian. *The Slogan "Back to the Qur'an and the Sunna" as the Ideal Solution to the Decline of Islam in the Modern Age (1774–1974)*. Yogyakarta: Pesantren Nawasea Press, 2007*a*.

———. *Is Islam Secular?: A Critical Study of Ḥanafī, Ha<u>s</u>an's Legal Philosophy*. Yogyakarta: Pesantren Nawasea Press, 2007*b*.

Zaki Mubarok, Ahmad. *Pendekatan Strukturalisme Linguistic dalam Tafsir Al Qur'an ala M. Syahrur*. Yogyakarta: Elsaq Press, 2007.

Chapter 7

PLURAL ISLAM AND CONTESTATION OF RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY IN INDONESIA

Ahmad Najib Burhani

> Tawaf [ritual circling around the Ka'bah]… done (Defending Islam Action I), Sa'i [ritual walking]… done (Defending Islam Action II), Wuquf [standing before God] … done (Defending Islam Action III), one more ritual [to complete the hajj], i.e. throwing stones to the devils (ramy al-jamarat).[1]

INTRODUCTION[2]

This is one of the famous metaphors, circulated widely in the form of meme, to describe the series of Aksi Bela Islam (Defending Islam Action), held in Jakarta on 14 October 2016, 4 November 2016, and 2 December 2016. In terms of scale, these religion-motivated rallies were unprecedented. It is comparable to the rallies before the fall of Suharto in 1998. The latter, however, is solely triggered by political issues. A similar instance, known as the alleged case of blasphemy by Martodharsono, created a series of rallies in 1918, when Martodharsono wrote an article about Islam in Djawi Hisworo. Subsequent rallies with the name "Tentara Kandjeng Nabi

Muhammad" (TKNM) or "the Army of the Lord Prophet Muhammad" were organized by Sarekat Islam and attracted thousands of people (Alfan 2016; Agung DH 2016).

Fealy (2016) perceives the rallies as "further evidence of deepening conservatism in Indonesian Islam" or, in the view of Jones (2016), these are the precise reasons "why Indonesia has been ineffective in curbing extremism". This chapter intends to show that this phenomenon can also be seen as a critical event to trace the development of religion in Indonesia, particularly on the issue of fragmentation and contestation of religious authority. Before the rally, the chairman of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Said Aqil Siradj, warned NU members against joining the third rally on 2 December 2016. Despite his advice, some NU members still supported Habib Rizieq Syihab, one of the leaders of the rally. Even the *fatwa* from the NU on the prohibition of conducting Friday prayer in the streets on 2 December 2016 was ignored by some of its members. A reflection of disobedience to the central leadership of the NU, some *pesantren* (religious boarding schools) in Jakarta and West Java, such as Ciamis and Tasikmalaya, even sent some of its students to join the rally in the National Monument Tower (Monas), Jakarta.[3]

Similar to the NU, the second largest Islamic movement, Muhammadiyah, also experienced a similar problem. The call and advice from the Chairman of this organization, Haedar Nashir, to its members not to join the rallies fell on deaf ears. Instead of listening to the advice of their chairman, some members of the NU and Muhammadiyah opted to join the rallies led by Rizieq Syihab, Abdullah Gymnastiar, Arifin Ilham, Bachtiar Nasir, and Zaitun Rasmin. In his speech at the University of Muhammadiyah in Jakarta on 23 November 2017, Haedar Nasir expressed his shock and sadness by stating that

it was "easier to gather people for a rally than enjoining them to go to the library".[4]

Commonly, the NU and Muhammadiyah are considered the two largest Islamic organizations in Indonesia. During the rallies of Aksi Bela Islam, however, these two organizations seemed to be overshadowed by other new Muslim organizations, such as the Front for the Defense of Islam (FPI), Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), and Council of Indonesian Ulama (MUI). They seemed incapable of leading, directing, and managing their own members, let alone Indonesian Muslims in general. They were unable to do what has been known as their role in moderating Indonesian Muslims; balancing between radicalism and liberalism (Burhani 2012). Discussions with some social activists in Indonesia suggest their scepticism of the role of the NU, and particularly that of Muhammadiyah, in promoting moderate Islam. This scepticism grew after the rallies. For some of the activists, the story of the NU and Muhammadiyah as guardians of tolerant Islam is over, it can only be found in historical past. Instead of the NU and Muhammadiyah, there were other groups of Muslims commonly underestimated, ignored or seen as parasite that took the stage to led the dynamics of Islam in the country.

Is it still relevant and valid to see the NU and Muhammadiyah as the two main representations of Indonesian Islam and that no other groups have enough influence in Indonesia? Is the Aksi Bela Islam an indication of conservatism and a threat to "moderate Islam"? Is this an ideological or political movement, or just a sudden occurrence that will disappear soon after the Jakarta gubernatorial election in 2017?

This chapter argues that Aksi Bela Islam indicates a new religious map and a shift of religiosity in Indonesia. Before the rallies, this picture was still somewhat blurred. After the rallies,

it became clear and obvious that non-mainstream Islam, represented by organizations other than NU and Muhammadiyah, are gaining a foothold in Indonesia and are steadily growing. They have undermined the two organizations that have dominated Indonesia for decades. To discuss this issue (i.e. the fragmentation and contestation of religious authority after Aksi Bela Islam), this chapter will be divided into three sections. Firstly, it recaps the chronology of events leading up to Aksi Bela Islam. Secondly, it discusses the construction of Rizieq Syihab's religious authority and a shift from being labelled "*preman berjubah*" (religious-cloaked thug) to "*imam besar*" (great religious leader) of Indonesian Muslims. Lastly, it analyses the rise of new religious forces in Indonesian Islam that try to challenge the authority and domination of the NU and Muhammadiyah.

AKSI BELA ISLAM I, II, AND III

Aksi Bela Islam initially began as a protest to the speech of Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok), the governor of Jakarta, delivered in Kepulauan Seribu on 27 September 2016. Protesters considered one statement of his speech as blasphemous to the Quran or defaming *ulama*. In general, Ahok spoke about policies and empowerment programmes of cultivating Kerapu (groupers) fish. He assured the city officials of Pulau Seribu that the programme will continue to be implemented even if he failed to be elected as the governor of DKI Jakarta in 2017. Therefore, they need to keep working and maintaining the programme. Ahok's controversial statements are the following:

> Perhaps in your heart, you believe that you cannot vote for me because you are misled using Surat Al Maidah 51 and the like. That's your right. If you feel you cannot vote for me because

> you are afraid of going to hell, because you are fooled by, so, oh, that's okay, because this is your personal right. This program will keep going. So you do not have to feel uncomfortable. Just follow your heart, you do not have to vote for Ahok.

The full length of the speech was an hour and forty-eight minutes. It was uploaded to YouTube by the Government of DKI Jakarta on 28 September 2016, and there was no immediate response to this video. It was only after a person by the name of Buni Yani uploaded a very short version of the video (thirty seconds) on his Facebook account on 6 October 2016 that this video went viral. The title of Yani's Facebook status is "*Penistaan terhadap Agama?*" (Defamation of Religion?). He also attached the following pieces of transcript in his status: "Ladies and gentlemen [Muslim voters] ... lied to with Surat Al Maidah 51' [and] 'go to hell also [ladies and gentlemen] fooled'. There seems to be something wrong with this video."

Ahok's controversial statement was in the twenty-fourth minute of his speech. In that statement, Ahok urged the Muslim audience, mostly city officials of Kepulauan Seribu, not to be fooled by *ulama* who use *al-Maidah* (a chapter from the Quran) to convince them that Muslims should not take non-Muslims as leaders. The transcription uploaded by Buni Yani is different from the original speech because there is one missing word, namely "*pake*" (using). The transcription gives the readers the impression that Ahok was accusing Muslim voters that they could be fooled by the Quran. The missing word became a subject of debate in society because it had implications in the meaning of the sentence; either that verse of the Quran misleads Muslims or it is manipulated to deceive Muslim voters. Buni Yani's status was then shared by tens of thousands of people, and Ahok's original speech that was almost two hours (1:48:32 hours) was ignored.

The wildfire of anger and insults to Ahok continued to proliferate and grew bigger. To stop the anger, Izzul Muslimin, former Chairman of Muhammadiyah Youth, urged Ahok to apologize for his controversial remarks. He expected that the controversy would stop and the situation would be back to normal again once Ahok publicly apologized to the Muslims. On 10 October 2016, Ahok apologized at the City Hall of Jakarta. He said, "I convey to all Muslims or to the offended, I apologize. I have no intention of defaming Islam or anything" (Rudi 2016). But this did not calm the anger and attacks.

Apparently, the protest and anger against Ahok did not end despite his apology. Some groups, such as the Muhammadiyah Youth organization and the Muslims Forum (FUI), sued him, brought the case to the court, and demanded a trial for Ahok. Protests against Ahok became massive in various places as more people joined the movement. This political issue had more religious weight and reverberation after MUI issued an edict, named "*Pendapat dan Sikap Keagamaan MUI tentang Penistaan Agama, Penghinaan pada Ulama dan Penodaan Al-Qur'an oleh Ahok*" (Religious Opinion and Position on the Case of Defamation of Religion, Insulting Ulama, and Blaspheming the Quran by Ahok) on 11 October 2016. The edict stated that "Jakarta Governor's statement is categorized as: (1) insulting the Qur'an and/or (2) insulting *ulama* which certainly has legal consequences."[5] After the issuance of that opinion and position, often misunderstood as a *fatwa*, a coalition of Islamic revivalist groups calling themselves GNPF-MUI (National Movement to Guard the MUI Fatwa) emerged.[6] This coalition later became the initiator and vehicle of Aksi Bela Islam.

The first Aksi Bela Islam rally was led by Rizieq Syihab, Zaitun Rasmin, Arifin Ilham, Bachtiar Nasir, and others. It was attended by tens of thousands of people, organized by FPI, with

additional support from a few conservative Muslim groups. The second rally involved more groups, including Muhammadiyah. Officially, Muhammadiyah prohibited its members from participating in the rally to outwardly demonstrate any affiliation to the organization. As stated in its official decree, issued on 1 November 2016 and signed by Haedar Nashir and Abdul Mu'ti, Muhammadiyah did not explicitly prohibit its members from joining and participating in the rally because it is part of democracy. However, as an organization, Muhammadiyah did not want to be involved in the rally. As an institution, Muhammadiyah did not participate in the 4 November rally. Muhammadiyah members, however, have the right, as part of democracy, to participate in the rally as long as it is in line with the principle of *al-amr bi al-ma'rūf wa al-nahy 'an al-munkar* (commanding right and forbidding wrong), and conducted in accordance with the position and characters of Muhammadiyah. Therefore, Muhammadiyah members who joined the rally fully understood that their participation was their own choice, and they were not allowed to bring Muhammadiyah's attributes, especially its flags, or use the facilities and funds of the organization for the rally.[7]

Ignoring this decree, Muhammadiyah members who participated in the rally carried the attributes of the organization, such as its flags and banners. Some of them even rode Muhammadiyah's buses and cars to Jakarta. The assembly point for them were also the offices belonging to Muhammadiyah, even its headquarters in Jakarta. The leaders and members of Muhammadiyah appeared divided in response to the rally. Some of them, such as Ahmad Syafii Maarif, publicly declared that he is against the rally and urged people to close this case after Ahok's apology. The incumbent chairman of Muhammadiyah, Haedar Nashir, was at the headquarters of

Muhammadiyah in Jakarta on that very day. He delivered an opening speech at the launch of twelve new books on Muhammadiyah, which was also attended by Muslim scholars, such as Azyumardi Azra, Mitsuo Nakamura, and some chairmen of the organization. Although he was in Jakarta and in the middle of the crowd who joined the rally, he preferred to attend the book launch rather than the rally. Some other Muhammadiyah leaders, such as Amien Rais, participated in the rally. He even led a huge number of people from the headquarters of Muhammadiyah (in Jl. Menteng Raya 62 Jakarta) to the rally. In his Friday sermon delivered before the rally, also attended by the author, Amien mentioned Ahok's statement on *Al-Maidah 51* as "a momentum given by Allah to the Muslims" to defeat him in the gubernatorial election and it is also a momentum for Islamic awakening.

The second Aksi Bela Islam received support from diverse Muslim communities. Approximately one million people gathered around Hotel Indonesia and the surrounding areas. Despite the chaos and small clashes in the evening, the protest was generally peaceful and orderly. Following the success of the second Aksi Bela Islam, the GNPF organized the third Aksi Bela Islam on 2 December 2016. The government, through Indonesian police officers, tried to deflate the rally. Similarly, some religious leaders also tried to weaken the rally. NU, for instance, issued a *fatwa* on the prohibition of performing Friday prayer on the street. Amidst these oppositions, more than a million people participated in the rally around Monas (National Monument Tower). Some prominent figures, such as Hidayat Nur Wahid, deputy chairman of the House of Representatives, attended and gave a speech at the arena of the rally. The sheer number of people who joined the rally defied many expectations. From predictions and discussions before

the rally, many people assumed that this third rally would be attended by tens of thousands of people only. The reality was beyond expectation; it gained massive support from people and broke the record of rally in Indonesia.

A number of videos and books were published and circulated to portray the magnitude of the second Aksi Bela Islam or known as Aksi 212. Among them are *Mengetuk Pintu Langit: Kesaksian Peserta Aksi 411 & 212* (Knocking Sky's Door: Witnesses from Participants of Aksi 411 and 212), *Dahsyatnya Aksi Bela Islam: Sebuah Episode Perjuangan Bela Qur'an, Jihad Melawan Ketidakadilan* (The Formidable of Defending Islam Action: An Episode of the Struggle to Defend the Qur'an, Jihad Against Injustice), *Potret Aksi Damai Bela Islam 212* (Pictures of the Defending Islam Action 212), *Spirit 212: Cinta itu menyatukan Kita* (The Spirit of 212: Love that Unites Us), *Aksi Bela Islam 212: Gerakan Hati, Kekuatan Bangsa* (The Defending Islam Action 212: The Movement of the Heart, the Power of the Nation).

NEW RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY

Peter Mandaville (2007) indicated that the process of fragmentation and breakdown of religious authority in Islam is not entirely new. This phenomenon, however, has intensified in the last few decades, particularly with "rising literacy rates and mass education in the Muslim world, the emergence of new technologies and modes of communication, and a shift from 'traditional' to 'modern' attitudes" (2007, p. 102). The traditional system of authority, developed in madrasah or *pesantren* (Islamic boarding schools), has been eroded and decentralized. Television station, Facebook, and Twitter are now the mediums that elevate a lay person into authoritative

religious figure. They have been used to even fool some groups in society to consider someone, who used to be called "religiously-cloaked thugs" as their awaited *imams* (religious leaders). Aksi Bela Islam demonstrates how personalities such as Abdullah Gymnastiar (alias Aa Gym), Yusuf Mansur, and Rizieq Syihab transformed from ordinary people into authoritative religious figures.

High-prestige and high-impact media, such as television, can imbue a preacher with an aura of authority. If they are genial, it can contribute to their popularity. Eickelman and Anderson observe that, "In the era of multiple and alternative channels of communication, issues of how various publics are reached, how messages with religious and political content are listened to… are as important as the overt content of their messages" (2003, p. 7). Before the 1990s, Aa Gym's name was not known within the social and religious discourses in Indonesia. He is not a son of a *kyai* or a famous person or an aristocrat who would bestow him traditional authority, in Weber's terminology. Since young, his main interests were in business and entrepreneurship. A street vendor, a newspaper seller, an itinerant busker, and a minicab driver were among his experiences as a fledgling entrepreneur when he was young. His first brush with national fame of extraordinary proportions did not start until 2 December 2001 when he was invited to give one of the addresses at the official government celebration of *Nuzulul Qur'an* (the revelation of the Qur'an to the Prophet Muhammad) at the Istiqlal Mosque, the largest mosque in Southeast Asia. This celebration was attended by President Megawati Sukarnoputri, ministers, senior politicians, and ambassadors from a number of countries with substantial Muslim populations. His speech was broadcasted live across the nation by state television channel (TVRI) and all the private television

channels, attracting extensive press coverage. It was after the *Nuzulul Qur'an* event that Aa Gym's name gained recognition and he became the nation's most popular Islamic preacher.

Yusuf Mansur was a bankrupt, a malpractice trader, and a prisoner before he became a preacher. He then became an advocate of philanthrophy. He became a professional preacher after being imprisoned two times, in 1998 and 1999, because of trade malpractice. Yusuf gained popularity after he launched a *sinetron* (cinema electronic) or serial movie on TV entitled *Maha Kasih* (The All-Loving). This sixty-minute movie was directed by Chairul Umam, a prominent Indonesian movie director, and started broadcasting on 7 January 2006 at the RCTI channel. Based on stories narrated by Yusuf during our interview, this movie successfully became a top-ten best television programme in Indonesia.

Prior to Aksi Bela Islam, Rizieq Syihab was often seen as a leader of a vigilante group rather than an *ulama*. In terms of religious education, Syihab has stronger religious background compared to the above mentioned celebrity preachers. He received his high school education in a *pesantren* in Tangerang. He then went on to LIPIA (Institute of Islamic and Arabic Sciences), Jakarta, and Imam Muhammad ibn Saud University, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. He finished his undergraduate studies in the field of Islamic law (Shari'a) in 1990.[8] Putting aside his educational background, Amin Abdullah, former rector of UIN Yogyakarta, often refers to Syihab and the FPI as a "noisy minority". Although Syihab is a leader of a small group of followers, he often creates "excessive noises" when expressing his group's demands, and claimed to represent the majority of Indonesian Muslims. Ahmad Syafii Maarif did not even consider Syihab an *ulama* or someone who has authority to speak about religion. The term used by Maarif for Syihab and the FPI is "*preman berjubah*"

(religiously-cloaked thugs), or those who like to engage in the act of terror by "hijacking" God as a pretext (Maarif 2005). In a discussion organized by the Maarif Institute in Yogyakarta on 20 January 2017, Woodward referred to the FPI as a terrorist organization, and aligned them with the Ku Klux Klan in the United States. Regardless of the views of the people on Rizieq Syihab and the FPI, the Jakarta protests—Aksi Bela Islam I, II, and III—convinced Syihab and his followers that he was no longer a marginal and peripheral person, but an imam of Muslim community, albeit for a short time. Some quarters of Indonesian Muslims accepted him as imam and dimissed his previous image as a thug.

What transformed him from a thug into an imam? During the Aksi Bela Islam III, Syihab delivered the sermon at a Friday prayer at Monas, which was incidentally attended by President Joko Widodo, Vice President Jusuf Kalla, Minister of Religious Affairs Lukman Hakim Saefuddin, Minister of Politics and Security Wiranto, TNI Commander Gatot Nurmantyo, Chief of Police Tito Karnavian, and other high officials of the state. On that day, Syihab appeared to be the leader of millions of Indonesian Muslims. The Aksi Bela Islam turned him into a figure not to be ignored. It was a spontaneous and uncalculated move by the President. The leaders' presence has been interpreted by some as an endorsement of the rally, with the government bowing to Syihab, the person who often instigated the public to oppose the Constitution because God is higher than the law of the state (Mietzner and Stewart 2016). Hence, Aksi Bela Islam transformed Syihab from "zero to hero". Huge banners and various memes were distributed widely, particularly in Jakarta, portraying him as an imam and national leader.

Syihab even allegedly proclaimed himself as the *imam besar* (highest religious leader) of Indonesian Muslims, and not only

of the FPI. The FPI sent a letter of oath of allegiance (*bai'ah*) to various individuals and *pesantren* asking them to acknowledge Syihab's leadership. Its content included the willingness and the faithful promise to "appoint Dr. Habib Muhammad Rizieq Syihab, Lc, MA, DPMSS, as the highest religious leader of Indonesian Muslims and pledged loyalty to his orders and prohibitions in accordance with the Shariah of Allah and His Messenger". While some dismissed the proposal, others accepted the invitation openly and took it seriously. In fact, some activists of religious mainstream organizations, such as the NU and Muhammadiyah, accepted and praised Syihab as "our leader, our imam", listened to his preaching, and obeyed his commands. Syihab's religious authority was constructed and strengthened by his political activities, particularly during Aksi Bela Islam. The image of Syihab as an imam and leader was developed through social media and via banners, which often downplayed his real religious credentials.

CHALLENGING TRADITIONAL AUTHORITY

Perhaps the best way to see the fragmentation of religious authority is by looking at the treatment of Ahmad Syafii Maarif, Ahmad Mustofa Bisri, and Muhammad Quraish Shihab during the campaign leading up to the gubernatorial election in Jakarta in 2017. These three senior and authoritative religious figures were ignored by some quarters of the Muslim community for their religious views and positions. Ahmad Syafii wrote articles on Ahok, such as "400 Tahun untuk Ahok" (400-Year [Imprisonment] for Ahok) and "Ahok Tidak Menghina Al-Qur'an" (Ahok Not Insulting the Qur'an). Ahmad Syafii believed that no single statement of Ahok in his speech in Kepulauan Seribu can be considered blasphemy. He

attributed the narrow-mindedness of people and their personal hatred for the accusations of him committing blasphemy. As expressed in his article "Tidak Mengutuk, Malah Dikutuk" (Cursed Because Not Cursing), Ahmad Syafii was harshly bullied by people, including those from his own organization (Muhammadiyah) and his hometown (Minang). Although he spent most of his entire life being a student of religion, including working with Fazlur Rahman for his PhD dissertation at Chicago University, his authority and credibility to speak about religion was questioned by some young Muslims. A young activist of Muhammadiyah, for instance, made a viral Twitter posting saying that Ahmad Syafii's comment has no basis at all (*ngelantur*).

Ahmad Mustofa Bisri was also abused by supporters of Rizieq Syihab before Aksi 212. Although he is the *kyai* or head of *pesantren* and was elected as *rois 'am* of the NU during the Congress in Jombang in 2015, it was not a guarantee that his views would be respected by people in this post-truth era.[9] Supporting the *fatwa* from the NU on the prohibition of occupying the streets for performing Friday prayer, he argued that this religious practice has no religious basis, it is a *bid'ah* (unlawful innovation). He urged the participants of the 212 rally not to manipulate religion for political purposes. For this religious position, Bisri received a harsh response from a young Muslim who supported the rally. In his Twitter comment he argued that Ahmad Mustofa's comment is anachronistic and, therefore, unacceptable.

Muhammad Quraish Shihab is the best *mufassir* (interpreter of the Quran) in Indonesia. He is the author of *Tafsir al-Misbah* and a number of books on the Quran. His authority in interpreting the Quran was never questioned, at least publicly, until recently. Before the alleged blasphemy of Ahok, Shihab

was a target of hatred from some quarters of Muslims because of his view on *jilbab* (headscarf worn by Muslim women), and the difference between religious leader and community or professional leader. When his view on non-Muslim leadership was distributed during the election, verbal and written abuses against him were widespread on social media. He was, for instance, humiliated several times by Jonru Ginting, a social media activist with more than a million followers, for his view that in professional work, Muslims are allowed to be led by non-Muslims.

There are at least three points that can be inferred from the above stories and Aksi Bela Islam. First, the interpretation of religious text, in this context *Al-Maidah 51*, is no longer the monopoly of traditional and high-brow *ulama*. Celebrity preachers, media-created *ulama*, and laymen can compete for the interpretation of verses from the Quran. Progressive, liberal, conservative, and radical Muslims are in contestation to win the *ummah* through textual interpretation of religious text. In short, it can be said that religious authority has been decentralized and democratized; everyone can contribute in "reshaping religion with their own hands", it is no longer under the hegemony of *ulama* or clerics (Mandaville 2007, p. 102). The understanding and positioning of high-brow *ulama* does not guarantee respect from the people, regardless of how sound or strong the arguments may be. Muslim communities have moved from conventional accounts of traditional authority and now the "structures of authority become increasingly diffuse, disparate, polyvalent and translocalized" (Mandaville 2007, pp. 102–3).

Second, the masses are united because they share a common discourse, and not because of their idolization of any individuals. Aksi Bela Islam demonstrates that not all

participants perceive Rizieq Syihab as their leader. Some of them even denied the assumption that their participation in the rally was due to the call from Syihab. For example, after the third Aksi Bela Islam, the chairman of a Muhammadiyah district in Central Java, explained to the author that the reason for his participation in the Monas rally on 2 December was not the call from Rizieq Syihab, Abdullah Gymnastiar, Rasmin Zaitun, Al-Khattat, Bachtiar Nasir, or other GNPF-MUI leaders, but a common ideology and common political interest between him and Syihab. He explained, "Participants of Aksi 411 and 212 have common political psychology with Rizieq Syihab. But he is not their leader." Inferably, individuals have their own views that determine their actions. It is not solely controlled or determined by religion, but also by politics and psychology.

Without a doubt, some Muslims in Jakarta feel that they are being marginalized by Ahok's policies. In some sections within the Muslim community, animosity towards Ahok was nurtured. The animosity stems from, for example, Ahok's style of speaking that sometimes resemble a thug. Even his vice governor, Djarot Saiful Hidayat, admitted that Ahok's way of speaking has created antipathy and hostility.[10] This hostility continues to be reproduced and disseminated through social media and religious lectures.[11] Consequently, there was consensus that Ahok's weakness lies in his lack of control over his choice of words; an indicator of a bad leader. This common animosity, as stated by the district chairman of Muhammadiyah, was the engine that made people move together and join Syihab in demanding the imprisonment of Ahok. Another participant explained to the author that, "I joined the Aksi 411 and 212 not because of Rizieq Syihab but I wanted to mingle with the congregation of Muslims all over Indonesia who struggle to

challenge Ahok's run for governor." The hatred for Ahok ran so deep that even if he was sentenced to 400 years, the people would still not be satisfied (Maarif 2016*a*).[12]

There is certainly political aspects in this issue. The part that united Muslims to come and join the Aksi is, of course, an attempt to stop Ahok from being elected as the governor of DKI Jakarta. The Aksi 212 intimidated those who still wanted to vote for Ahok or those who were still in doubt whether Muslims are allowed to vote for non-Muslims as their political leader. The rally wanted to emphasize that Ahok is not good to be elected as governor not only because he is non-Muslim, but largely because he is a Chinese-Christian who was against Islam. In connection with Syihab, he became a leader in the series of rallies by accident and, as expected by the district chairman of Muhammadiyah, he will not be able to maintain that role after the rallies. He is just an "accidental" or "incidental" hero.[13]

The rise of new authorities in Islam has not dismantled old authorities completely. In fact, it arrives at a more plural Islam. While it certainly "disrupts and destabilizes the traditional system of knowledge production", it does not replace it completely, at least not in the near future. In this context, the rise of Syihab and the emergence of new religious authority certainly cannot be seen as taking over the role of the NU and Muhammadiyah in Indonesian Islam. Instead, they offer a competing authority and undermine the role of these two organizations. NU, with its *pesantren* networks, and Muhammadiyah, with its strong cause for philanthropy, education, and health provide unique contributions to Indonesian Muslims which extend and strengthen the endurance of their influence and authority. Syihab has started developing and expanding the activities of the FPI, which are not only limited

to previous activities such as sweeping and attacking bars and discotheques, but also on humanitarian and economic actions. However, as compared to the actions of NU and Muhammadiyah in education, health, and charitable enterprises, Syihab and the FPI's new activities are still at their infancy. The challenge from Syihab to NU and Muhammadiyah is mainly in the leadership of the Muslim community, and the authority to speak on religion, and not social and economic contributions.

CONCLUSION

With the advancement of information and communication technology, especially with the proliferation of the use of internet and social media, people can easily learn and seek information related to religious issues. What was previously only accessible through books or studying for a long time in *pesantren*, can now be easily accessible via "Habib Google". This development provides opportunities for someone to become a religious authority without necessarily studying religion in a *pesantren* for decades. Theoretically, this condition has already demonstrated the possibility of the fragmentation of religious authority not only in Indonesia, but also in the world and in various religious traditions.

However, this fragmentation of religious authority was just realized and strongly felt during the Aksi Bela Islam when individuals who have been considered as having religious authority and whose advice or call obeyed and followed, were in fact ignored by some Muslims who preferred to join celebrity preachers and low-brow *ulama*, such as Syihab, Aa Gym, and Yusuf Mansur. While it certainly cannot be seen as a total shift and move of the Muslim community from traditional *ulama* to newly "self-manufactured" *ulama*, this phenomenon shows

that these individuals of religious authority are no longer the only references on religious matters. Another point that can be inferred from the Aksi Bela Islam is that people can determine their own political and emotional choice regardless of the *fatwa* and advice of the *ulama*. They decide to join *ulama* who fit with their own inclination without considering whether they are high or low-brow *ulama*.

The series of rallies reveal that the existence of new religious authority outside of NU and Muhammadiyah are increasingly visible and taking a firm grip in Indonesian Muslim community. NU and Muhammadiyah remain as the two main faces and representations of Indonesian Islam in the years to come. However, in the map of religion in Indonesia, they are no longer the only dominant groups. New groups, such as the FPI, born in recent decades or years are steadily growing and challenging the domination and authority of these two oldest and largest Muslim organizations.

Notes

1. "Beredar Meme; Aksi 411 Seperti Tawaf, Aksi 212 Seperti Wukuf, Kalau Ahok Tidak Juga Ditangkap, Saatnya 'Lempar Jumroh'". Available at <https://pasarkaki5.blogspot.sg/2016/12/beredar-meme-aksi-411-seperti-tawaf.html> (accessed 8 August 2017).
2. This article is the revised and extended version of the article published in *Jurnal Maarif* 11, no. 2 (December 2016) with the title "Aksi Bela Islam: Konservatisme dan Fragmentasi Otoritas Keagamaan" (in Bahasa Indonesia).
3. Whether these *pesantren* are affiliated to the NU still need to be checked. It is undeniable, however, that many of the NUs joined or supported the *Aksi Bela Islam* on 2 December 2016 or also known as *Aksi 212*.

4. "Haedar Nashir: Mengumpulkan Orang untuk Demo Lebih Mudah Daripada Mengajak ke Perpustakaan", *suaramuhammadiyah.id*, 23 November 2016, available at <http://www.suaramuhammadiyah.id/2016/11/23/haedar-nashir-mengumpulkan-orang-untuk-demo-lebih-mudah-daripada-mengajak-ke-perpustakaan/>.
5. According to KH Ma'ruf Amin, the MUI does not only issue religious edict in the form of *fatwa*. It is true that issuing *fatwa* is one of the main activities of MUI and there is legal aspect in the *fatwa*. However, in addition to the *fatwa*, the MUI also issues *tausyiyah* or opinion and admonition related to certain issues. Interview with KH Ma'ruf Amin in Koja, North Jakarta, 4 August 2012. A detailed discussion on this subject can be found in Moch Nur Ichwan (2005). In the case of Ahok, what was issued by the MUI is not a *fatwa*. It is an opinion or *tausyiyah*.
6. The main components of the GNPF-MUI are FPI (Front for the Defense of Islam), HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia), MIUMI (Council for Young Muslim Scholars and Intellectuals), and Wahdah Islamiyah. It is also strongly supported by famous preachers, such as Abdullah Gymnastiar and Arifin Ilham.
7. During the Tanwir of Muhammadiyah in Ambon on 24–26 February 2017, attended by this author, the chairman of the organization, Haedar Nashir, reiterated the position of Muhammadiyah on the *Aksi Bela Islam*. He said that Muhammadiyah supported the 212 rally but not the rest.
8. More detailed explanation on Habib Rizieq Syihab and FPI can be found in Bamualim (2011).
9. Not long after elected as *rois 'am* of the NU, Bisri resigned from this position which was then given to Ma'ruf Amin (Norshahril 2015).
10. Speech in *Kajian Titik Temu* Paramadina on 1 March 2017, attended by the author.
11. Even Ahmad Syafii Maarif who strongly defends Ahok in the case of *Al-Maidah 51* also admitted to "*liarnya mulut Ahok"* (uncontrollable of Ahok's mouth) (Maarif 2016*c*). The official statement from the NU on this issue also underlines this problem and even quotes an

old Arabic proverb *salamatul insan fi hifdzil lisan* (a man's safety is in holding his tongue).

12. The antagonism towards Ahok united and mobilized people in Jakarta, bearing resemblance to what happened in Pakistan on 29 February 2016, when more than a hundred thousand people gathered in Rawalpindi for the burial of Malik Mumtaz Hussain Qadri. Qadri is a bodyguard who killed his master, Salman Taseer, governor of Punjab, in 2011 for what he considered as defending religious minorities, Asia Bibi. In his article, Aatish Taseer (2016), a son of Salman Taseer, mentioned that the presence of people in the burial was "motivated not by love for the man who was dead but by hatred for the man he killed". Similarly, in *Aksi Bela Islam*, using this analysis, people gathered not out of love or due to Rizieq Syihab's invitation, but because of their anamosity towards Ahok.
13. This conclusion is similar to what is found by other researchers in that the people do not agree with FPI, but the reason for joining the rally was varied and amongst them are "for law enforcement and to defend my religion" (Mietzner and Stewart 2016) or just "would be great to pray with a million Muslims in Medan Merdeka" (Fealy 2016).

References

Agung DH. "Saat Penistaan Agama Lahirkan Tentara Kandjeng Nabi Muhammad". Tirto.id, 4 November 2016. Available at <https://tirto.id/saat-penistaan-agama-lahirkan-tentara-kandjeng-nabi-muhammad-b1R9>.

Alfan, Ahsanul. "Gerakan Tentara Kanjeng Nabi Muhammad (TKNM) Tahun 1918". *Avatara* 4, no. 3 (2016): 1147–55.

Bamualim, Chaedar S. "Islamic Militancy and Resentment Against Hadhramis in Post-Suharto Indonesia: A Case Study of Habib Rizieq Syihab and his Islamic Defenders Front". *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 31, no. 2 (2011): 267–81.

Burhani, Ahmad Najib. "Al-Tawassuṭ wa-l I'tidāl: The NU and Moderatism in Indonesian Islam". *Asian Journal of Social Science* 40, nos. 5–6 (2012): 564–81.

———. "Fatwās on Mohamed Bouazizi's Self Immolation: Religious Authority, Media, and Secularization". In *Sharia Dynamics: Islamic Law and Sociopolitical Processes*, edited by Timothy P. Daniels. New York: Palgrave Macmillan Press, 2017, pp. 63–89.

Eickelman, Dale F. and Jon W. Anderson, eds. *New Media in the Muslim World: The Emerging Public Sphere*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2003.

Fealy, Greg. "Bigger than Ahok: Explaining the 2 December Mass Rally". *Indonesia at Melbourne*, 7 December 2016. Available at <http://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/bigger-than-ahok-explaining-jakartas-2-december-mass-rally/>.

Hasan, Noorhaidi. "The Making of Public Islam: Piety, Agency, and Commodification on the Landscape of the Indonesian Public Sphere". *Contemporary Islam* 3, no. 3 (2009): 229–50.

Hoesterey, James B. *Rebranding Islam: Piety, Prosperity, and a Self-Help Guru*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016.

Ichwan, Moch Nur. "'Ulamā', State and Politics: Majelis Ulama Indonesia After Suharto". *Islamic Law and Society* 12, no. 1 (2005): 45–72.

Jones, Sidney. "Why Indonesian Extremists are Gaining Ground". *The Interpreter*, 1 November 2016. Available at <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/why-indonesian-extremists-are-gaining-ground> (accessed 8 August 2017).

Lim, Merlyna. "Freedom to Hate: Social Media, Algorithmic Enclaves, and the Rise of Tribal Nationalism in Indonesia". *Critical Asian Studies* 49, no. 3 (2017): 411–27.

Maarif, Ahmad Syafi'i. "Preman Berjubah". *Republika*, 9 August 2005.

———. "400 Tahun untuk Ahok". *Koran Tempo*, 2 December 2016*a*.

———. "Energi Bangsa Habis Terkuras". *Republika*, 22 November 2016*b*.

———. "Liarnya Lidah Ahok dan Pintu Masuk". *Republika*, 15 November 2016*c*.

———. "Ahok Tidak Menghina Al-Qur'an". *Radar Banyumas*, 9 November 2016*d*. Available at <http://radarbanyumas.co.id/ahok-tidak-menghina-al-quran/>.

———. "Ahok Tidak Menghina Al-Qur'an". Rmol.co., 5 November 2016*e*. Available at <http://politik.rmol.co/read/2016/11/05/267191/Buya-Syafii-Maarif:-Ahok-Tidak-Menghina-Al-Quran>.

———. "Tidak Mengutuk, Malah Dikutuk". *Republika*, 25 October 2016*f*.

Mandaville, Peter. "Globalization and the Politics of Religious Knowledge: Pluralizing Authority in the Muslim World". *Theory, Culture & Society* 24, no. 2 (2007): 101–15.

Mietzner, Marcus and Devin T. Stewart. "Indonesia's Growing Islamist Populism". Asia Dialogues, Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs, 19 December 2016. Available at <http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/studio/multimedia/20161219/index.html>.

Norshahril Saat. "Nahdlatul Ulama's 33rd Congress: Ma'ruf Amin's Rise and its Impact on Indonesia's Traditionalist Islam". *ISEAS Perspective*, no. 48 (8 September 2015).

Pendapat dan Sikap Keagamaan MUI tentang Penistaan Agama, Penghinaan pada Ulama dan Penodaan Al-Qur'an oleh Ahok. Dikeluarkan di Jakarta, 11 Oktober 2016. Ditandatangani oleh Ma'ruf Amin dan Anwar Abbas Ketua Umum dan Sekretaris Jenderal.

Pernyataan Pers Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah tentang Rencana Aksi, 4 November 2016. Nomor: 552/PER/1.0/A/2016. Dikeluarkan di Jakarta, 1 November 2016. Ditandatangani oleh Haedar Nashir dan Abdul Mu'ti selaku Ketua Umum dan Sekretaris Umum.

Pernyataan Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah Nomor: 570/PER/1.0/A/2016 tentang "Aksi Damai 4 November dan Aspirasi Umat Islam". Dikeluarkan di Jakarta, 8 November 2016. Ditandatangani oleh Haedar Nashir dan Abdul Mu'ti selaku Ketua Umum dan Sekretaris Umum.

Pernyataan dan Sikap Resmi PBNU Pasca Aksi Demo, 4 November 2016. "Saatnya Memenuhi Rasa Keadilan Masyarakat". Dikeluarkan di

Jakarta, 7 November 2016. Ditandatangani oleh Said Aqil Siroj dan Helmy Faishal Zaini selaku Ketua Umum dan Sekretaris Jenderal.

Prasetyo, Eko. "Kelas Menengah Islam: Wajah Keagamaan Tanpa Ide Populis". In *Bela Islam atau Bela Oligarki? Pertalian Agama, Politik, dan Kapitalisme di Indonesia*, edited by Dede Mulyanto and Coen Husain Pontoh. Jakarta: Pustaka IndoPROGRESS and Islam Bergerak, 2017.

Rudi, Alsadad. "Ahok Minta Maaf kepada Umat Islam". *Kompas*, 10 October 2016. Available at <http://megapolitan.kompas.com/read/2016/10/10/09245441/ahok.minta.maaf.kepada.umat.islam>.

Taseer, Aatish. "My Father's Killer's Funeral". *The New York Times*, 11 March 2016. Available at <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/13/opinion/sunday/my-fathers-killers-funeral.html?_r=0>.

Chapter 8

PREACHERS-CUM-TRAINERS: THE PROMOTERS OF MARKET ISLAM IN URBAN INDONESIA[1]

Najib Kailani

INTRODUCTION

Lately, scholars have noted the rise of "market Islam", which refers to the middle class in many Muslim countries who associate consumption and wealth with Islamic piety (Haenni 2009; Rudnyckyj 2009; Jones 2007, 2010). Muslims have become passionate consumers and producers of "Islamized" products in the last two decades (Roy 2004; Njoto-Feillard 2004, 2012; Adas 2006; Fealy 2008; Nasr 2009; Haenni 2009; Rudnyckyj 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2014*b*; Hoesterey 2012, 2016). Advocates of market Islam typically have "more open attitudes toward Western management theory, popular psychology, and self-help industries" (Hefner 2012, p. 93). They consider Western management theories promoting self-sufficiency, discipline and entrepreneurship as in line with Islamic morals and ethics. Their encounter with Western management theories was significantly mediated by the massive development of self-help and popular management theory publications in Western countries. These books were then translated into various languages including Arabic and Indonesian (Thrift

1997, 2005; McGee 2005). Some popular Western management publications that were circulated in Muslim countries—including Indonesia—are Stephen R. Covey's *7 Habits of Highly Effective People*, Dale Carnegie's *Guide to Enjoying Your Life and Work* and Robert Kiyosaki's *Rich Dad, Poor Dad* (Rudnyckyj 2010, 2014*a*; Hefner 2012; Kenney 2015).

The popularity of self-help and Western management theories cannot be separated from the role of Muslim televangelist-cum-management trainers who have wedded Western management theories with Islamic teachings. In Egypt, these popular Muslim televangelist-cum-management trainers include Amr Khaled, Khaled al-Gendy and Muhammad Abdel Gawad, and they have promoted the entrepreneur subject and self-sufficiency (Atia 2013; Jung, Juul Petersen and Lei Sparre 2014; Zaied 2008). In Saudi Arabia, there is a young trendy preacher, Ahmad Al-Shugairi, the host of a television show called *Yalla Shabab* (Hello Youth). The show encourages young people to become open-minded and tolerant (Nasr 2009, p. 182; Wright 2011, pp. 176–84). To be sure, one should not discount the influence of Western neo-Pentecostal Charismatic televangelism and self-help gurus have on Muslim preachers (Einstein 2008; Njoto-Feillard 2004, 2012; Thomas and Lee 2012; Rudnyckyj 2010, 2014*b*; Hoesterey 2012, 2016).

The phenomenon of market Islam is also apparent in Indonesia. In the last decade, Indonesian Islam has witnessed the popularity of management trainings and publications which blend popular Western management theories with Islamic ethics (Rudnyckyj 2010, 2014*a*, 2014*b*; Howell 2013, 2014; Hoesterey 2012, 2016). Existing studies in this field associate the phenomenon with the role of new preachers and trainers in formulating current and modern forms of Islamic propagation, which also include management training. They suggest that the

new preachers and trainers have a role as an emerging source of new Muslim religious authority in contemporary Indonesia (Watson 2005; Howell 2013, 2014; Hoesterey 2012, 2016; Rudnyckyj 2010, Sakai 2012; Muzakki 2012). These studies have, however, mostly paid attention to the examination of contemporary figures in the post-New Order. Consequently, studies in this field seemed to pay no attention to historical trajectory in the past.

In order to have a comprehensive picture about this phenomenon, this chapter will investigate the preachers-cum-trainers in Indonesia and analyse their efforts in wedding Islamic morality and religious interpretations with applied and popular Western management theories from the New Order to the post-New Order eras. This chapter starts by illuminating the early proponent figures of preachers-cum-trainers Imaduddin Abdulrahim and Toto Tasmara and locate their position within the New Order development agenda.

My analysis of Imaduddin Abdulrahim and Toto Tasmara will demonstrate that they pioneered the form of preacher-cum-trainer in the Indonesian Islamic landscape. They attempted to interpret Islamic teachings in order to create a coherent model of Islamic management theory that was cogniscent of modern management theory. During the New Order, David McClelland's "need for achievement" theory was the most popular management theory. Imaduddin and Toto promoted a new interpretation of Islamic ethics, which states that Muslims have an obligation to create wealth and then wedded it with McClelland's "need for achievement" theory. Moreover, they also fostered the idea of work as a form of worship.

This chapter then highlights contemporary figures including Ary Ginanjar, Muhammad Syafii Antonio, Abdullah

Gymnastiar (Aa Gym) and Yusuf Mansur, locating them within the socio-political context of the post-New Order era. I argue that there is a continuity and change in their efforts to connect Islamic teachings with Western management theories from the New Order to the post-New Order eras. The continuity and change is significantly linked to the different social and political contexts in Indonesia. In order to understand this continuity and change, I have prepared Table 8.1. Details of the personalities highlighted will be discussed shortly.

TABLE 8.1
Preachers-cum-Trainers in Indonesia

Preachers-cum-Trainers	Contexts (years)	Branding of Islamic Management Programmes	Islamic Interpretations of Human Resource and Management
Imaduddin Abdulrahim	The New Order Development (late 1990s). Changing strategies of Suharto's government towards political Islam.	Achievement Motivation Training (AMT)	Muslim as a steward of God (*khalifah fil ardh*) which has a strong potential to create wealth.
Toto Tasmara	The New Order Development (late 1990s). Changing strategies of Suharto's government towards political Islam.	Achievement Motivation Training (AMT)	Muslim as a steward of God and has to strive for creating wealth (jihad).
Ary Ginanjar	Post-New Order (2000s). Social and political context of *reformasi* including campaigns against Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism (KKN) as well as privatization of state-owned enterprises.	Spiritual Company by ESQ (Emotional Spiritual Quotient)	Work as worship

TABLE 8.1 (*continued*)

Preachers-cum-Trainers	Contexts (years)	Branding of Islamic Management Programmes	Islamic Interpretations of Human Resource and Management
Muhammad Syafii Antonio	Post-New Order (2000s). The crisis of leadership after *reformasi*.	Prophetic Leadership and Management (ProLM)	Prophet Muhammad as a good moral exemplar in leadership and management.
Abdullah Gymnastiar and MQ trainers	Post-New Order (2000s). The emergence of urban Muslim middle class who aspire to be rich and pious.	Management Qalbu Training	Prophet Muhammad as a good moral exemplar of a pious and successful businessman.
Yusuf Mansur	Post-New Order (2000s). The social uncertainties faced by urban Muslims include unemployment and a fragile business environment.	KUN FAYAKUUN For Business	Islamic devotional acts, especially *sedekah* (voluntary alms giving) and *dhuha* (optional bright time prayer), are the methods to seek prosperity in return from God.

THE EARLY PROPONENTS OF PREACHER-CUM-TRAINER: IMADUDDIN ABDULRAHIM

One of the first figures who combined and popularized Western management theories with Islamic values and teachings to the Indonesian public was Imaduddin Abdulrahim. He was known as the architect behind the Islamic training sessions called *Latihan Mujahid Dakwah* (Training of Da'wa Striver), which were conducted at the Salman Mosque at the Institute of Technology Bandung (ITB) in the 1970s. Many studies highlighted his contribution to Islamic revivalism in secular campuses in Indonesia (Hefner 2000; Rosyad 2006; Hasan 2006). However,

little attention has been paid in exploring his role as the human resource management consultant and preacher-cum-trainer in Indonesia (exceptions are Njoto-Feillard 2004; Rudnyckyj 2010). The following description will highlight his ideas and initiatives on amalgamating Islam with popular Western management theory.

Imaduddin's career as a business consultant began after he completed his PhD in Industrial Engineering at Iowa University in 1985 and returned to Indonesia. Since then, he accepted invitations to speak at local and international platforms. In 1986, he established a foundation named *Yayasan Pembina Sari Insani* (the Foundation for the Development and Management of Human Resources, YAASIN[2]) in Jakarta, together with his former student at Salman mosque, Hatta Rajasa.[3] This foundation was dedicated to human resource development. In the following year, Imaduddin was invited by Anwar Ibrahim, then Malaysian Minister of Education (Tirtosudiro 2002, pp. 50–51), to deliver a talk on Islamic management in Malaysia. His lecture in Malaysia focused on promoting the new interpretation of Islamic theology (*tauhid*), namely Muslim as a steward of God on earth (*khalifatullah fil Ardhi*). In that lecture, he suggested that traditional Islamic theology contributed to the Malays' fatalistic attitudes. The traditional Islamic theology refers to *Sifat Dua Puluh* (the Twenty Attributes of God).[4] He argued that traditional Islamic theology underscored the way to understand God's attributes instead of highlighting the significant position of Muslims as stewards of God to seek prosperity in this world. He maintained that Malays cannot achieve development and progress if they continue to embrace the traditional Islamic theology (Abdulrahim 1992).

In essence, Imaduddin promoted the notion of the entrepreneur subject within the Islamic theology. In order to make his

scheme more fascinating and sophisticated to a wider audience, he combined his idea of God's stewards on earth (*khalifah fil-ardh*) with David McClelland's "need for achievement" theory. McClelland was a prominent theorist of developmentalism in the 1960s, particularly in modern management theory. Imaduddin maintains that as God's stewards on earth, Muslims have a strong potential to create wealth in this world. He then linked this notion with McClelland's "need for achievement" to foster a productive and entrepreneurial subject in the workplace (McClelland 1967, p. 65; Tirtosudiro 2002, pp. 14–20). He remarked that the blend of Islamic theology (*tauhid*) and the need for achievement produced the idea that "work is worship" (*kerja adalah ibadah*) (Abdulrahim 1992).[5]

Why did Imaduddin combine his idea of Islamic theology with McClelland's theory of a "need for achievement"? The "need for achievement" was the most popular management theory in the 1980s in many developing countries which considerably shaped their modernization efforts, including Indonesia. McClelland argues that there is a significant relationship between the "need for achievement" and economic development. He argues "if the need for achievement level is high, there will presumably be more people who behave like entrepreneurs, acting to produce more than they consume" (McClelland 1967, p. 65). In 1963, McClelland and his colleagues established an enduring institution, The Human Resource Development Corporation, to develop and practise achievement motivation training, particularly in targeted developing countries (Winter 1982).

In fact, in the 1980s, David McClelland's "need for achievement" was widely used in non-governmental organizations (NGOs) training programmes in Indonesia, which were popularly called Achievement Motivation Training (AMT). Some

prominent NGOs such as Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan, Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial (Institute for Social and Economic Research, Education and Information, LP3ES) and Bina Swadaya (Cultivating Self-Sufficiency) that promoted community development programmes to address the issue of poverty used AMT as their training instrument. AMT was recognized as an excellent method to help and assist communities in changing traditional social views on achievement and entrepreneurship to more "modern" ones by encouraging them to become active and vigorous in setting up enterprise groups (Fakih 1996; Hadiwinata 2003). However, references to Islam did not exist until Imaduddin established YAASIN, and wedded his new interpretation of God's steward on earth with the "need for achievement" theory.

Imaduddin's idea has resonated and influenced Muslims in Indonesia as well as neighbouring Malaysia. In 1992, his book on Islamic management entitled *Semangat Tawhid dan Motivasi Kerja* (The Spirit of Islamic Monotheism and Work Motivation) was published in Malaysia.[6] The book consecutively became one of the most significant and quoted publications on Islamic management in the 1990s. According to Hefner (2012, p. 96, footnote 14), Imaduddin's book was widely circulated in photocopy form among Muslim businessmen and activists during the 1990s. In addition, Imaduddin's influence was also indicated by his appointment as a management consultant of State-Owned Electricity Institute of Malaysia (Lembaga Listrik Negara) in 1992 (Tirtosudiro 2002, p. 51).

In the early 1990s, the configuration of Suharto's New Order politics changed dramatically towards Islam. This significantly impacted the social and political atmosphere of Islam in Indonesia. For example, the New Order removed the prohibition on veils for Muslim girls in schools, supported the establishment

ICMI (the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals), and donated funds to build thousands of mosques throughout Indonesia (Liddle 1996; Hasan 2006). In order to honour his commitment to Islam, Suharto and his family went to Mecca for pilgrimage and this was followed by Tutut, a daughter of Suharto, appearing in public events wearing a headscarf (Heryanto 1999; Smith-Hefner 2007).

According to Liddle (1996), one interpretation that has come to the fore regarding the establishment of ICMI is that it aimed to improve the quality of human resources in Indonesia. The discussion on human resources not only emphasized on technological matters but also involved Islamic values. The discourse of human resource was a combination of *Iptek* (*Ilmu Pengetahuan dan Teknologi*, Science and Technology) and *Imtaq* (*Iman dan Taqwa*, Faith and Devotion). The terms were originally presented by Habibie when he opened the Istiqlal Festival in February 1990 (Amir 2007). During the 1990s, the combination of *Iptek* and *Imtaq* was famously articulated in recorded sermons by a popular preacher, Zainuddin MZ, as "having a German brain with a Mecca heart" (*otak Jerman, hati Mekkah*)[7]. German denotes to the idea of technology and also the figure of Habibie who was trained in Germany. Meanwhile, Mecca refers to the Islamic site of pilgrimage, and is also a metaphor for devotion. In short, the combination of *Iptek* and *Imtaq* in the discourse of human resource management echoed the idea that modern knowledge is compatible with Islamic ethics (Amir 2007).

This new setting also drove Muslim reformists to become active in interpreting some key Islamic theories of economics and human resource development, which were also used to support Suharto's development projects. Federspiel (1998) highlights three major Islamic concepts that were developed

and discussed by Islamic scholars and religious leaders, namely human as stewards of God on earth (*khalifatullah fil Ardhi*), sharing wealth through religious tax (*zakat*) and fear of God (*taqwa*). For example, Federspiel shows that Syafii Maarif, a prominent Muslim figure from Muhammadiyah, the second largest Muslim organization in Indonesia, interpreted the concept of *taqwa* (fear of God) with a more positive reading. *Taqwa* (fear of God) to Maarif was a calling for Muslims to apply high discipline to achieve good behaviour.

Imaduddin has benefited from the changing context of the New Order towards Islam. He was one of the significant figures behind the establishment of ICMI. He then got affiliated with Habibie and contributed to the development of the Islamic view on human resource management. His career changed dramatically. The YAASIN foundation won a tender from the Indonesian Ministry of Health to coach and train all public hospital managers in Indonesia (Tirtosudiro 2002). He also had a much greater freedom to engage in Islamic preaching (Hefner 2000, p. 153), including in a regular Islamic television programme *Hikmah Fajar* (A Wisdom of Dawn), which featured Muslim intellectuals who delivered sermons.[8]

ECHOING WORK ETHICS

Besides Imaduddin, another prominent preacher-cum-trainer was Toto Tasmara. Toto was a Psychology of Communication graduate from Padjadjaran University (UNPAD) in Bandung and one of Imaduddin's cadres in the Salman mosque training sessions in the 1980s. In the 1990s, he was considered as one of the most popular Muslim preachers in Bandung (Rosyad 2006). In 1992, he was appointed as the Corporate Secretary of Humpuss Group, a company owned by Hutomo Mandala Putra

or well-known as Tommy Suharto, the younger son of the then President Suharto. Using his position in Tommy's company, Toto pioneered some important initiatives relating to Islam such as the first National Contest of Al-Qur'an Reading for Quranic Kindergarten Students and the Festival of Pious Indonesian Children (*Festival Anak Shaleh*) in 1992. These initiatives were fully supported by the Humpuss Company and were opened by Indonesia's then First Lady, Tien Suharto (Porter 2002).

While working for the Humpuss Company, Toto published a best-selling book that explored the idea of work ethics for Muslims, entitled *Etos Kerja Pribadi Muslim* (The Work Ethic of the Individual Muslim) (Tasmara 1994). In this book, he highlighted the social and religious meaning of work for a Muslim. He situated the notion of a Muslim as a steward of God who has to strive to create wealth in this world. His idea adopted Imaduddin's concept of Islamic theology. In Toto's view, Islamic theology instructs Muslims to obey God's commands completely. God commands Muslims to fulfil their duties as stewards of God (*khalifatullah fil-ardh*) in order to realize prosperity (*kemakmuran*) in this world. He also mentioned that God proclaims in the Al-Qur'an that Muslims are to be *khairu ummah* (the best community) who have an obligation to promote peaceful messages for the universe.

However, Toto argued that the Islamic theology (*tauhid*) and "the best community" (*khairu ummah*) should be put into practice by instilling Muslims with the idea of *jihad* (endeavour). In contrast to the general definition of *jihad* as simply "war", Toto defined it as "an effort to summon a goal and aim". The combination of Islamic theology and *jihad* in Toto's interpretation generates a Muslim work ethic namely "a world view which instructs a Muslim that the essence of work is not merely self-actualisation and fulfilment of the human being but

is also significantly a manifestation of good deeds and is to be valued as worship" (Tasmara 1994, p. 17).

Asef Bayat (1992) in his comparative analysis of work ethics in Islam and Protestantism demonstrates that an Islamic notion of "work as worship" began emerging in the 1980s during a period of particular Islamic revival in Muslim countries. It was developed by a number of Muslim writers, including Ibrahim El-Ne'mah, Ayyad and Ismail Al-Faruqi. Based on Bayat's enquiry, I would point out that the notion "work as worship" was not originally from Imaduddin or Toto, but they may have been exposed to these ideas through the available publications from Ibrahim El-Ne'mah, Ayyad and Ismail Al-Faruqi. The similar efforts to cultivate religious ethics have also been developed in other religions, including Judeo-Christian and Japanese East Asia (Pelikan, Kitagawa and Nasr 1985).

In order to justify his argument, Toto provided a historical narrative of the Prophet Muhammad's companion, Abdurrahman bin Auf, who was acknowledged as a rich and pious companion during the early period of Islam. Toto claimed that Abdurrahman was a good exemplar of Islamic work ethic. He wrote:

> We have to interpret the word "*jihad*" in a more workable way. It contains a work ethic that stimulates each Muslim to a need for achievement. This spirit can be found in one of the Prophet Muhammad's companions, Abdurrahman bin Auf. He was a good moral exemplar for us and he had a strong Islamic work ethic. Abdurrahman was well-known as a professional trader and was recognized as one of the richest in Mecca at that time. He decided to migrate (*hijrah*) with the Prophet Muhammad to Medina and left behind his life of luxury in Mecca. When he came to Medina, his best friend Saad bin Rabi offered him a property and luxury gifts but he did not accept the offer. He prayed to God to meet his needs and said to Saad, "Could you

> show me the location of the market?" The entrepreneurial spirit, the patience, the sincerity and the competence all fused into the figure of Abdurrahman. Abdurrahman believed that life was to be valued when worked hard and met the challenges of business (and the market). We know that Abdurrahman won the market competition. He was also able to play the role of the richest Muslim who could help the needy at any time. (My own translation) (Tasmara 1994).

The political elites of Suharto's New Order positively praised the publication of *Etos Kerja Pribadi Muslim* (The Work Ethic of the Individual Muslim). For example, the Minister of Manpower, Abdul Latief and the CEO of Humpuss, Hutomo Mandala Putra (or as he is more popularly known, Tommy Suharto) gave their testimonials for this book. Latief mentioned that the book contributed to the efforts made by the government to improve the quality of human resources in Indonesia. He highlighted the fact that the *Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun* (Five-Year Development Plans, REPELITA) of the New Order government had entered into a second phase, which emphasized on economics and human resource development. This allowed policymakers in the late New Order period to word the issue of human resource management in terms that were substantially tilted towards Islam and this Islamization of vocabulary was also the result of the changing political configuration of the New Order government towards Islam.

Toto's attention to the issue of Islamic management training seems to have continued after the fall of Suharto. Following the popularity of "Spiritual Quotient", which was based on Danah Zohar and Ian Marshall's book entitled *Connecting with Our Spiritual Intelligence* during the 2000s, Toto also developed the idea of "*kecerdasan ruhaniah*" (Transcendental Intelligence)

and created a training programme called "Spiritual Centred Leadership" targeting on managers (Tasmara 2001, 2006). Although his training programme was not as popular as Ary Ginanjar's Emotional and Spiritual Quotient as will be explained in the following discussion, some companies such as Jasa Marga Company, Bank Shariah Mandiri, and Bank Rakyat Indonesia Shariah, have regularly appointed Toto and his training institution to deliver motivational training to their employees.[9]

The following exploration will analyse the contemporary preachers-cum-trainers during the post-New Order and highlight their efforts in wedding Islamic teachings and values to Western and popular management theories. I will show that the concept of "work as worship" remains a significant notion promoted by the contemporary preachers-cum-trainers in this era. However, the new social and political context of Indonesia during the *reformasi* period has also significantly contributed to the making of various interpretations of Islamic ethics and their applications to Western management theory.

I divide the efforts of the contemporary preachers-cum-trainers in the post-New Order period into two forms of expression, namely management training and business motivation seminar. Management training targets executives and high rank employees in companies, while business motivation seminar targets the general audience, from university students to professionals who are approaching retirement. Although the Islamic management theory in these two activities intertwines, the two activities emphasize on Islamic management theory from a purely corporate employee orientation to much wider audiences.

A DEVELOPING ISLAMIC CORPORATE MANAGEMENT THEORY

In this section, I will describe two preacher-cum-trainer figures: Ary Ginanjar and Muhammad Syafii Antonio. Ary Ginanjar is a trainer who promotes Emotional and Spiritual Quotient, while Muhammad Syafii Antonio is a consultant on Islamic banking and finance who supports the idea of the Prophet Muhammad as a good moral exemplar. These two figures would be located within social and political changes of the post-New Order era.

After the fall of Suharto, Indonesia experienced a large number of social and political challenges, which include corruption, collusion, nepotism (*Korupsi Kolusi dan Nepotisme*, KKN) and a crisis in leadership (Young 1999). An awareness of these challenges has also been significantly driven by the emergence of various Islamic management training schemes. Islamic management training programmes address the crucial issues of the post-New Order era, such as corruption, collusion, nepotism (KKN), privatization of state-owned enterprises and the leadership crisis.

In the context mentioned above, Ary Ginanjar was one of the preachers-cum-trainers in the post-New Order who had creatively blended Western management ideas with Islamic teachings and values. Ary Ginanjar, a former lecturer who switched to being a businessman, created a management training programme called Emotional and Spiritual Quotient (ESQ). ESQ has come to the fore as a popular training programme during 2000. It has been used to train more than 600,000 company employees. Rudnyckyj (2008, 2009, 2010, 2014*b*) shows that Ary Ginanjar deliberately merged the idea of ESQ from Stephen R. Covey[10] and Danah Zohar[11] with Islamic

teachings, namely the Five Pillars of Islam (*Lima Rukun Islam*) and the Six Pillars of *Iman* (*Enam Rukun Iman*). In his trainings, Ary Ginanjar extensively applies Islamic rituals and frequently refers to authoritative Islamic sources (Howell 2013). In a broad context, the ESQ trainings address moral crises such as corruption, collusion and nepotism by inculcating ethical disposition of "work as worship" (Rudnyckyj 2008, 2009, 2010, 2014*b*).

Another contemporary preacher-cum-trainer figure is Syafii Antonio. He is a Chinese who converted to Islam, and received his Bachelor in Islamic Law from the University of Jordan, his Masters in Islamic Economy from the International Islamic University of Malaysia, and his PhD from Melbourne University. Antonio's educational background has given him a reputation as an expert in Islamic Economy. He is a member of the board of directors of the Shariah advisors for several banks and chairman of the Tazkia College of Islamic Economy as well as the founder of the Andalusia Islamic Centre (Hew 2012).

In addition to his expertise in Islamic economy, Antonio also delivers Islamic sermons on television as well as at mosques and Islamic gatherings. In response to the social and political changes during the *reformasi*, he also initiated a management training programme called Prophetic Leadership and Management (ProLM). The training programme addresses the problem of leadership in the period after New Order developmentalism. It highlights the life of the Prophet Muhammad as a leader in the spheres of military, family, and the state. Syafii Antonio wrote a book entitled *Muhammad SAW: Super Leader, Super Manager* (2007). The ProLM training targets high ranking government officers and executives in order to encourage greater initiatives in leadership.

There is no doubt that the new forms of Islamic propagation which blends Islamic teachings and values with Western management theories have attracted urban Indonesian Muslims. Rudnyckyj (2014*b*) argues that there are three reasons why urban Muslims are attracted to these programmes and their publications. First, the training and publications have provided an additional dimension to the meaning of work. Work is not merely understood as earning a living but is also recognized as a form of worship. Second, they have provided an alternative religious authority that is more attractive and modern than the established religious authorities. Finally they have also served to reconcile modern technology and attitudes with religion.

In addition, the globalization of Western management theories has significantly impacted on Indonesia as well (Thrift 2005). During the New Order period, AMT was recognized as the only beneficial training programme, whereas in the post-New Order environment there is a more dynamic attitude towards management theory. It began with the translation of popular management publications into Indonesian, such as Steven R. Covey's *7 Habits of Highly Effective People* and Robert Kiyosaki's *Rich Dad Poor Dad*.[12] These publications have significantly influenced Islamic management practice in Indonesia.

CONCLUSION: THE RISE OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP TRAINING AND SEMINARS

Post-New Order developments have also witnessed the rise of Islamic business motivation seminars, which promote the idea of prosperity. There are two clear Islamic messages concerning prosperity and wealth in Indonesia. First, while Islam encourages prosperity, it also recommends that Muslims who aspire to be

rich should be pious by using their wealth to undertake good deeds. Meanwhile, the latter highlights that performing Islamic devotional acts can expedite Muslims' paths to prosperity (Fealy 2008).

One of the earliest promoters of Islamic prosperity discourse in Indonesia is Abdullah Gymnastiar (alias Aa Gym). He is well-known as a celebrity preacher and Muslim televangelist. During his peak popularity in the 2000s, he had successful businesses under the MQ management. He also wrote a book entitled *Saya Tidak Ingin Kaya, Tapi Harus Kaya* (I Do Not Want to Be Rich but I Have to Be Rich) (2006). In this book, Gymnastiar popularized a particular moment of Prophet Muhammad's life history, especially his involvement in commerce. He interprets the Prophet Muhammad's characteristics such as *al-amin* (trustworthy) as being in line with modern attitudes, such as accountability, responsibility and hard work. He also reframes the Prophet Muhammad as a professional, an entrepreneur and a rich man (Hoesterey 2012, 2016).

Business motivation training and seminars target urban Muslims who aspire to be rich. These seminars provide a moral justification for the aspiration to be rich in Islam, since the Prophet Muhammad himself was rich and generous. In other words, being rich is socially and religiously acceptable if the wealthy can also direct their wealth towards religious goals, such as establishing orphanages, mosques and schools (Hoesterey 2012, 2016; Rudnyckyj 2008, 2010, 2013).

In fact, aspirations to be rich among Indonesians revived significantly during the 1990s when Indonesia witnessed the emergence of a new and expanded Indonesian middle class. Before that, being rich, especially among the rural society, was considered suspicious (Heryanto 1999). Indeed, majority of urban Muslims in Indonesia have a rural background, and according

to the rural culture, being rich is socially unacceptable. The rich in this rural culture are usually associated with having mystical spirits. Moreover, religious teaching has regularly circulated the idea that being rich contributes to the delay in entering paradise due to the many questions addressed to the rich on how they have used their wealth.

The other business motivation seminar on prosperity, titled "*Kun Fayakuun* for Business", accentuates the performance of Islamic devotional prayers, especially voluntary alms giving (*sedekah*) and optional bright time prayer (*dhuha*). The promoter of this trend is Yusuf Mansur. He is one of the emerging Muslim televangelists in contemporary Indonesia. He has hosted many religious programmes on television including *Wisata Hati* (The Journey of the Heart) and "The Miracle of Giving". He also published more than fifty books on these topics. Through his television programmes and publications, he promotes the idea that voluntary alms giving is not merely a distribution of wealth, but a significant way to seek prosperity. In contrast to his senior trainers and preachers who place emphasis on ethics, Mansur promotes performative acts. He grounds his ideas in Islamic scriptures, including Al-Qurán and Hadist. These scriptural references highlight the way that performing voluntary alms giving will be rewarded by God in multiple economic material rewards.

The spread of "market Islam" in Indonesia could not be separated from the significant role of the new preachers and trainers in promoting modern form of Islam among urban Muslims in Indonesia. These preachers and trainers cultivate and inculcate Islamic ethics and merge them with the popular modern management theories. Furthermore, they circulate ideas through training programmes, seminars and publications. The various articulations of market Islam in Indonesia from

the New Order to the post-New Order eras demonstrate the efforts of Indonesian Muslims to negotiate their religiosity to modernity by wedding Islamic teachings with popular management theories.

This chapter also shows that different social and political contexts within Indonesia shape different management training programmes, and a diverse range of interpretation of Islamic ethics. The trainers and preachers blend Western management theories with Islamic morals and ethics to respond to the social and political changes of the Indonesian people. During the New Order, AMT and Islamic theology (*tauhid*) were articulated and used widely in management training, while in the post-New Order period the Islamic management training is presented in more nuanced and dynamic ways.

Notes

1. I would like to thank Minako Sakai, Nicolaas Warouw, and Hew Wai Weng for their valuable comments on an earlier draft of this chapter and Norshahril Saat for his helpful comments and editorial advice.
2. YAASIN seems to refer to one chapter in Al-Qur'an titled YAASIN. It is a famous chapter of the Al-Qur'an among Indonesians who recited it during the *slametan* or *tahlilan* in villages.
3. After *reformasi,* Hatta Rajasa is well known as a politician of Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party) and was a vice presidential candidate in the 2014 Presidential Election.
4. *Sifat Dua Puluh* (Twenty Attributes of God) is the most popular Islamic theological concept among the Malay people. Until recently it is circulated through Islamic study groups and Islamic sermons. The notion was introduced by al-Sanusi (1437–90) and transmitted into the Muslim archipelago in the nineteenth century through a *Kitab Jawi* as commentary of Sanusi treatise called *Aqidah al-Najin* by Zain al-Abidin Ibn Muhammad al-Patani. See Mohd. Nor Bin

Ngah, *Kitab Jawi: Islamic Thought of the Malay Muslim Scholars* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1983), pp. 9–10; Virginia Matheson and M.B Hooker, "Jawi Literature in Patani: The Maintenance of an Islamic Tradition", *Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 61, no. 1 (1988): 1–86; Mujiburrahman, "Islamic Theological Texts and Contexts in Banjarese Society: An Overview of the Existing Studies", *Southeast Asian Studies* 3, no. 3 (2014): 611–41.

5. Imaduddin's idea of Islamic theology seems to connect with Weber's notion on "calling" in Protestant ethic. Weber argued that the idea about "calling" is the product of Reformation which means "the valuation of the fulfilment of duty in worldly affairs as the highest form which the moral activity of the individual could assume. This it was which inevitably gave everyday worldly activity a religious significance." See Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1976), p. 80; Gwenaël Njoto-Feillard, "Insuffler L'esprit Du Capitalisme 'A L'umma: La Formation D'une ‹‹Éthique Islamique Du Travail›› En Indonésie", *Critique Internationale* 4, no. 25 (2004): 65–91.
6. This publication initially appeared in *Ulumul Qur'an*, an academic journal published by Lembaga Studi Agama dan Filsafat. It was published as "Sikap Tauhid dan Motivasi Kerja" in 1990 and was republished in the Malay language in Malaysia in 1992. See Imaduddin Abdulrahim, "Sikap Tauhid dan Motivasi Kerja", *Jurnal Ulumul Qur'an* 2, no. 6 (1990): 36–43; Imaduddin Abdulrahim, *Semangat Tawhid dan Motivasi Kerja* (Kuala Lumpur: Institut Kajian Dasar Malaysia, 1992).
7. During the establishment of ICMI, I was a senior high school student. I regularly listened to Zainuddin MZ who used and popularized the term "having a German brain with a Mecca heart" via the radio and cassette-sermon.
8. Imaduddin regularly conveyed his idea of Muslim as a steward of God which has a strong potential to create wealth in *Hikmah Fajar*

television programme. *Hikmah Fajar* was a regular Islamic television programme of RCTI. It featured a host who directed a discussion with a Muslim cleric. On religious television programmes during that time see Inaya Rakhmani, "Regime and Representation: Islam in Indonesian Television, 1962 to 1998", *RIMA: Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs* 47, no. 1 (2013): 61–88.

9. In 2002, Toto's *Etos Kerja Pribadi Muslim* (1994) was revised and reprinted as Toto Tasmara, *Membudayakan Etos Kerja Islami* (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 2002). The new publication was endorsed by Imaduddin Abdulrahim. Imaduddin mentioned that "This book is a must-read for managers that manage Muslim employees in order to improve the productivity of their business to support the prosperity of nation which recently nearly collapse."
10. Stephen R. Covey is widely recognized as a best-selling author of popular management books including *The 7 Habits of Highly Effective People*. The book has been translated into more than fifty languages. He is also recognized as a management guru.
11. Danah Zohar is a best-selling author. One of her popular publications is about Spiritual Quotient (SQ) entitled *SQ: Connecting with Our Spiritual Intelligence*.
12. Robert Kiyosaki is a well-known investor and financial education guru. He writes several books on how to build wealth. His books have been translated into Bahasa Indonesian, for example, Robert T. Kiyosaki, *Rich Dad, Poor Dad: Apa yang diajarkan Orang Kaya Pada Anak-anak Mereka Tentang Uang yang tidak Diajarkan oleh Orang Miskin dan Kelas Menengah*, 31st edition (Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2012). See also Stephen R. Covey, *7 Kebiasaan Manusia Yang Sangat Efektif* (Jakarta: Binarupa Aksara, 1997).

References

Abdulrahim, Imaduddin. "Sikap Tauhid dan Motivasi Kerja". *Jurnal Ulumul Qur'an* 2, no. 6 (1990): 36–43.

———. *Semangat Tawhid dan Motivasi Kerja*. Kuala Lumpur: Institut Kajian Dasar Malaysia, 1992.

Adas, Emin Baki. "The Making of Entrepreneurial Islam and the Islamic Spirit of Capitalism". *Journal for Cultural Research* 10, no. 2 (2006): 113–37.

Amir, Sulfikar. "Symbolic Power in a Technocratic Regime: The Reign of B.J. Habibie in New Order Indonesia". *Sojourn: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia* 22, no. 1 (2007): 83–106.

Antonio, Muhammad Syafi'i. *Muhammad SAW: The Super Leader, Super Manager*. Jakarta: Tazkia Multimedia, 2007.

Atia, Mona. *Building a House in Heaven: Pious Neoliberalism and Islamic Charity in Egypt*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2013.

Bayat, Asef. "The Work Ethic in Islam: A Comparison with Protestantism". *The Islamic Quarterly* 36, no. 1 (1992): 5–27.

Bin Ngah, Mohd. Nor. *Kitab Jawi: Islamic Thought of the Malay Muslim Scholars*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1983.

Covey, Stephen R. *The Seven Habits of Highly Effective People: Restoring the Character Ethic*. Melbourne: Business Library, 1989.

———. *7 Kebiasaan Manusia Yang Sangat Efektif*. Jakarta: Binarupa Aksara, 1997.

Einstein, Mara. *Brands of Faith: Marketing Religion in a Commercial Age*. London and New York: Routledge, 2008.

Fakih, Mansour. *Masyarakat Sipil Untuk Transformasi Sosial: Pergolakan LSM Di Indonesia*. Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 1996.

Fealy, Greg. "Consuming Islam: Commodified Religion and Aspirational Pietism in Contemporary Indonesia". In *Expressing Islam: Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia*, edited by Greg Fealy and Sally White. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008, pp. 15–39.

Federspiel, Howard M. *Indonesia in Transition: Muslim Intellectuals and National Development*. New York: Nova Science Publisher, 1998.

Gymnastiar, Abdullah. *Saya Tidak Ingin Kaya, Saya Harus Kaya*. Bandung: MQS, 2006.

Hadiwinata, Bob S. *The Politics of NGOs in Indonesia Developing Democracy and Managing a Movement*. New York, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003.

Haenni, Patrick. "The Economic Politics of Muslim Consumption". In *Muslim Societies in the Age of Mass Consumption: Politics, Culture and Identity between Local and the Global*, edited by Johanna Pink. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009, pp. 327–42.

Hasan, Noorhaidi. *Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy, and the Quest for Identity in Post-New Order Indonesia*. Cornell: Cornell University Press, 2006.

Hefner, Robert W. *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000.

———. "Religious Resurgence in Contemporary Asia: Southeast Asian Perspectives on Capitalism, the State, and the New Piety". *Journal of Asian Studies* 69, no. 4 (2010): 1031–47.

———. "Islam, Economic Globalization, and the Blended Ethics of Self". *Bustan: The Middle East Book Review* 3 (2012): 91–108.

Heryanto, Ariel. "The Years of Living Luxuriously: Identity Politics of Indonesia's New Rich". In *Culture Privilege in Capitalist Asia*, edited by Michael Pinches. London and New York: Routledge, 1999, pp. 159–87.

Hew, Wai-Weng. "Expressing Chineseness, Marketing Islam: The Hybrid Performance of Chinese Muslim Preachers". In *Chinese Indonesians Reassessed: History, Religion and Belonging*, edited by Chang-Yao Hoon and Siew-Min Sai. London: Routledge, 2012, pp. 179–99.

Hoesterey, James B. "Prophetic Cosmopolitanism: Islam, Pop Psychology, and Civic Virtue in Indonesia". *City & Society* 24, no. 1 (2012): 38–61.

———. *Rebranding Islam: Piety, Prosperity and a Self-Help Guru*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016.

Howell, Julia D. "'Calling' and 'Training': Role Innovation and Religious De-Differentiation in Commercialised Indonesian Islam". *Journal of Contemporary Religion* 28, no. 3 (2013): 401–19.

———. "Christendom, the Ummah and Community in the Age of Televangelism". *Social Compass* 61, no. 2 (2014): 234–49.

Jones, Carla. "Fashion and Faith in Urban Indonesia". *Fashion Theory: The Journal of Dress Body and Culture* 11, nos. 2–3 (2007): 211–32.

———. "Materializing Piety: Gendered Anxieties about Faithful Consumption in Contemporary Urban Indonesia". *American Ethnologist* 37, no. 4 (2010): 617–37.

Jung, Dietrich, Marie Juul Petersen, and Sara Catherine Lei Sparre. *Politics of Modern Muslim Subjectivities: Islam, Youth and Social Activism in the Middle East*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.

Kenney, Jeffrey T. "Selling Success, Nurturing the Self: Self-Help Literature, Capitalist Values and the Sacralization of Subjective Life in Egypt". *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 47 (2015): 663–80.

Kiyosaki, Robert. *Rich Dad, Poor Dad: Apa yang diajarkan Orang Kaya Pada Anak-anak Mereka Tentang Uang yang tidak Diajarkan oleh Orang Miskin dan Kelas Menengah*, 31st ed. Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2012.

Liddle, R. William. "The Islamic Turn in Indonesia: A Political Explanation". *The Journal of Asian Studies* 55, no. 3 (1996): 613–34.

Matheson, Virginia and M.B. Hooker. "Jawi Literature in Patani: The Maintenance of an Islamic Tradition". *Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 61, no. 1 (1988): 1–86.

McClelland, David C. *The Achieving Society*. New York: Free Press, 1967.

McGee, Micki. *Self-Help, Inc.: Makeover Culture in American Life*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Mujiburrahman. "Islamic Theological Texts and Contexts in Banjarese Society: An Overview of the Existing Studies". *Southeast Asian Studies* 3, no. 3 (2014): 611–41.

Muzakki, Akh. "Islamic Televangelism in Changing Indonesia: Transmission, Authority, and the Politics of Ideas". In *Global and Local Televangelism*, edited by Pradip Ninan Thomas and Philip Lee. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, pp. 45–63.

Nasr, Vali. *The Rise of Islamic Capitalism: Why the New Muslim Middle Class is the Key to Defeating Extremism*. New York: Free Press, 2009.

Njoto-Feillard, Gwenaël. "Insuffler L'esprit Du Capitalisme 'A L'umma: La Formation D'une ‹‹Éthique Islamique Du Travail›› En Indonésie". *Critique Internationale* (2004): 65–91.

———. *L'islam et la réinvention du Capitalise en Indonésie*. Paris: Karthala IISMM, 2012.

Pelikan, Jaroslav, Joseph Mitsuo Kitagawa, and Seyyed Hossein Nasr. *Comparative Work Ethics: Judeo-Christian, Islamic and Eastern*. Occasional Papers of the Council of Scholars. Washington: Library of Congress, 1985.

Porter, Donald J. *Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia*. London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002.

Rakhmani, Inaya. "Regime and Representation: Islam in Indonesian Television, 1962 to 1998". *RIMA: Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs* 47, no. 1 (2013): 61–88.

Rosyad, Rifki. *A Quest for True Islam: A Study of Islamic Resurgence Movement among the Youth in Bandung Indonesia*. Canberra: ANU E-Press, 2006.

Roy, Olivier. *Globalised Islam: The Search for a New Ummah*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2004.

Rudnyckyj, Daromir. "Worshipping Work: Producing Commodity Producers in Contemporary Indonesia". In *Taking Southeast Asia to Market: Commodities, Nature and People in the Neoliberal Age*, edited by Joseph Nevins and Nancy Lee Peluso. Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 2008, pp. 73–87.

———. "Market Islam in Indonesia". *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 15, S183–S201 (2009).

———. *Spiritual Economies Islam, Globalization, and the Afterlife of Development*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2010.

———. "Engineering Entrepreneurial Ethics: Islam after Development in Indonesia". *Moussons* 21 (2013): 37–49.

———. "Regimes of Self-Improvement: Globalization and the Will to Work". *Social Text* 32, no. 3 (2014*a*): 109–27.

———. "Religion and Asia's Middle Class". In *Routledge Handbook of Religions in Asia*, edited by Bryan S. Turner and Oscar Salemink. London, New York: Routledge, 2014*b*, pp. 329–42.

Sakai, Minako. "Preaching to Muslim Youth in Indonesia: The Dakwah Activities of Habiburrahman El Shirazy". *RIMA: Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs* 46, no. 1 (2012): 9–31.

Smith-Hefner, Nancy J. "Javanese Women in the Veil in Post-Soeharto Indonesia". *Journal of Asian Studies* 66, no. 2 (2007): 389–420.

Tasmara, Toto. *Etos Kerja Pribadi Muslim*. Yogyakarta: Dana Bhakti Wakaf, 1994.

———. *Kecerdasan Ruhaniah (Trancendental Intelligence): Membentuk Kepribadian Yang Bertanggung Jawab, Profesional Dan Berakhlak*. Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 2001.

———. *Membudayakan Etos Kerja Islami*. Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 2002.

———. *Spiritual Centered Leadership: Kepemimpinan Berbasis Spiritual*. Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 2006.

Thomas, Pradip N. and Philip Lee. *Global and Local Televangelism*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.

Thrift, Nigel. "The Rise of Soft Capitalism". *Cultural Values* 1 (1997): 29–57.

———. *Knowing Capitalism*. London: Sage Publications, 2005.

Tirtosudiro, Achmad. *Bang 'Imad: Pemikiran Dan Gerakan Dakwahnya*. Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 2002.

Watson, Conrad W. "A Popular Indonesian Preacher: The Significance of AA Gymnastiar". *The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 11, no. 4 (2005): 773–92.

Weber, Max. *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1976.

Winter, David G. "David C. MacClelland: An Intellectual Biography". In *Motivation and Society*, edited by Abigail J. Stewart. San Fransisco, Washington, London: Jossey-Bass Publisher, 1982, pp. xix-xxxiv.

Wright, Robin. *Rock the Casbah: Rage and Rebellion across the Islamic World*. New York: Simon and Shuster, 2011.

Young, Ken. "Post-Suharto: A Change of Regime?". In *Reformasi: Crisis and Change in Indonesia*, edited by Arief Budiman, Barbara Hatley and Damien Kingbury. Monash: Monash Asia Institute, 1999, pp. 69–104.

Zaied, Al-Sayed. "Da'wa For Dollars: A New Wave of Muslim Televangelists". *Arab Insights* 2, no. 2 (2008): 21–27.

———. "Da'wa for Dollars: A New Wave of Muslim Televangelists", 24 September 2013. Available at <www.arabinsight.org>.

Zohar, Danah and Ian Marshall. *SQ: Connecting with Our Spiritual Intelligence*. New York, London: Bloomsbury, 2001.

SECTION III

Singapore

Chapter 9

SHARIAH REVIVALISM IN SINGAPORE

Noor Aisha Abdul Rahman

INTRODUCTION

Since the 1970s, Southeast Asia has witnessed the emergence of religious resurgence amongst the Malays, popularly referred to as the *dakwah* movement.[1] Essentially an urban phenomenon, it is manifested in a puritanical understanding and experience of Islam expressed in various domains of life, not excluding the Muslim law otherwise known as Shariah. While there has been considerable research on the problems of Shariah revivalism in neighbouring countries, the same cannot be said for Singapore, where the Muslims are subjected to the same laws as non-Muslims in all areas except in the domain of the family and inheritance. In these areas, the AMLA (1968), supplemented by the classical Muslim law, in particular the tenets of the Shafie school, bind them while non-Muslims are subjected to the Woman's Charter (1960). This chapter analyses the mode of thinking of Singapore's Shariah revivalist proponents based on their discourse. It argues that their imagination of the Shariah is not only alienated from the legal history and tradition of the community, but reflects and breeds exclusivist and dogmatic perceptions of Shariah which impedes prospects for

the development of effective Muslim law, imperative for the well-being of Muslims and the wider community.

ISLAMIC RESURGENCE

Shariah revivalism is a major facet of the Islamic resurgence in Singapore that emerged about a decade after Independence amidst unprecedented social change induced by the process of development and nation building. For the Malays already mired in socio-economic problems under the colonial rule, adaptation to the demands of the new socio-political conditions proved highly challenging. Their stark socio-economic lag compared to non-Malays quickly drew the attention of scholars and community leaders alike who warned that their manifold problems did not bode well for the young nation as a whole.[2]

In their attempts to alleviate the problems and propel the community's progress, the Malay elites constantly evoked religious values and cultural traditions, an effort reinforced by the government's emphasis on multiculturalism in its search for national identity. The turn to Islam as ballast for the community's socio-economic progress was neither novel nor unexpected given its strong influence on the lives of the Malays. However the potential of the religion in preparing and facilitating adaptation to the demands of modernization in the value sphere was impeded by the emergence of a religious experience strongly characterized by exclusivist, puritan and authoritarian traits. Proponents simplistically attributed the complex problems of the community to the impact of Western culture, values and models of development based on the West. In their bid to safeguard the community against the onslaught of modernity, they dogmatically sought to redefine, cultivate and impose a pristine Malay/Muslim identity, culture and society deemed authentic as basis for the

community's spiritual and material progress while claiming to embrace modern life.

While problems of adaptation and insecurity in the midst of rapid and extensive change following Independence provided fertile ground for the resurgence, the impact of the phenomenon from the region, and the wider Muslim world similarly confronted with such challenges, were no less relevant. The Iranian revolution in 1979 and the establishment of the Islamic state thereafter further heightened the resurgence. It symbolized for resurgents, the success of Islam in overthrowing a corrupt, secular regime and the possibility for a society based on social justice. In the wake of the revolution, some local Malays became Shia though these early "converts" chose to conceal their religious affiliation for fear of potential adverse ramifications from their predominantly Sunni community. Over the decades, the resurgence has been reinforced by a host of complex factors not excluding problems of urbanization, maladaptation to the demands of change and conditions of the pluralistic society, technological advancement in communications and social media, the influence of religious fundamentalism in the region in response to internal socio-political conditions, global politics and its impact on the Muslim world.[3] However the basic motives of resurgence agenda and discourse have persisted throughout these decades, albeit manifested in different approaches adopted by proponents and their sense of issues as they attempt to respond to their changing social, economic and political milieu.

Unlike theologians trained in religious studies (either formally or informally), who have monopoly of Islam in the community, revivalists radically differ in terms of their profile and religious outlook. They emerge from disparate, social status groups and are generally the product of modern education or

Islamic studies pursued in Western-styled universities although today their influence is manifested even in traditionalist religious circles. Devoid of strong expertise both in religious knowledge as well as modern sciences, they nevertheless positioned themselves as having the best of both. At the height of the resurgence in the 1980s, their leading ideologues included Abul ala Maududi, Hassan al-Banna, Syed Qutb, Kurshid Ahmad, Ismail Faruqi, Maryam Jamilah, Yusuf al-Qaradawi and Rashid Ghannouchi. Furthermore, leaders of Islamist movements such as Anwar Ibrahim of Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM) and others from Himpunan Mahasiswa Indonesia (HMI) were also regularly invited by youth-based *dakwah* organizations to deliver talks at Islamic cadre camps. The more active amongst these then included Himpunan Belia Islam, Permusi, Muslim Fellowship and others that have remained, such as the Muslim tertiary students organizations on campus, Muhammadiyah, FAMSA and Perdaus. Over time, revivalist mode of thought has also penetrated traditionalist religious organizations including PERGAS. While some of the personalities mentioned above remain highly influential, Malaysian scholars on Islam namely Syed Muhammad Naguib Alattas, Sidek Fadil, Muhammad Kamal Hassan, and Mohd Nor Manuty are also much sought after today. Their strong influence has been facilitated by the increasing enrolment of local Muslim students into Islamic tertiary institutions in Malaysia such as the International Islamic University of Malaysia (IIUM), the Institute of Islamic Civilisation and the Malay World (ISTAC) and the Centre for Advanced Studies on Islam, Science and Civilisation (CASIS). Twinning programmes on Islamic studies between local Muslim organizations such as PERGAS and such institutions also attract many young local Muslims.

Revivalists' mode of religious thought is strongly characterized by defensive, authoritarian and exclusive streaks. They

assume sole guardianship of Islam and are intolerant of intra-community competing thoughts and perspectives drawn from competing Islamic traditions (Azhar 2014, pp. 35–90). In their bid to make Muslims better believers, proponents have not only attacked "un-Islamic" cultural beliefs, practices and performances as conflicting with their puritan definition of Islam, they also label and vilify those who do not conform to theirs (Azhar 2014, pp. 61–64). The ferocious hate-speeches and attacks against "liberal", "plural" or "secular" Muslims and even Sufistic groups and practices proliferating in the social media are some of the more recent manifestations of their exclusive and intolerant imprints on intra-community diversities of religious expressions and perspectives.[4] They have also been at the forefront in supporting and introducing Islamic education that attempts to combine Islamic knowledge with modern sciences and Islamic finance initiatives as alternatives to mainstream or conventional institutions (*Berita Minggu*, 14 August 2006).[5] Since 2000 or so, proponents have adopted public adversarial standpoints against policies affecting Muslims which they deem un-Islamic. These include the prohibition of *tudong* in schools and specific jobs which proponents deem compulsory, bans imposed on certain Muslim evangelist preachers from being invited to Singapore, Muslims' participation in public/national events and its impact on worship, demands for *halal* certification for food products and safeguards against contamination of utensils in food joints, among many others. Their articulation on moderation in Islam in response to the government's call for moderate Muslims to speak up to counter religious extremism after the attack of 9/11, provides further evidence of their attempts to negotiate with authorities on issues pertaining to Islam and religiosity of the Muslims in Singapore.[6]

ISLAM AS *AD-DEEN*

While the dominant experience of traditionalist Islam has been largely apolitical, centred on individual piety and personal salvation, revivalists' political motif is clearly revealed in their understanding of *Ad-deen* or Islam as the comprehensive religion. While *Ad-deen* has been generally understood in traditionalist teachings to mean that Islam has provided a complete system of values and principles as guidance for humanity, quite distinct from how Islamic history had evolved into complex civilizations, revivalists dogmatically assert that the religion has provided mankind with fixed "systems" or order that govern their lives on every aspect—social, economic, cultural, political, moral, and legal. Utilizing selective reading of the Koran and Sunna (traditions ascribed to the Prophet Muhammad) articulated in absolute terms, proponents assert that *Ad-deen* in this sense is integral to the very fundamental teachings of Islam. The famous dictum of Hassan al-Banna invoked by PERGAS in its book *Moderation in Islam* illustrates their mode of thought:

> Islam is a comprehensive system that touches on all aspects of life. It is the state and the land, the government and the people, morals and strengths, mercy and justice, civilisation and law, knowledge and judgement, natural resources, production and wealth, jihad and preaching, a team and an ideology as much as it is a straight path and true aqidah no more, no less (PERGAS 2004, p. 107).

Similarly, Maududi's claims for "Islam as a comprehensive religion governing all aspects of life with no separation between any of the aspects", including affairs of state, matters of justice and social regulations, are commonly referred to for support of

their puritan view that in Islam, religion and politics are indivisibly intertwined (Hassan 2007). Proponents also consistently reiterate the rhetoric of like-minded ideologues to the effect that Islam does not accept detaching any aspect of life from the guidance of religion and despises those who are selective in applying God's teachings. Absolutist claims attributed to Syed Qutb that Muslims have only two choices—either to accept all the teachings of Islam for this world and the afterlife, or abandon them woven into this discourse reflect and legitimize their absolutist mode of thought. Such "testimony" fixated on conflating religion and politics completely overlooks relevant critiques advanced by Muslim intellectuals on the ideological limitations of politicizing religion and its adverse ramifications on Muslims as well as Islam itself (Al-Ashmawy 1994). Proponents are preoccupied with tampering the concerns of the authorities against political Islam as a security threat, while they completely dissociate from engaging in competing views on the fatal consequences of such conflation.

While the socio-economic problems of the community are conditioned by complex factors that can only be alleviated by accurate diagnosis, planning and structural reforms, revivalists simplistically and reductively attribute them to Muslims' deviation from or lack of awareness of the comprehensiveness of Islam's teachings and their implementation. Rhetorical slogans and assertions to the effect that the problems of the modern world can only be resolved by returning to the comprehensive teachings of Islam prescribed in the Koran and Sunna predominate their discourse. The serious limitations of their fuzzy, unsubstantiated rhetoric have been severely critiqued by Muslim reformers (Alatas 1979, pp. 2–6).

Revivalists' political motif is further reflected in their discourse on *dakwah* and the role of man as "Khalifah" (vicegerent) of God on earth. While in traditional Islam *dakwah* is understood as the ethical duty to perform good deeds and refrain from evil based on basic values and teachings of the religion, revivalists define it as God's command to Muslims to establish His order on earth as integral to faith and identity. This political slant to *dakwah* is manifested in religious publications, including official ones published since the 1980s. One such piece carried Faruqi's views to the effect that *dakwah* is the imperative of "exerting pressure on the knower to share the supreme vision with his peers" and the "obligation to actualise the divine pattern in space and time" (Faruqi 1988).[7] *Dakwah* has also been taken to mean that Muslims have the responsibility of implementing Islam in politics or participating in politics in accordance with the principles of Islam for "Islam cannot be separated from politics nor politics from Islam" (Hassan 2007*a*, pp. 5–6).

Revivalists' political credo of Islam as *ad-deen* conditions inasmuch as it reflects the simplistic dichotomy they draw between existing states and institutions which they label as secular and the product of the West from those they deem Islamic. This constructed dichotomy is upheld even as they differ on how and what Muslims, particularly minority Muslims living in a secular state and subjected to its institutions, should do while keeping the faith. In their discourse, the West is caricatured as the potent symbol of secularism which they vilify as analogous to atheism, nihilism, materialism and relativism of human values with all its adverse ramifications on man and society. They attack or dissociate themselves from their very caricature as conflicting and undermining Islamic ethics and worldview and as threatening the very integrity of Islam itself. Such perception

condition their total rejection of secularism as illustrated by the standpoint of PERGAS: "Islam differs from secularism"—while secularism segregates the role of religion from matters of society and state, "Islam has guidelines for all aspects of life and demands its believers' commitment to all teachings." Hence

> whatever form of secularism, whether it be one which totally rejects religion in society or which limits it to just the moral aspects of society or with the purpose of eliminating religion from society or one which accepts religion to secure harmonious living, it is in principle, conflicting with our understanding of religion (PERGAS 2004, p. 109).

Their simplistic and reductive binary consistently pervades their discourse irrespective of intellectual debates and competing views advanced by Muslim social thinkers on the conceptual limitations and misunderstanding of secularism and its adverse ramifications on the community.[8]

SHARIAH REVIVALISM AND THE MALAYSIAN CONNECTION

Revivalists' mode of thought is notably evident in the domain of law. Their discourse reveals an understanding of the Shariah as a fixed system of rules which they deem integral to the comprehensiveness of Islam as a "religion, state, creed and system". In Singapore where stringent laws and their vigilant enforcement prevent and negatively sanction the politicization of religion, Shariah revivalism is confined to the discursive plane unaccompanied by political activism for its expansion beyond legally defined perimeters. Those who echo assertions that Shariah is integral to the Islamic state or order do not lobby or champion for changes to the national law in which Shariah

is confined essentially to family law regulated by AMLA. They also do not seek to challenge parliamentary democracy. Their discourse, strategy and approach differ starkly from neighbouring Malaysia where the politicization of religion by both government and opposition in a bid to undercut opponents' Malay electoral support has shored and reinforced radical changes to and demands for the expansion and implementation of Shariah beyond historically defined legal parameters. For more than three decades, PAS, for instance, has persisted in its political project to introduce *hudud* in Kelantan as integral to its agenda of establishing an Islamic state despite joining Pakatan in an opposition coalition. Proponents have also imposed their own version of the legal status and influence of Islam in Malaysia in defiance of strong historical evidence.[9] In mounting its own Islamization agenda in response, the government has over the decades introduced a host of policies and laws aimed at improving the Shariah Courts. It has endorsed constitutional amendment guaranteeing their exclusive jurisdiction, vastly expanded the religious bureaucracy and its legal powers apart from supporting harmonization of Islamic and secular law in the areas of family and evidence law, much of which have resulted in endless litigation in conflict of law issues and friction[10] (Harding 1995; Faruqi 2005). The more recent spates of controversial legal issues provide further instances of the long standing politicization of religion in the domain of law not replicated in Singapore.[11]

While the conflation of religion and politics on Shariah is absent in Singapore, Shariah revivalist discourse here nonetheless mirrors similar traits of thought as their Malaysian counterparts in terms of selection of themes, valuation and perspectives while treading carefully within the bounds of regulatory surveillance and constraints.[12] Their bias in favour of the imagination of Malaysia's Shariah revivalists on the status

and influence of Islamic law in Malaysia illustrate the point. The utopian view held by some Malaysian academics that Islamic law had been strongly observed and implemented in Malay society and would have remained so had it not been "robbed" of its status by colonial powers to justify its reinstatement today is uncritically adopted (Saedon 1988).[13] Echoing such views, a prominent member of PERGAS maintained that prior to colonialism, Islamic law had been a strong "force" in Malaya and would have been the operative law "if not for the British arriving on the Peninsula". He also uncritically glorified Malay rulers' significance in giving effect to Islamic law which has influenced the definition of Malay in the Constitution of Malaysia and made Islam a symbol of unity, based on revivalist literature (Hassan 2007*b*).[14] While undoubtedly Islam is a major source of Malay law, scholars have noted that the extent to which Islamic law was implemented remains uncertain. Such an imagination also negates stark incongruence between Islamic values and feudal customs that co-existed in legal texts on matters as fundamental as the rule of law, equality and justice. It also uncritically overlooks the problems of Malay feudalism in entrenching stark inegalitarian laws that accorded absolute power to the ruling class at the expense of Malay subjects apart from overlooking relevant historical sources on the variance between the values of Islam and injustices perpetuated by Malay rulers prior to colonialism. Indeed in actuality, many laws that reflected Islamic influence were flouted by rulers whose rights and privileges were themselves guaranteed of its protection. No less that Abdullah himself had in the mid-nineteenth century critically censured some of these laws based on the values and teachings of Islam.[15]

The lack of awareness of ideological motives underlying legal texts reinforces as much as it conditions the problem. Provisions

that reflect or ascribe to a source to Islam are taken literally to mean that the laws were in fact implemented by Malay rulers given their devotion and religiosity. As Azhar Ibrahim rightly pointed out:

> They are easily impressed by the Islamic elements they find in their uncritical readings of feudal legal tracts but fail to see that many of these legal tracts functioned more as an ideological instrument to boost feudal power than as an implementation of Islamic law. Hence they believe that the recent call for the implementation of Shariah law is valid and that only the enemies of Islam would deny it (Azhar 2014, p. 68).

Such pitfall mars an objective and critical appraisal of Islamic law in the legal history of the Malays crucial for genuine reconstruction and reform of existing law.

Like their counterparts in the region, revivalists generally denounce intra-community competing views that promote human rights, gender equality, freedom of belief and other aspects of fundamental liberties which further illustrate their exclusivist and authoritarian streaks. Those who support these issues on the premise that they are compatible with the richness of Islamic legal tradition and its democratic values are not tolerated and are vehemently attacked.[16] *Fatwas* proclaimed by religious conservatives within Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia (JAKIM) in Malaysia and Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) in Indonesia are commonly utilized to demonize their opponents and legitimize their actions. The protest by PERGAS against ISEAS for inviting Zainah Anwar, former President of Sisters in Islam, an NGO dedicated to promoting Muslim women's rights based on Islam and Ulil Absha, Head of Research and Human Resource of Nahdlatul Ulama and founder of Jaringan Islam Liberal, to speak at its Regional Outlook Forum in 2003, is a case

in point. Their views on gender equality, headscarves for women and *hudud* among others had incensed conservative religious authorities back home. In deeming them "not qualified to speak on Islam", PERGAS asserted: "It is common knowledge that the two speakers were controversial speakers. ISEAS must know that their stands, statements and assertions have already met with strong reactions from the Islamic religious authority in their respective countries." Despite maintaining that engaging diversity of views through discussion and debate is commendable, they inconsistently refused to respond to the speakers' views intellectually, while alleging that both had deviated from "accepted method of debate in Islam" and disparaged Muslims' respect for religious authority by "indirectly instigating" Muslims to be "defiant" against them. Such allegations reveal lack of tolerance for competing group thought, apart from unfounded presumptions that Muslims are devoid of the capacity for individual judgement (*Straits Times*, 25 January 2003, p. 30). The insistence that they should be consulted on who should speak for Islam so as to avoid confusion also reveals their attempt at monopolizing guardianship over Islam.

Though Singapore's Shariah revivalists refrain from advocating for the implementation of Shariah beyond defined parameters given their political reality, they nevertheless succumb to the same rhetoric as their Malaysian counterparts in promoting the view that Shariah is indispensable to *Ad-deen* which in turn cannot be isolated from politics and power. PAS, for instance, proclaims that its "struggle for power to govern is not merely for power itself, but as a means to establish an Islamic state, able to realise the laws of Allah completely" (Salleh 1999, p. 52). This view is echoed by PERGAS which asserted that: "It is the responsibility of every Muslim to implement Islam in politics or to participate in politics in accordance with the principles of

Islam" so that "criminal law and justice" can be implemented in perfection (PERGAS 2004, p. 115). The rhetoric of Hassan al-Banna is also invoked to justify their stance: "…we call on you to absorb the teachings of Islam, the laws of Islam and its guidelines. Therefore if you view this as politics then this is politics…". Revivalists here do not champion for their pristine Shariah, they abstain on grounds of exigency (*darurah*) given that they are politically emasculated:

> While we believe in the comprehensiveness of Islam, the socio-political realities of the Muslim community here indicate the possibility of practicing comprehensive Islam in the Singapore context is remote. Muslims have no choice but to pragmatically accept the political reality and choose more appropriate and beneficial priorities (PERGAS 2004, p. 111).

Though they state that the secular state which is impartial to religion should be accepted, they reject it in principle as to their minds, Islam has already provided for their formulations. Their discourse is not only extremely vague and nebulous as concepts used are not explicated, it also fails to problematize the Islamic state and how the existing law and state are un-Islamic (Hassan 2007*a*, p. 7). Their rejection of the existing law and state in principle, since it differs from their pristine imagination of *Ad-deen*, also conveys the danger that should they have political power, they will impose their version of the divine Shariah.

SYURA VERSES PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY

Revivalists' rhetoric on the differences between parliamentary democracy and the "Syura" also reflect their fuzzy rhetoric and exclusivist orientation. While they maintain that they accept parliamentary democracy as it does not oppress the

Muslims and is neutral to religion, they nevertheless uphold the Syura, which they deem as obligatory in Islam. Despite noting the strengths of the state and parliament, proponents nevertheless proclaim that "until an Islamic Shura (consensual) system of government is established, the second best alternative for Muslims is a secular democratic [state]" (Hassan 2007*a*, p. 17). Rhetoric on the Syura first emerged at the height of *dakwah* in the 1980s. Utilizing selective readings of specific verses from the Koran, they accord Syura as one of three fundamental religious obligations that binds Muslims (apart from prayers and charity), an understanding alien to traditionalist religious discourse. As integral to faith, the Muslims, they claimed, are obliged to demand it from their leaders who must establish it as a fundamental component of Islam. Utopian debates that have no relevance to the Singapore context nor experience of Muslims here pertaining to the scope of the Syura, the extent of its powers to make laws already legislated by God, its binding effect on the leaders of the community, whether significant events in Muslim history were in fact based on Syura, predominate their discourse (Salleh 1983*b*, pp. 32–33).

The persistence of the political motif in revivalists' discourse on Syura resurfaced in the context of debates on moderation after the attack of 9/11. While PERGAS maintained that Syura is quite similar to modern democratic system, it nevertheless caricatures and distinguishes the latter as having power to pass any laws based on the views and interests of the majority. On the contrary, the Syura's law making power, they asserted, is limited only to areas that have not been predetermined by the Koran and Sunnah (*hukm qat'ii*). Such statements erroneously imply that parliamentary democracy is arbitrary as any law can be made or unmade based simply on the endorsement and interests of the majority. It also assumes that what PERGAS

presume as immutable of Shariah is unanimous amongst Muslims though this is far from true given fierce contestations on the very nature of Shariah itself. While proponents often invoke the extreme example of same sex marriage endorsed in some Western countries as the fundamental difference between parliamentary democracy and Syura, they are silent on the effective law that prohibits a marriage between a Muslim and a Kitabiyyah in Singapore, despite the fact that it is recognized as a valid Muslim marriage by scholars within the Muslim tradition. This is so even as they seek to position themselves as guardians of moderation in Islam. Furthermore the extent to which the singular extreme example they highlight promotes a balanced view of the vast contributions of the institution in establishing the rule of law and protection of basic rights and liberties for all, is highly questionable. Their exclusivist streak is also evident in their treatment of Syura as comprising only Muslims tasked to "take over the rule and ensure that Islamic Sharia is ardently applied", despite the plural society in which they exist. Equally pertinent, their discourse on the Syura completely overlooks the fundamental issue of "who guards the guardians". Instead, idealistic assertions that the institution is based on sound values of mutual respect and the common good that transcends individual interests abound without clear explication of how these are institutionalized to ensure transparency and accountability to citizens (PERGAS 2004, p. 120).

HUDUD

Shariah revivalists' fixation with *hudud* as integral to faith is yet another strong indication of their authoritarian and exclusivist mode of thought. While what they mean by *hudud* is ill-defined,

their uncritical support for *hudud* proponents in Malaysia, however, strongly suggests that they share similar understanding as their Malaysian counterparts. While they maintain the need to understand it, they abstain from engaging intellectually with competing thoughts on *hudud* and sweepingly assert that it is mandatory. PERGAS' assertions illustrate the point:

> Hudud is part of our religion and one needs to understand it as best possible, before we talk about its implementation or criticise it. As hudud is enshrined in the Holy Koran and as-Sunnah, it is compulsory for Muslims, wherever we are, to believe in the sanctity of hudud.

Such statement defies critical thinking apart from revealing authoritarian streak. Furthermore, fear mongering is also resorted to discourage questioning of *hudud* as "doubting and disputing it" "may lead to apostasy" (PERGAS 2004, p. 129). PERGAS' warning to the effect that those who do not implement *hudud* "have strayed from Islam" (PERGAS 2004, p. 129) is yet another example. In other words, *hudud* in their view, should be accepted without question as it is integral to faith. To do otherwise will lead one astray. The Koranic verse 5:44 that reads:

> And if any do fail to judge by (the light of) what Allah has revealed, they are (no better than) Unbelievers, (so judge between them by that which Allah hath revealed, and follow not their desire but beware of them lest they seduce thee from some part of that which Allah hath revealed unto thee

is also invoked to justify the selective view without problematizing whether the verses refer to *hudud* and equally pertinent their very version of it. The lack of critical analysis is also clearly manifested in their fixation on approaches to be adopted for

its implementation while marginalizing the central crux of the issue.[17]

Shariah revivalists' abstain from stating their standpoint on the death sentence for apostasy as an essential aspect of *hudud* law proclaimed by proponents such as PAS. While they acknowledge that "there is no compulsion in religion", they use the verse one-sidedly to apply to non-Muslims while they refrain from stating clearly whether Muslims have the freedom of belief and the consequences if any for them, should they abjure Islam (PERGAS 2004, pp. 22–24). Instead, their overriding concern lies with impediments in the enforcement of *hudud*. They delve at length into who can implement *hudud*, the stages of its implementation, grounds for exception and prioritization of needs for minority Muslims in Singapore who are unable to implement it.

Revivalists' evaluation and fixation on *hudud* as a compulsory religious obligation clearly mirrored in their evaluation of the variety of responses to *hudud* in Malaysia also reveal their authoritarian streaks. Those who reject *hudud* as a compulsion in Islam are labelled as either "ignorant" or "secularists" who reduce religion to a private matter for symbolic and ceremonial purposes only without any substantiated evidence. In the words of a prominent member of PERGAS:

> Many Malays remain ignorant about their religion, despite the tide of Islamic resurgence. They view their religion as a cultural issue or ritualistic practice. They view a good Muslim as one who performs the five daily prayers, fasts during Ramadhan, pays *zakat* (tithe) and performs one pilgrimage in a lifetime. They will be content as long as they are free to perform all those rituals. The government's effort to build mosques, organise *zakat* collection and improve services for pilgrimage are sufficient for them (Hassan 2007*b*, pp. 303–4).

As opposed to the secularists, he positively evaluates those who seek to implement *hudud* as having "a great affinity for Islam". Blind to competing thoughts on *hudud* and its ramifications on the progress of the Muslims within the context of Malaysia's pluralistic society, he instead dabbles on the strategies the latter employs to implement *hudud*, stating his preference to the incremental approach advocated by Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM) and some factions of *United Malays National Organisation (*UMNO) as opposed to the "fundamentalist" approach, presumably of PAS. His dogmatic standpoint that *hudud* is compulsory is, however, stark despite the gross lack of analysis of intra-community competing thoughts as well as an understanding of the criminal law and justice system (Hassan 2007*b*, p. 303).

While the fixation on *hudud* among Shariah revivalists in Singapore is confined to the rhetorical plane, it nevertheless bears serious implications on the image and understanding of Islamic law and the religion. Muzaffar explicates that not only is *hudud* not central to Islam, its emphasis is also at variance with the Quranic meaning of the term which as he maintains, alludes to the limits or restraints that one is advised to adhere to in one's behaviour. The modes of punishment prescribed do not define one's piety but the strong commitment to justice demonstrated through actual deeds that is the ultimate measure of one's goodness. Equally pertinent, Muzaffar warned that the preoccupation with *hudud* deflects attention from vital problems confronting the Muslims including poverty, corruption, exploitation, authoritarianism and foreign domination that has drained Muslims and which cannot be resolved through mere promulgation of *hudud*. In fact, countries that have imposed *hudud* are the very ones guilty of heinous violation of distributive justice, accountability of leaders,

freedom and dignity of the human being and where access to education, transparency in administration, accountability, promotion of unity among different communities, social justice, freedom of expression and checks against elite corruption, licentiousness and authoritarianism are wanting (Muzaffar 2002, pp. 233–38).

MINORITY FIKH/FIKH OF PRIORITIES

While they do not challenge the parliamentary system and in fact maintain that it protects and respects their religious interests, the notion of the pristine Shariah and Syura which they deemed imperative to *Ad-deen* necessitates their articulation for exemption based on specific methodologies alien to traditionalist thought (PERGAS 2004, p. 113). A methodology they invoke to justify exemption from existing law is *ruksah*, devised to excuse themselves from implementing what they deemed as immutable laws of God, due to their minority status in Singapore. The need for such methodology to justify exemption follows from the presumption that the national law is in conflict with their version of authentic Islamic law. Proponents assert that the device allows for exemption from a general rule in the event of debilitating difficulties to cater to the varying contexts faced by man. While they utilize the analogy of the permissibility of drinking alcohol under exigent conditions when water cannot be obtained so as not to endanger life deemed sacred in Islam (Hassan 2007*a*, pp. 11–12), it is unclear how such a device can be extended to legitimize exemption from national laws without first demonstrating how the laws harm or undermine life or property. On the contrary the protection of these are the common objectives of both Islamic and civil laws. This pertinent issue is glaringly unaddressed despite their claim as the voice of moderation. Even

their call for "contextualizing" Shariah is not accompanied by clear and systematic principles relevant to the task.

The related methodology of "fikh of priorities" which they promote as part of Islamic teachings also suffer the same pitfall. Essentially this fikh is justified to eliminate a bigger harm for a smaller one or a general harm for a specific one. It again follows from the vague rhetorical premise that in principle, the laws of the state are in conflict with their pristine Shariah. Proponents maintain that this device justifies acceptance of existing laws such as the law on theft in order to avoid a greater harm (*mudarat*) like lawlessness or negative perceptions from non-Muslims about Muslims' loyalty. Yet they are silent in explicating clearly on grounds of principles, how the criminal law including punishment for theft opposes Islam and its values in the first place. While overlooking this significant question, they nevertheless assert that Muslims should not remain silent in facing laws that are opposed to the principles of Shariah but prioritize dealing with them based on the "degree of maslahat, mudarat, reality, capability and the existing dakwah scenario" in consultation with religious authorities (Hassan 2003*a*, pp. 16–17). Muslims are also urged to "consciously" avoid living in a situation that is far from ideal in terms of the Shariah. In their words: "without this consciousness in our hearts, what will be left from our faith?" Proponents are fixated on strategies to avoid head-on clashes with state laws, as to do otherwise would result in unnecessary opposition and complicate *dakwah* activities and the practice of Islam (PERGAS 2004, p. 17). Their preoccupation with dialogues aimed at changing regulations and policies on *tudong* in schools and specific spaces at the expense of facilitating critical discussions on *tudong* which they deem mandatory in Islam further illustrates their sense of priority. In the last few

years, proponents have called for a re-focus from concerns on state and law to civil and commercial matters which they deem more beneficial. However even in the proliferation of writings on these areas that have emerged, simplistic and reductive binary between secular law and institutions based on their version of the "authentic" Islamic law have persisted. The new fikh has not ushered critical revaluation of dogmatic presuppositions but merely suspended them. While there have been new initiatives such as Islamic banking, finance and management and greater attention on regulations and practices deemed Islamic in the proliferation of materials and institutions that has emerged, existing exclusivity in thought remains starkly evident. Their praise for Islamic banking as allowing Muslims to "free themselves from un-Islamic practices while displaying the beauty of Islam" illustrates the point (Hassan 2003*a*, p. 17).[18] Furthermore, assertions to the effect that Muslims should support and participate in these alternative Islamic investment schemes which exist today are also revealing of their authoritarian and exclusivist mode of thought.

Shariah revivalists' exclusivist mental mode is also evident in their uncritical importation of fikh for minorities which emerged in the West to provide legal response to issues emerging within their own local condition. Developed by Yusof Qardhawi, this fikh attempts to develop a specific methodology for rulings in response to concerns of Muslim minority migrants in the West grappling with the problem of "deterritorialization". While the practice of turning to and assimilating relevant and progressive religious ideas emanating from all over the Muslim world is praiseworthy and imperative, the same cannot be said if such importation is carried out without critical deliberation of the ideas imported. In this respect some of the views promoted by Qardhawi to safeguard a distinct Islamic identity for Muslims

living in predominantly non-Muslim states and societies accentuate dichotomies between Muslims and others that can impede effective harmonization based on commonality of values and objectives. His stand on freedom of belief and opinions on non-Muslims are also marred by overgeneralizations and bias. That revivalists have not only endorsed this fikh in their writings and discourse but fervently advocate for its introduction in the madrasah and mosques with the support of the Malay media and religious institutions, reveal their alienation from their own legal history as indigenous people who have long embraced and participated in the national law and legal system.[19] The justification adduced for its dissemination that Islamic law is all encompassing and extends beyond merely family law further reveals revivalist yearnings.

For instance, while Qardhawi proclaims that there is no compulsion to accept Islam, he nevertheless uphold the view that whosoever embraces Islam of his own free will is not permitted to abandon it (al-Qaradawi 2003, p. 62). Furthermore his *fatwa* on the marriage of a Muslim wife who abjures Islam must be dissolved based on the "unanimous agreement" of those who proclaimed that a Muslim woman who apostasizes must be killed or imprisoned raises strong issues of concern of his sources and their orientation (al-Qaradawi 2003, pp. 62–63). While Qardhawi himself is silent on whether she should be killed, he not only does not object or condemn those who do but even resorts to their view as basis for invalidating such marriages. The fact that he, however, allows one who embraces Islam during the course of his/her marriage to a non-Muslim to keep the marriage and even proclaim that it "obliges a kind relation including sexual intercourse", reveals the relativity of values he enjoins (al-Qaradawi 2003, p. 116). Qardhawi also adopts a highly restrictive position on marriage between a Muslim male

and a Kitabiyyah even though he acknowledges that it is permitted in Muslim law. He asserts that the original ruling which permitted such marriages "strengthens ties of compassion and mercy among Muslims and people of the Book". Nevertheless the restrictions he imposes on such marriages not only reflect his strong disfavour for them but deep bias in favour of the Muslim male against the Kitabiyyah. The Kitabiyyah and not the Muslim male needs to be a genuine believer in a religion of divine origin, such as Judaism or Christianity; that she "must be pure, chaste and completely free of doubt concerning her morality"; she is not to be from those "bearing enmity or at war with Muslims and that the marriage should not cause *fitnah* (ordeal) or any kind of harm to the Muslim man" (al-Qaradawi 2003, pp. 64–78). Qardhawi's views on a Muslim's right to inherit the property of a non-Muslim kin is no less questionable for its negative presumptions and stereotypes of non-Muslims. Departing from the majority view which prohibits a Muslim from inheriting from a non-Muslim and vice versa, he proclaimed that Islam does not stand as an obstacle in the way of good or benefit coming to the Muslims as long as he supports Islam thereby. Thus "if any law allows the Muslim to inherit, we must not deprive them of this good by granting it to the unbelievers to enjoy and to devise malicious schemes against Muslims" (al-Qaradawi 2003, pp. 118–19). Believers are worthier of this wealth so long as they devote it to obey Allah the Almighty (al-Qaradawi 2003, p. 119).

The methodologies revivalists invoke to justify exemption from what they deem as God's laws reveal puritan assumptions of their understanding of Islam as *Ad-deen* absent in religious thought and discourse of traditionalist religious elites. In fact to my mind acceptance of the national law and the parliamentary system as the sovereign law making institution has never been contested by the community since its introduction. Rhetoric on

the apparent dichotomy between Islamic and secular law has also never surfaced in local discourse. On the contrary, Muslims have all the while lobbied for legislative proposals or reforms through these institutions. Their overriding concern has clearly been the adequacy, effectiveness and fairness of the law in expediting justice for Muslims and their families. Revivalist discourse can thus be said to be alienated from their own legal tradition.

In effect revivalist discourse reveals the notion of Shariah as fixed and immutable. It overlooks the fact that Shariah which they seek to uphold has evolved in Muslim civilizations and history and interacted as well as assimilated numerous influences (Hamidullah 1966, pp. 1227–31). While they may admit evidence of this interaction they fail to systematically and consistently develop an inclusive approach in their understanding of the relationship between Islamic law and the civil law and legal institutions. Furthermore, while the Islamic law in operation can be traced to a lineage of ideas expounded by Muslim legal scholars in the classical tradition with modifications, Shariah in revivalist thought is ahistorical and alienated from these processes. Instead, it is taken as a system of laws legislated by God quite isolated from how it had organically evolved and developed by communities in response to specific socio-historical contexts.

SHARIAH REVIVALISM IN PRACTICE

While Shariah revivalism has been largely confined to the discursive plane, its imprints have penetrated legal decisions. The recent judgement of a kadi who declined to solemnize and register the marriage involving a Shia Malay after the bride's father refused to consent to her marriage on the ground that the suitor is a Shia, is a case in point.[20] That this was not an isolated

case as indicated in the Appeal Board's judgement, warrants concern. As Shias are an integral part of the fold of Islam, the kadi's dismissal of the marriage application bears serious implications. It is generally known that since 2000 Shias have been targeted, labelled, demonized and even subjected to violent persecutions by Sunni extremists at times with the complicity of the relevant authorities in the region (Boy 2015; Musa and Tan 2017). The manifold reasons for the rise of this anti-Shia sentiment will not be discussed here. Suffice to say that although Singapore has not witnessed violent anti-Shia attacks given legal safeguards, fear mongering and anti-Shia hate speeches persist particularly over the social media (Johari 2016).

In the case in point, the kadi in question rightly invoked an earlier *fatwa* passed by Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura (MUIS) which enunciated to the effect that Shi'ism is not part of mainstream Islam and that consistent with the standpoint of Muslims all over the world, they are a part of the *ummah*, except the extremists (*al-ghula*) within their own community. Nevertheless as the Appeal Board pointed out, the kadi failed to investigate whether the Shia suitor indeed belonged to such an extremist group. The decision also deviated starkly from the dominant approach consistently adopted by kadis in the last few decades that generally defer to the bride's choice of her suitor in the absence of evidence of adversity against her. Utilizing the authority of the legal scholar Syed Ameer Ali, the Appeal Board also aptly pointed out that the kadi had deviated from principles governing the power of the wali over his ward as explicated by Shafie. Contrary to the kadi's opinion that under the Shafie school of law, the father as a wali has absolute power over the marriage of his ward, the Appeal Board differed. It affirmed as a matter of principle that it is commendable for the wali not to abuse his power where an adult

sane woman wishes to marry her suitor under no compulsion. In reversing the kadi's judgement, the Appeal Board submitted that the bride, an adult, had chosen to be married out of her own free will and her husband had affirmed that he is not an extreme Shia. There was no concern that family disharmony or hardship would result as the couple had no intention to sever ties with the bride's parents. More significantly it was pointed out that as they are recognized as Muslims it would be unfair and contrary to the values of Islam not to allow their marriage to be solemnized. While the judgement puts to rest the question of validity of marriage to a Shia, the decision of the kadi may nevertheless give rise to unwarranted speculation of revivalist trappings in official religious institutions.

The imprints of Shariah revivalism is also evident in the attempts at reviving selective legal devices of the past no matter how remote for general legal application today, at the expense of relevant law deemed secular, without recourse to principles. The *fatwa* on *nuzriah* passed by MUIS for Muslims to "validate" the civil law joint tenancy agreements and CPF nominations against the system of fixed shares prescribed by the Muslim law of inheritance (*faraid*) illustrates the point.[21] These instruments have been used by many Muslims in Singapore who are bound by the Muslim law of inheritance by virtue of sections 111 and 112 of AMLA for decades for reasons best known to themselves. Yet in a *fatwa* enunciated by MUIS in 1998, the joint tenancy was deemed inconsistent with the *faraid* which is to take effect in the event of a Muslim's death, irrespective of the testator's intent and other legal arrangements. As a result of the tremendous problems and friction that arose from contesting kin arising from the *fatwa*, MUIS amended its original *fatwa* and introduced the *nuzriah*, an expressed agreement made between the joint owners subject to specific

conditions that will allow the property to devolve on the named survivor irrespective of the *faraid*. Despite the judgement of the Court of Appeal on the irrelevance of the *fatwa* to the validity of joint tenancy agreements,[22] the fact that the *nuzriah* itself is remotely practised even in its apparent place of origin (i.e. Yemen), unheard of in the legal history of the region and by no means an unambiguous instrument, it continues to be promoted not only by MUIS and some Muslims in a bid to override the Islamic law of inheritance.[23] This reaction stems from a deep dogmatic binary drawn between Islamic law and the national law commonly manifested in Shariah revivalists' mode of thought. Rather than embracing the joint tenancy agreement on grounds of principles common to Islamic law, revivalists prefer to re-invent a remote legal tool uncommon even in this region to promote what it deems Islamic despite problems of its legality and conceptual weaknesses. Its usage has, and probably will, continue to result in litigation and friction. Furthermore unnecessary costs are incurred by parties in making the *nuzriah*, all of which bear adverse repercussion on the aim and image of Islamic law.

CONCLUSION

Revivalist discourse deflects attention from problems of the effective Muslim law in operation. While there remains pressing issues that call for its revaluation, in some aspects, Shariah revivalists do not partake at alleviating them. Generally major issues involving the effective Muslim law do not feature in their discourse despite the need to facilitate its adaptation to contemporary conditions and experiences of Muslim families. At the heart of the problem is the extent to which the Muslim law formulated to regulate the family in the context of traditional

society in which change is relatively slow, communities less complex, diverse and plural, and rights and obligations of individuals determined by affiliation to tribe and kin must be adapted to meet the demands of social change and modernization that have impacted the family and other social institutions. Continuing appeal to the conscience and piety of the individual at the expense of systematic reform of substantive law needed for contemporary social conditions remains evident in areas that include *talak*, divorce at the instance of wives, inheritance, gender rights and relations in marriage, law affecting children and matrimonial property issues. Contestations in these areas have been mounting in the Muslim world which Muslims in Singapore are not isolated from.[24]

Revivalists' rhetoric and fixations with an imagined Shariah are non-productive in alleviating genuine problems pertaining to Islamic law in Singapore and compromises urgent attention to reforming the existing Shariah and adapting it to contemporary conditions that Muslim reformers have long battled with.[25] Furthermore, though proponents do not directly challenge nor reject existing national laws and institutions, their discourse nonetheless creates a negative binary in the minds of Muslims between Shariah and the national law giving rise to ambivalence or even adverse sentiments towards the latter deemed secular. This impedes Muslims' integration with the national law and legal system and partaking effectively in its development for all. Such discourse is also alienated from the historical and contemporary experiences and sentiments of Muslims towards the national law and legal institutions. Essentialist presumptions of Shariah as a fixed system of rules legislated by God quite isolated from how it had evolved in response to specific socio-historical conditions also promote adverse consequences on the community. Instead of facilitating Muslims' adaptation and

contribution to the development of good law on the basis of principles, revivalists' puritanical "asociological" understanding of Shariah reinforces exclusivism. This tendency, needless to say, must be checked for the well-being not only of the community but the larger society, more generally.

Notes

1. The concept of Islamic resurgence was first used by Muzaffar (1987) to characterize the phenomenon manifested in new forms of religiosity hitherto unknown. It is not synonymous with increasing awareness of Islam as commonly understood.
2. For a discussion on the problems, see Stanley Bedlington, "The Singapore Malay Community: The Problems of Integration", PhD thesis, Cornell University, 1974. See also Sharom Ahmat and James Wong, eds., *Malay Participation in the National Development of Singapore* (Singapore: Eurasia Press, 1971); Riaz Hassan, "Occupational and Class Structure of Singapore Malays", *Civilisation* 20, no. 4 (1970): 496–515.
3. On some aspects of religious revivalism in Singapore, see Hussin Mutalib, *Singapore Malays: Being Ethnic Minority and Muslims in a Global City State* (Abingdon, Oxon, NY: Routledge, 2012). For a discussion on the external factors conditioning the phenomenon relevant to Singapore, see Chandra Muzaffar, *Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia* (Petaling Jaya: Fajar Bakti, 1987).
4. For a discussion on some of these issues, see Nurul Fadiah Johari, "Fearing the Enemy Within: A Study of Intra-Muslim Prejudice Among Singaporean Muslims", MA thesis, Department of Malay Studies, National University of Singapore, 2016.
5. See, for example, the degree and postgraduate programmes in Islamic Studies offered by PERGAS. Its website claims that one of the most popular programmes is the Bachelor in Islamic Revealed Knowledge & Heritage (BIRKH) which is offered in collaboration with the International Islamic University Malaysia

(IIUM). Available at <https://www.pergas.org.sg/what-we-do/islamic-education.html>.

6. The recent Muktamar Ulama on 12 August 2017 organized by PERGAS at the Sultan Mosque, Singapore reveals a persistent agenda at reaffirming its standpoint on moderation in the light of new events impacting on the Muslims in Singapore.
7. Ismail Faruqi, "On the Nature of Islamic Da'wah", *Falad* (November 1981). For an account of early revivalists' centrality on *dakwah*, see *Fajar Islam* (1981); 1983 (1); 1984 (3).
8. For a good critique on the conceptual limitations around the scare of secularism, see Shaharuddin Maaruf, "Religion and Utopian Thinking Among the Muslims of Southeast Asia", Occasional Paper, Department of Malay Studies, National University of Singapore, 2001.
9. See, for instance, the judgement of the High Court (Seremban) case of Meor Atiqulrahman bin Ishak and Fatimah bte Sihi, 5 Malayan L.J. 375 (2000) in which the court cited Maudoodi in support for its view to the effect that Islam is not just a mere collection of dogmas and rituals but a complete way of life covering all fields of human activities, private or public, legal, political, economic, social, cultural, moral or judicial. That being the case the judge submitted, "it would be an insult to the Malay kings", if the result of their campaign was registered to merely "Islamic rituals and ceremonies" and not ad-deen al Islam "as a complete way of life". See also Mohd Roslan Mohd Nor, Ahmad Termizi Abdullah and Abdul Karim Ali, "From Undang-undang Melaka to Federal Constitution: The Dynamics of Multicultural Malaysia", *SpringerPlus* 5 (2016): 1683. For insights into the position of Islam in the Constitution and contested debates, see Andrew Harding, "Malaysia: Religious Pluralism and the Constitution in a Contested Polity", *Middle East Law and Governance* 4 (2012): 356–85.
10. See also Zainah Anwar, "Law-making in the Name of Islam: Implications for Democratic Governance", in *Islam in Southeast Asia: Political, Social and Strategic Challenges for the 21st Century*, edited by

K.S. Nathan and Mohammad Hashim Kamali (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005); Farid Sufian Shuaib, "The Islamic Legal System in Malaysia", *Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal* 21, no. 1 (2012): 85–113.

11. Amongst these are the government's move on 26 May 2016 to expedite Parliamentary deliberation of the Private Member's Bill introduced by Abdul Hadi Awang, President of PAS, to expand the Shariah Court's jurisdiction which presumably would allow *hudud* to be implemented; the withdrawal of a clause in the new Bill presented to Parliament on 8 August 2017 which legitimizes the unilateral conversion of children by the parent who has converted to Islam, the decision of a government department to follow the Fatwa Council's view that an illegitimate child cannot carry the name of his father in defiance of a Court of Appeal decision to the contrary despite the fact that a *fatwa* is merely an advisory opinion in Islamic law; the incessant ban on a series of books including the latest translated work of Abdullahi Naim on the Shariah, all of which defy fundamental constitutional provisions, existing laws and judgement.
12. PERGAS, *Moderation in Islam: In the Context of Muslim Community in Singapore* (Singapore: PERGAS, 2004), p. 118; see also Muhammad Haniff Bin Hassan, *Negara Islam: Satu Pandangan in Al-Risalah* (Singapore: PERGAS, April–June 2003).
13. See also Abdul Basir Alias, *Ancaman nasionalis Sekular Ekstrim di Malaysia*, cited in Azhar Ibrahim, *Contemporary Islamic Discourse in the Malay-Indonesian World* (Petaling Jaya: Strategic Information and Research Development Centre, 2014), p. 70.
14. Muhammad Haniff Bin Hassan, "Explaining Islam's Special Position and the Politic of Islam in Malaysia", *The Muslim World* 97 (April 2007*b*): 288.
15. See Shaharuddin Maaruf, *Malay Ideas on Development: From Feudal Lord to Capitalist* (Petaling Jaya: SIRD, 2014), pp. 1–50.
16. An anti-liberal Islam Facebook group which expressed its concerns over what it sees as the penetration of liberal Islam in MUIS'

selection of speakers for its public lectures is another case in point. MUIS' 2005 *fatwa* which denounced secularism, pluralism and liberalism as SIPILIS has also been selectively invoked to vilify the so-called liberal Muslims despite numerous critics against it.

17. See, for example, the critique by Muhammad Said Al-Ashmawy, *Islam and the Political Order* (Washington, D.C.: Research Council for Values and Philosophy, 1994). See also Rose Ismail, *Hudud in Malaysia: The Issues at Stake* (Kuala Lumpur: SIS Forum, 1995).
18. See, for example, the discussion in Risalah (2012).
19. See, for instance, the strong support expressed for the propagation of minority *fikh* in Islam & Realiti Semasa, *At-Takwin* (November–December 1997).
20. Re Izzah Amalina bte Ibrahim, Ahmad Murtadha bin Mohamad Rosli and Ibrahim bin Mustaffa Appeal No. 25/2016.
21. See <http://www.muis.gov.sg/cms/view> (accessed 26 September 2017).
22. Shafeeg bin Salim Talib v Fatimah bte Abu bin Talib [2009] 3 SLR 439.
23. For a good discussion on the problems of *nuzriah*, refer to the judgement of Ruben J in Mohamed Ismail bin Ibrahim v Mohamed Taha bin Ibrahim Mohamed [2004] 4 SLR 756.
24. Some of these problems in the context of Singapore are discussed in Noor Aisha Abdul Rahman, "Muslim Personal Law and Citizen's Rights: The Case of Singapore", *Asian Journal of Comparative Law* 7 (2012): 27–152.
25. For a discussion on some of these problems in Malay society, see the discussions in Norani Othman, *Shari'a Law and the Modern Nation State* (Kuala Lumpur: Sisters in Islam, 1994).

References

Ahmat, Sharom and James Wong, eds. *Malay Participation in the National Development of Singapore*. Singapore: Eurasia Press, 1971.

Al-Ashmawy, Muhammad Said. *Islam and the Political Order*. Washington, D.C.: Research Council for Values and Philosophy, 1994.

Alatas, Syed Hussein. *Kita Dengan Islam: Tumbuh Tiada Berbuah*. Singapore: Pustaka Nasional, 1979.

al-Qaradawi, Sheikh Yusuf. *Fikh of Muslim Minorities: Contentious Issues and Recommended Solutions*. Cairo: Al-Falah Foundation, 2003.

Anwar, Zainah. "Law-making in the Name of Islam: Implications for Democratic Governance". In *Islam in Southeast Asia: Political, Social and Strategic Challenges for the 21st Century*, edited by K.S. Nathan and Mohammad Hashim Kamali. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005.

Azhar Ibrahim. *Contemporary Islamic Discourse in the Malay-Indonesian World: Critical Perspectives*. Petaling Jaya: SIRD, 2014.

Bedlington, Stanley. "The Singapore Malay Community: The Problems of Integration". PhD thesis, Cornell University, 1974.

Berita Minggu. "Urus Simpanan Ikut Ajaran Islam", 14 August 2006.

Boy, Pradana. "Fatwa in Indonesia: An Analysis of Dominant Legal Ideas and Modes of Thought of Fatwa-making Agencies and their Implications in the Post-New Order Period". PhD thesis, Department of Malay Studies, National University of Singapore, 2015.

Fajar Islam (1981); 1983 (1); 1984 (3).

Faruqi, Ismail. "On the Nature of Islamic Da'wah". *Falad* (November 1981).

Faruqi, Shad Saleem. "The Malaysian Constitution, the Islamic State and Hudud Laws". In *Islam in Southeast Asia: Political, Social and Strategic Challenges for the 21st Century*, edited by K.S. Nathan and Mohammad Hashim Kamali. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005.

Hamidullah, Mohammad. "Jurisprudence". In *A History of Muslim Philosophy*, vol. 2, edited by M.M. Shariff. Weisbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1966.

Harding, Andrew. "Islamic Law in Malaysia". *Yearbook of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law Online* 2, no. 1 (1995): 61–71.

———. "Malaysia: Religious Pluralism and the Constitution in a Contested Polity". *Middle East Law and Governance* 4, nos. 2–3 (2012): 356–85.

Hassan, Muhammad Haniff bin. *Muslim … Moderat ... Warga Singapura = Muslim Moderate Singaporean*. Singapore: Perdaus and Al-Khair Management Board, 2003*a*.

———. *Negara Islam: Satu Pandangan in Al-Risalah*. Singapore: PERGAS, April–June 2003*b*.

———. "Contextualizing Political Islam for Minority Muslims". RSIS Working Paper no. 138. S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, 2007*a*.

———. "Explaining Islam's Special Position and the Politic of Islam in Malaysia". *The Muslim World* 97 (April 2007*b*).

Hassan, Riaz. "Occupational and Class Structure of Singapore Malays". *Civilisation* 20, no. 4 (1970): 496–515.

Islam & Realiti Semasa. *At-Takwin* (November–December 1997).

Ismail, Rose, ed. *Hudud in Malaysia: The Issues at Stake*. Kuala Lumpur: SIS Forum, 1995.

Johari, Nurul Fadiah. "Fearing the Enemy Within: A Study of Intra-Muslim Prejudice Among Singaporean Muslims". MA thesis. Department of Malay Studies, National University of Singapore, 2016.

Kadir, Suzaina A. "Islam, State and Society in Singapore". *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies* 5, no. 3 (2004): 357–71.

Meor Atiqulrahman bin Ishak and Fatimah bte Sihi. 5 Malayan L.J. 375 (2000).

Mohd Nor, Mohd Roslan, Ahmad Termizi Abdullah and Abdul Karim Ali. "From Undang-undang Melaka to Federal Constitution: The Dynamics of Multicultural Malaysia". *SpringerPlus* 5 (2016): 1683.

Mohd Zainordin, Muhammad Daud. "Apakah Fahaman Kita Terhadap Riba?" *Risalah* 9 (2012).

Musa, Mohd Faizal and Tan Beng Hui. "State-backed Discrimination against Shi'a Muslims in Malaysia". *Critical Asian Studies* 49, no. 3 (2017): 308–29.

Mutalib, Hussin. *Singapore Malays: Being Ethnic Minority and Muslims in a Global City State*. Abingdon, Oxon, NY: Routledge, 2012.

Muzaffar, Chandra. *Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia*. Petaling Jaya: Fajar Bakti, 1987.

———. *Rights, Religion and Reform: Enhancing Human Dignity through Spiritual and Moral Transformation*. London: Routledge, 2002.

Noor Aisha Abdul Rahman. "Muslim Personal Law and Citizens' Rights: The Case of Singapore". *Asian Journal of Comparative Law* 7 (2012): 27–152.

Othman, Norani. *Shari'a Law and the Modern Nation State*. Kuala Lumpur: Sisters in Islam, 1994.

PERGAS. *Moderation in Islam: In the Context of Muslim Community in Singapore*. Singapore: PERGAS, 2004.

———. "What We Do: Islamic Education". Available at <https://www.pergas.org.sg/what-we-do/islamic-education.html>.

Re Izzah Amalina bte Ibrahim, Ahmad Murtadha bin Mohamad Rosli and Ibrahim bin Mustaffa Appeal No. 25/2016.

Saedon, Mahmud. "Ulama Jadi Fakta Halang Perlaksanaan Undang-Undang Islam". *Mingguan Wanita* 2–9 (1988).

Salleh, Maarof. "Kepimpinan: Beberapa Ciri Asas dipandang dari Kaca Mata Islam". *Fajar Islam* 1 (1983*a*).

———. "Satu Ciri Asas Kepemimpinan dan Kehidupan Umat". *Fajar Islam* (1983*b*).

Salleh, Muhammad Syukri. "Recent Trends in Islamic Revivalism in Malaysia". *Studia Islamika* 6, no. 2 (1999).

Shafeeg bin Salim Talib v Fatimah bte Abu bin Talib [2009] 3 SLR 439.

Shaharuddin Maaruf. "Religion and Utopian Thinking Among the Muslims of Southeast Asia". Occasional Paper. Department of Malay Studies, National University of Singapore, 2001.

———. *Malay Ideas on Development: From Feudal Lord to Capitalist*. Petaling Jaya: SIRD, 2014.

Shuaib, Farid Sufian. "The Islamic Legal System in Malaysia". *Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal* 21, no. 1 (2012): 85–113.

Straits Times. "ISEAS Speakers were Controversial Figures", 25 January 2003, p. 30.

INDEX

Note: Page numbers followed by "n" refer to endnotes.

A
Aa Gym. *See* Gymnastiar, Abdullah
Abdi Sumaithi, 97
Abduh, Muhammad, 122–23
Abdul Ilah bin Saud, 68
Abdul Karim, Khalil, 122
Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, 4, 36, 48, 69, 70
Abdullah bin Abdulaziz al-Sabti, 68
Abdullah bin Nuh, 99
Abdullah Md. Zin, 69
Abdul Muhsin Al-Qaasim, 69
Abdul Mu'ti, 146
Abdul Qadim Zallum bin Yusuf bin Abdul Qadim bin Yunus bin Ibrahim, 98–99
Abdul Rahman Osman, 56
Abdurrahman bin Auf, 175–76
Abed al-Jabiri, Muhammad, 122, 124, 125
Abu Bakar as-Siddiq Mosque, 77
Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, 74
Abu Zaid, Nasr Hamid, 9, 122, 124, 125
Achievement Motivation Training (AMT), 170, 171, 180, 183
ad-deen, Islam as, 42, 200–203, 207, 214
  adverse ramifications, 201
  dakwah movement, 202
  political credo, 202
  political motif, 200, 202
  in politics, 202
  pristine imagination of, 208
  secularism, 202–3
  teachings, 201
Ahli Sunnah wal Jamaah, 54
ahlul bait, 100
Ahlul Bait Indonesia (ABI), 95
Ahlul Halli Wal 'Aqdi, 71–72
Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah, 77, 80n5
Ahmad Husin Yaacob, 75, 81n11
Ahmadiyah Idrisiah, 54
Ahmadiyah, in Indonesia, 5, 114–15

Ahmad, Khurshid, 16, 198
Ahmed bin Khalid Al Mjna, 68
Ahmed bin Saleh Al-Sudais, 68
Ahok. *See* Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok)
Aksi Bela Islam (Defending Islam Action), 9, 140, 142–43, 160n12
  Ahok's controversial statements, 143–45
  books and videos, 148
  initiation for, 145
  Nashir, Haedar, 146–47
  rally, 145–46
  religious authority, 157
  second rally, 147, 148
  Syihab, Rizieq, 151
  third rally, 147–48, 155
Aksi Bela Islam III, 151
Aksi Bela Islam 212: Gerakan Hati, Kekuatan Bangsa, 148
Aksi 212, 148, 153, 156, 158n3
Al-Ahmadiyah al-Idrisiah al-rashidiah al-dandarawiah, 50–51
al-amin (trustworthy), 181
Alattas, Syed Muhammad Naguib, 198
Al-Azhar (Egypt), 43, 47
Al-Baghdadi, Abu Bakr, 108
al-Baghdadi, Shaikh Abdurrahman, 99
al-Banna, Hassan, 97, 198, 200, 207–8
al-Baqir Al-Habsy, Muhammad, 94
Al-Faruqi, Ismail, 175
al-Fauzan, S. Fauzan, 72
Al-Ghazalli, 118
al-Haddad, Datuk Syed Alwi Tahir, 53
Alhelbawy, Kamal, 16
Ali Audah, 116, 123
Al-Imam Muhammad ibn Saud Islamic University, 64, 68
al-Jama'ah al-Salafiyyah al-Muhtasibah, 73, 74
al-Jazairi, Abu Bakr, 73–74, 81n8
al-Kalbani, Adel, 75–76
  takfir view, 76
  views on Shi'ism, 77
Allport, Gordon, 127
Al-Madinah International University. *See* MEDIU
Al-Maidah 51, 147, 154, 159n11
al-Mawardi, 118
al-Otaybi, Juhayman, 73
al-Qaradawi, Yusuf, 16, 41, 198
al-Sanusi, 183n4
Al-Shugairi, Ahmad, 165
al-Tahtawi, Rifaat, 130n3
Al-Uthaimin, Muhammad bin Solih, 72
Amanah, 7, 32
  attracting PAS members, 30
  challenge for, 30
  electoral achievements, 32
  Expert Advisory Council, 27, 28

formation of, 26–27
influence of Ghannouchi, 29
leaders, 27
Maszlee Malik, 28–29
progressives ideals, 28
takfiri approach, 27–28
visions, 27
Aman Declaration, 44
Ameer Ali, Syed, 122, 220
Ameer Ikhwan Zaini, 64–65
Amien Rais, 123, 147
Amin Abdullah, 119, 123, 124, 150
Amin, Ahmad, 122
AMLA, 195, 203, 221
Amr Khaled, 165
Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM), 16, 48, 69, 198, 213
An-Naim, Abdullahi, 122
anti-Salafi-Wahhabi ideas, 53
Antonio, Muhammad Syafii, 10, 166
educational background, 179
Muhammad SAW: Super Leader, Super Manager, 179
as preacher-cum-trainer figure, 178
Prophetic Leadership and Management programme, 179
Anwar Ibrahim, 16, 42, 169, 198
Anwar, Zainah, 206
apostasy, 48, 211
Aqidah al-Najin, 183n4
Aqqad, Abbas Mahmud, 122
Arabization, 2, 3, 6, 8, 10
Arab Spring (2011), 92, 106–9
Arifin Ilham, 141, 145
Arkoun, Mohammed, 118, 119, 122–25
"Army of the Lord Prophet Muhammad", 141
Ary Ginanjar, 10, 166
Emotional and Spiritual Quotient, 177, 178
Islamic teachings, 178–79
as preacher-cum-trainer figure, 167, 178
Asia-Pacific forum, 106
Assad, Bashar, 107, 108
as-Shadiqi, Muhammad, 122
authentic Islamic law, 214, 215
authoritarianism, 213
Awang, Abdul Hadi, 4, 14, 16–18, 21–23, 27, 28, 225n11, 226n11
Ayatollah Khomeini, 75, 93, 95
Ayob Khan Mydin Pitchay, 79
Ayub, Salahuddin, 14
Ayyad, 175
azan, 42
Azwira Abd Aziz, 64–65
Azyumardi Azra, 123, 147
Azzam, Abdullah, 76

B

baju kurung, 3, 35
baju Melayu, 3

Bank Rakyat Indonesia Shariah, 177
Bank Shariah Mandiri, 177
Barisan Nasional (BN), 49
Barlas, Asma, 122
Baso, Ahmad, 125
Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok), 5, 9, 143, 155
  antagonism towards, 160n12
  apologized to Muslims, 145
  blasphemy incident, 5
  controversial statement, 143–44
  MUI's edict, 145
  protest against, 145
  statement on *Al-Maidah* 51, 147
Basyir, Abu Bakar, 71–72
Bayat, Asef, 175
Bey Ariffin, 116
Bina Swadaya (Cultivating Self-Sufficiency), 171
Bin Laden, Osama, 76
Bisri, Ahmad Mustofa, 152, 153, 159n9
Boulatta, Issa J, 122
Bulan Bintang, 116
Buni Yani, 144
Burhanuddin Al-Helmy, 25
business motivation seminars, 177, 180–82

C

"campus Islam", Indonesia, 91, 109, 109n1
  Arab Spring (2011), 106–8
  Forum Silaturahmi Lembaga Dakwah Kampus, 98
  Hizbut Tahrir movement, 98–101
  Hizmet movement, 104–6
  Islamic Students' Association, 96
  Jemaah Tarbiyah movement, 96, 97
  Muslim organizations, 92
  national ideology, 96
  Salafi movement, 92, 101–4
  secular campuses, 94–97
  Shi'ism. *See* Shi'ism/Shias movement, in Indonesia
  Tarbiyah's influences on, 98
  transnational Islamic movements, 91, 92
  young Muslims in, 93
Centre for Advanced Studies on Islam, Science and Civilisation (CASIS), 198
Chairul Umam, 150
Chaplin, Chris, 78
Christianity, 218
"civil Islam", 4
civilizations, Muslim, 200, 219
classical Muslim law, 195
Cokroaminoto, Omar Said, 129
conservative Islamists, 14
Constitution of Malaysia, 205
corruption, collusion, nepotism (KKN), 167, 178, 179

Council of Indonesian Ulama (MUI), 142, 145, 159n5, 206

D

Dahlan, Ahmad, 129
Dahsyatnya Aksi Bela Islam: Sebuah Episode Perjuangan Bela Qur'an, 148
dakwah movement, 2, 41, 95–97, 195, 198, 202, 209, 215
Darul Arqam, Malaysia, 115
Dawam Rahardjo, 123
democracy
  concept of, 101
  parliamentary, 208–10
Democratic Action Party (DAP), 17, 56
Department of Islamic Development in Malaysia. *See* Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia (JAKIM)
Department of Welfare Society, in Kelantan, 66
dershane (shelter), 105
deterritorialization, 216
developmental creativity, Alatas' notion of, 129, 131n9
Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia (DDII), 96, 97
Dewan Himpunan Penyokong PAS, 20
Dewan Pemuda (Youth Wing), 22
Dewan Ulama (Ulama Wing), 22, 26
Djarot Saiful Hidayat, 155
Dokumen Negara Islam (Islamic State Document), 18
Dzulkefly Ahmad, 14, 29

E

Effendi, Djohan, 123
El-Sisi, Abdel Fatah, 107
Emotional and Spiritual Quotient (ESQ), 177–79
Ennahda movement, 29
Erdogan, Racep Tayyib, 106
"Erdogans", 15
Escak, Farid, 122
Etos Kerja Pribadi Muslim, 174, 176, 185n9
exclusivism, among Muslims, 6, 39, 50, 51, 56, 223

F

Fadil, Sidek, 198
Fadlallah, Sayyed Mohammad Hussein, 95
Fadl, Khalid Abou, 122
Fahad Al-Ahmad, 68
Fanon, Frantz, 127
Farah Ann, 50
faraid, 221
Faruqi, Ismail, 198, 225n7
Fathul Bari Mat Jahya, 64
fatwas, 41, 53, 206, 217, 220, 225n11
  on Khomeini, 75

Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 145, 159n5
Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura, 221, 226n16
from Nahdlatul Ulama, 141, 147, 153
on *nuzriah*, 221
fear mongering, 211, 220
Federal Territory Mosque, Kuala Lumpur, 77
Federspiel, Howard M., 172, 173
Festival of Pious Indonesian Children (*Festival Anak Shaleh*), 174
Fetullah Terrorist Organization (FETO), 106
"fikh of priorities"
"authentic" Islamic law, 214, 215
deterritorialization problem, 216
inclusive approach, 219
Islamic and secular law, 218
Islamic banking, 216
methodology of, 214
national law and legal system, 217
unanimous agreement, 216
Fikrul Islam (Islamic Thought), 99
Filali-Ansary, Abdou, 122
fiqh tradition, 10, 71, 130n5
Five Pillars of Islam (*Lima Rukun Islam*), 179
Forum Silaturahmi Lembaga Dakwah Kampus (FSLDK), 98
Fouda, Farag, 122
Freire, Paulo, 127
Fromm, Erich, 126–27
Front for the Defense of Islam (FPI), 142, 150–51, 159n6
Syihab's leadership and, 152
FUI. *See* Muslims Forum (FUI)
"fundamentalist" approach, 213

G

"Gen-1 activists", 29
"Gen-2 activists", 29, 30
gender equality, 28, 71, 206
Ghannouchi, Rached, 16, 29
"global *santris*" movements, 92
GNPF-MUI (National Movement to Guard the MUI Fatwa), 145, 159n6
Gokalp, Ziya, 130n3
Gulen, Fethullah, 106, 115
Gulen movement. *See* Hizmet movement
GUSU5113, 77
Gymnastiar, Abdullah (Aa Gym), 10, 141, 149, 155, 166–67
promoter of Islamic prosperity, 181
Saya Tidak Ingin Kaya, Tapi Harus Kaya, 181

H
"Habib Google", 157
Habib Hasan Al-Aydrus, 95
Habibie, 172, 173
hadiths, 44, 71, 75, 101
Hadramaut, 115
Haji Ahmad Fuad, 25
Haji Jainal Al-Jauhari, 53, 54
halaqahs (study circles), 99
Halimah Ali, 69
Hamka (Haji Abdul Malik Karim Amrullah), 116, 123, 129
Hanafi, Hassan, 9, 118, 122–24
Harb, Ali, 122
Haron Din, 18
Haron Taib, 16, 17
Harussani Zakaria, 38, 47
  controversial statements, 48
  on Muslim women, 49–50
  Perak constitutional crisis, 49
  Saudi monarchy, 49
  views on apostasy, 48
Hasan Said, 51
Hashim Asy'ari, 129
Hashim Jasin, 17
Hasrizal Abdul Jamil, 31
Hatta Rajasa, 169, 183n3
Hidayat Nur Wahid, 147
hijab (headscarves), 6
Hijri, 75
Hikmah Fajar (A Wisdom of Dawn), 173, 184n8
Hilmi Aminuddin, 96, 97
Himpunan Mahasiswa Indonesia (HMI), 198
Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), 142, 159n6
Hizbut Tahrir movement, 92, 98–101, 108, 115, 120
Hizmet movement, 8, 104–6
"Honest, Fair, and Clean Government: Towards Negara Berkebajikan", 18
hudud, 14, 19, 22, 29, 206
  as compulsion in Islam, 212
  essential aspect of, 211
  fear mongering, 211
  fixation on, 213
  implementation, 211, 212
  Koranic verse 5:44, 211
  Muzaffar, Chandra, 213
  and sweepingly assert, 211
  uncritical support for, 210
Human Resource Development Corporation, 170
human resources, in Indonesia, 172
Humpuss Group, 173–74
Husain Taha, 122
Husam Musa, 23, 27
Husayn bin 'Ali, 100
Hussein Sharif Al Abdali, 68
Hutomo Mandala Putra. *See* Tommy Suharto

I
Ibn Arabi, 118

Ibn Hazm, 118
Ibn Qayyim al-Jauzi, 118
Ibn Taimiyyah, 118
Ibrahim El-Ne'mah, 175
Ibrahim Iskandar, 36
Ichwan, Moch Nur, 125
ICMI (Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals), 172–73, 184n7
Ikatan Jamaah Ahlul Bait Indonesia (IJABI), 95
Ikhawul Muslim/Ikhwanul Muslimin, 8, 96–98, 104, 107, 114, 120
Imaduddin Abdulrahim, 10, 166, 184n8
  as business consultant, 169
  God's stewards on earth idea, 170
  ICMI (Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals), 172–73
  Islamic theology and, 169–70, 184n5
  Latihan Mujahid Dakwah, 168
  lecture in Malaysia, 169
  "need for achievement" theory and, 170
  Semangat Tawhid dan Motivasi Kerja, 171
  Yayasan Pembina Sari Insani foundation, 168, 173
imams (religious leaders), 6, 149, 151
Imtaq, 172
Indonesia. *See also* "campus Islam", Indonesia
  conservative turn, 4–5
  corruption, collusion, nepotism, 178
  human resources in, 172
  Muhammadiyah. *See* Muhammadiyah
  Muslims in, 2, 106, 109, 114–15, 142
  Nahdlatul Ulama, 141–43
  non-governmental organizations training programmes, 170–71
  post-*reformasi* period, 116, 121
  preachers-cum-trainers. *See* preachers-cum-trainers, in Indonesia
  prosperity and wealth, 180–81
  religion in, 141
  Wahhabism in, 78
Indonesian government, 95, 106
Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council, 96
Institut Darul Ehsan (IDE), 31
Institute of Islamic Civilisation and the Malay World (ISTAC), 198
Institut Teknologi Bandung (ITB), 121
Intellectual Responsibility in Islam (Shari'ati), 94
Internal Security Act (ISA), 5

International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT), 115
International Islamic University of Malaysia (IIUM), 43, 65, 77, 198
Iptek, 172
Iqbal, Muhammad, 122
Iranian Embassy, in Jakarta, 93, 99–100
Iranian revolution (1979), 93, 94, 197
Iranian Shi'ism, 8, 115
Islam Berkemajuan, 8, 92
Islam Embedded: The Historical Development of the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party PAS 1951–2003, 33n1
Islam Hadhari, 36
Islamic banking, 216
Islamic Brotherhood, 40–41
Islamic College of Klang, 66
Islamic Credo, 72, 73, 80n5
Islamic Creed, 72, 79
Islamic Da'wah & Guidance Center, 68
Islamic Development Bank (IDB), Jeddah, 67
Islamic knowledge, transmissions of, 113–14
Islamic law, 205, 206, 217
  and civil law, 219
  of inheritance, 222
  and national law, 222
  in Singapore, 223
Islamic management theory, 166
Islamic movements, 91, 109. *See also* Shi'ism/Shias movement, in Indonesia
  Hizbut Tahrir movement, 98–101
  Hizmet movement, 104–6
  Jemaah Tarbiyah movement, 96, 97
  Salafi movement, 92, 101–4
  transnational, 91, 92
Islamic Outreach Association, 69
Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS), 4, 13, 32, 131n6, 204, 207, 211, 213
  acceptance of non-Muslims, 22
  conservative Islamists, 14
  conservatives' tolerance, 15–18
  five-point proposals, 20
  ideological camps in, 13–14
  Mujahid's attempt to transform, 20–21
  Muktamar (annual general meeting), 23–24
  "Negara Berkebajikan" proposition, 19
  newfound strategy, 17
  political agenda, 16
  "professional camp", 14
  progressive faction in, 14
  progressive Islamists, 14–15
  return of, 25
  reviewing ACT 355, 37

Shariah implementation, 25
splitting of, 32
ulama faction, return of, 23–24
vision of Islamic state, 18
Islamic Religious Council of Johor, 53
Islamic Religious Department, 52
Islamic Renaissance Front (IRF), 31
Islamic Representative Council (IRC), 16
Islamic Republic of Iran, 75
Islamic resurgence movement, 2, 41, 224n1
Islamic Shariah law, 14
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), 1, 3, 45
sympathizers, 5
Islamic University of Madinah, 63–64, 67, 73
graduates from, 64
Wahhabi ideology in, 64
Islamism, 2, 39
Islamization, 113, 117
Mahathir's approach to, 42
Islam Nusantara, 8, 92, 129
Islam Wasatiyyah, 36
ISMA (Ikatan Muslimin Malaysia or Malaysia Muslim Network), 48
Istanbul Network for Liberty, 31
Istiqlal Mosque, 149
Izzul Muslimin, 145

J

Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia (JAKIM), 42, 67, 206
Jakarta, 5. *See also* Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok)
Aksi Bela Islam (I, II, and III), 140, 151
Iranian Embassy in, 93, 99–100
Jaringan Islam Liberal, 126
Muslims in, 155
universities in, 93, 94
Jalaluddin Rakhmat, 94, 95, 123
jamaah, 126
Jamaat Tabligh (Indo-Pakistan), 115
Jamilah, Maryam, 198
Jaringan Intelektual Muda Muhamaddiyah (JIMM), 126
Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL), 126
Jasa Marga Company, 177
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), 72, 77
Jemaah Tarbiyah movement, 96–98
jihad (endeavour), 174
Jihad Melawan Ketidakadilan, 148
JKF-MKI. *See* National Fatwa Committee (JKF-MKI)
Johor
Islamic Religious Council, 53
Sultan of, 3, 36
tariqah groups in, 53, 54
ulama, 53
Joko Widodo, 151
Jong Islamieten Bond (JIB), 109n1

Jonru Ginting, 154
Jordanian Salafi Movement, 74
Judaism, 218
Jursyi, Shalahuddin, 122
Justice Party, 98

K
kafir harbi, 56
Kalla, Jusuf, 151
Kamal Hassan, Muhammad, 198
Kamoruddin Hidayat, 123
"*kecerdasan ruhaniah*" (Transcendental Intelligence), 176–77
kemakmuran (prosperity), 174
kenduri, 3
Kepentingan Tariqah Dan Tasawwuf (Muhammad Fuad), 54
Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia (KAMMI), 98
khairu ummah (best community), 174
Khaled al-Gendy, 165
Khalifah, 202
khalifatullah fil-ardh, 169, 170, 173, 174
Khomeini. *See* Ayatollah Khomeini
King Saud University, 64
Kiri Islam, 124
kitab kuning, 113–14
Korupsi Kolusi dan Nepotisme (KKN). *See* corruption, collusion, nepotism (KKN)
"*Kun Fayakuun* for Business", 182

L
Lapensdam, 126
Latief, Abdul, 176
Latihan Mujahid Dakwah (Training of Da'wa Striver), 168
Lembaga Dakwah Kampus (LDK), 97, 98
Lembaga Mujahid Dakwah (LMD), 96
Lembaga Penelitian, 171
LGBT groups, 6
liberal Muslims, 226n16
LKiS (Pusat Kajian Islam dan Transformasi Sosial), 127
Lutfillah Maula Khawjah, 68

M
Maarif, Ahmad Syafii, 123, 146, 150, 152, 159n11, 173
Maarif Institute, 126, 151
Madjid, Nurcholish, 119, 123, 124, 129
madrasah (religious school), 114, 116, 148, 217
Maha Kasih (The All-Loving), 150
Mahathir Mohamad, 3, 4, 42–43, 69, 70
Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), 71, 72

Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI). *See* Council of Indonesian Ulama (MUI)
Majlis Penasihat Pakar (Parti Amanah Negara), 28
Majlis Perundingan Parti (Party Consultative Council), 21
Majlis Syura Ulama, 21, 22, 25, 26, 28
Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura (MUIS), 220–22, 226n16
Malaysia. *See also* Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS); Malaysia's Shariah revivalism
  Arabization of Islam, 8, 35
  imitating Arabs, 36
  institutes of higher learning, 8
  Islamism in, 7, 13, 39
  Middle Eastern Islam influence on, 37–38
  National Council for Islamic Religious Affairs Malaysia, 67
  post-Islamic resurgence period, 42–43
  progressive Islamism, 30–31
  religious elite controversies, 37
  religious extremism in, 55
  Salafism in, 39
  state-led Islamization, 3
  Sufism in, 40, 54
  Wahhabi Islam in, 67
Malaysian Islamic Party PAS 1951–2013: Islamism in a Mottled Nation, The (Farish Noor), 33n1
Malaysian Islamic politics, 4
Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement. *See* Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM)
Malaysian Muslims, 2, 45, 56
  Arab-style garments, 3
  political Islamist ideas, 32
  Sufism and, 40
Malaysia's Shariah revivalism
  criminal law and justice, 207
  existing law and state, 208
  expansion and implementation, 204
  feudalism, 205
  fixed system of rules, 203
  Islamic law, 205, 206
  lack of awareness, 205
  pluralistic society, 212
  political activism, 203
  religious authority, 207
"Mamak". *See* Abdullah bin Nuh
Mansour Fakih, 123, 129
Mansur, Yusuf, 10, 149–50, 157, 167, 182
Maqasid al-Shari'ah (the higher objectives of Islamic Law), 15, 29
Marina Mahathir, 35
market Islam, 164. *See also* preachers-cum-trainers, in Indonesia

advocates of, 164
entrepreneurship training and seminars, 180–83
phenomenon of, 165–66
spread of, 182–83
Western management theories and, 164
work ethics, 173–77
marriages, Muslim women, 217
Martodharsono, 140–41
Marzuki, Mohamad Zuhdi, 14
Maszlee Malik, 28–29, 31
Maududi, Abdul ala, 198, 200
maulid (celebration of Prophet's birthday), 3, 54, 103
Maza, 31, 38, 44, 56
anti-Shia sermons, 44
books by, 44, 45
as conservative, 45
disagreements between muftis and, 46
religious training, 46
McClelland, David, 166, 170
Mecca, 51, 68–69, 172
Medina University, 43, 47
MEDIU, 67, 80n5
anti-Shia propagation in, 77
delegation, 68
formation of, 67
granting scholarships, 67–68
ideological setting of, 70–71
investigation by Malaysian authorities, 77
promoting Wahhabism, 70–73
religious establishments visits, 69
Saudi Arabia's moral police visits, 68
Saudi Development Bank and, 69
Umm al-Qura University and, 68
visitors of, 68–70
Megawati Sukarnoputri, 149
Mengetuk Pintu Langit: Kesaksian Peserta Aksi 411 & 212, 148
Menuju PAS Baru: Krisis, peluang dan dinamisme (Mujahid Yusof), 20, 21
Mernissi, Fatima, 122
Meuleman, Johan, 124
Middle East, 3, 7, 46. *See also* "campus Islam", Indonesia
elite's conservatism, 38
impact in Southeast Asia, 6, 39–41
Malaysian Islamic discourse and, 37–38
progressive Muslims from, 9
religious discourse, 46
Middle Eastern universities, 43, 46
Middle East movements, 92, 109
"Miracle of Giving, The", 182
MIUMI (Council for Young Muslim Scholars and Intellectuals), 159n6
Moderation in Islam, 200
Moeslim Abrurrahman, 123, 129

Mohamed Nawab, 40
Mohamad Sabu, 14, 23
Mohammad Khalifa Al-Tamimi, 68
Mohammad Redzuan Othman, 31
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, 93
Mohd Asri Zainul Abidin. *See* Maza
Mohd Mizan Aslam, 72
Mohd Mustadza Ahmad, 50, 51
Mohd Nakhaie Ahmad, 48
Mohd Nor Manuty, 198
Mohd Said, Ahmad, 51
muftis, 8, 35, 36
  Datuk Tahrir Samsudin, 52–53
  e-book series, 53–54
  Harussani Zakaria, 38
  Mohd Asri Zainul Abidin, 38, 46
  Mohd Yusof Ahmad, 51–52
  in Negeri Sembilan, 50–51, 55
  religious and political behaviour of, 38–39
  Tahrir Samsudin, 38
Muhamad Rozaime Ramle, 31
Muhammad (Prophet), 95, 100, 104
Muhammad Abdel Gawad, 165
Muhammad Abduh dan Teologi Rasional Mu'tazilah, 123
Muhammad Ahmad al Khatib, 75
Muhammad al Bandar, 75
Muhammad Fuad bin Kamaludin Al-Maliki, 54
Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, 39–40, 70, 73, 101
Muhammadiyah, 8, 9, 92, 120, 145, 152, 155
  in Aksi Bela Islam rally, 146
  Indonesian Islam and, 141–42, 158
  Nashir, Haedar, 146–47
  taqwa (fear of God), 173
Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani, 74–75
Muhammad SAW: Super Leader, Super Manager (Syafii Antonio), 179
Muhyiddin Yassin, 4
Mujahid Yusof, 20, 21, 23
Mukhriz Mahathir, 4
Muktamar (annual general meeting), 23–24
Mulkhan, Abdul Munir, 123
murshids (spiritual leaders), 54
Mursyidul Am, 27
Murtadla Mutahhari, 94
Muslim Brotherhood, 40, 41, 96–98, 108, 114, 121, 131n6
Muslim law of inheritance, 221
Muslims Forum (FUI), 145
muwahhidin, 101
Muzaffar, Chandra, 213, 224n1

N

Nader Hashemi, 122
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), 8, 9, 92, 143, 152

fatwa, 141, 147
ideological challenge to, 120
Indonesian Islam and, 158
pesantren networks, 156
rallies of Aksi Bela Islam and, 142
Najib Razak, 4, 36, 37, 64
Naqshabandiyah, 54
Nasaruddin Umar, 123
Nashruddin Mat Isa, 23, 33n5
Nashir, Haedar, 141–42, 146–47, 159n7
Nasir, Bachtiar, 141, 145, 155
Nasr, Syed Hossein, 122
Nasruddin Hassan, 14
Nasution, Harun, 123
National Contest of Al-Qur'an Reading for Quranic Kindergarten Students, 174
National Fatwa Committee (JKF-MKI), 42, 45
National Justice Party (Keadilan), 17
national law
legal system and, 217
parliamentary system and, 218
National Mosque of Kuala Lumpur, 69
National University of Malaysia (UKM), 66
Natsir, M., 96, 129
"need for achievement" theory, 166, 170, 171
"Negara Berkebajikan", 18–19
Negeri Sembilan
fatwa committee, 52
muftis of, 50–51, 55
religious council, 51
religious law in, 52
Negeri Sembilan Shariah Criminal Code 1992, 52
New Order regime, 96–97, 171–72, 176, 183
Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat, 27, 29, 69, 70
Nik Mohamad Ammar Abdullah, 14
9/11 attack, 209
Nizhamul Islam, 99
non-Muslims, 15, 20, 48, 195, 216, 218
Noor, Fadzil, 16–18, 27
Noor, Farish, 32–33n1
Nur Jazlan Mohamed, 77
Nur Semesta Foundation, 105
nuzriah, 221, 222
Nuzulul Qur'an, 149, 150

O

Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC), 65

P

Pacific Nations Social and Economic Development Association (PASIAD), 105
Pahang Religious Council, 56
Pakatan Rakyat (PR), 4, 49

Panduan Pemuda, 105
Paramadina, 126
parliamentary democracy, Syura *vs.*, 208–10
Parti Amanah Negara (Amanah), 13
"Parti Nik Aziz", 27
PAS. *See* Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS)
Pendidikan, 171
Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial, 171
"*Penistaan terhadap Agama?*" (Defamation of Religion?), 144
PERGAS, 206, 209, 226n12
  assertions, 207, 210, 211
  Moderation in Islam, 200
  Muslim organizations, 198
  prominent member, 212
  secularism as, 203
PERKIM (Muslim Welfare Organization of Malaysia), 65–66
pesantren (Islamic boarding schools), 97, 116, 141, 148, 152, 156, 158n3
Petro-Islam, 63. *See also* MEDIU
  Al-Madinah International University, 67–68
  financial aid or oil money, 67
  flourish of, 66–70
  Wahhabi literature and scholars, 73–77
Pink Dot movement, 6
political Islam, 2, 13, 15, 32, 202
  activists, 29–30
  rise of, 120
Post Tradisionalisme Islam, 125
Potret Aksi Damai Bela Islam 212, 148
preachers-cum-trainers, in Indonesia, 167–68
  Ary Ginanjar, 166, 177–79
  Gymnastiar, Abdullah, 166–67, 181
  Imaduddin Abdulrahim. *See* Imaduddin Abdulrahim
  Mansur, Yusuf, 167, 182
  Syafii Antonio, Muhammad, 166, 178–79
  Toto Tasmara. *See* Toto Tasmara
progressive Islamist, 14, 15
  civil society organizations, 32
  ideology, 31
Prophetic Leadership and Management (ProLM), 179
Prophet Muhammad, 53–54, 75, 77, 100, 175, 181
Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), 96, 98
Putro, Suadi, 124

Q

Qadri, Malik Mumtaz Hussain, 160n12
Qardhawi, Yusof, 216, 217

Quraish Shihab, Muhammad, 123, 152–54
Quran, 3, 41, 54, 101, 144, 153
Qutb, Syed, 198, 201

R
Rahman, Fazlur, 118, 119, 123–25, 153
Raja Ali Haji, 130n1
Rakhmad Abdullah, 97
Ramadan, Tariq, 122
Rasyid Ridha, Muhammad, 122–23
reformasi movement (1998), 98
Regional Outlook Forum (2003), 206
Rejuvenasi PAS: Idea, realiti, aplikasi (Mujahid Yusof), 20, 21
religious authority, 143, 148–52, 157–58, 207
religious bureaucracy, 3, 43, 47, 204
religious revivalism, in Singapore, 224n3
Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun (Five-Year Development Plans, REPELITA), 176
revivalists' political motif, 200, 202, 209
Risalah i Nur (Said Nursi), 105
Rizieq Syihab, 141, 143, 149, 155
  in Aksi Bela Islam, 145, 151
  Front for the Defense of Islam and, 150–51, 157
  as *imam besar*, 151–52
  leadership, 152
  religious authority, 152
  religious education, 150
  transformation from thug to imam, 151
Rohmaniyah, Inayah, 71, 72

S
Saefuddin, Lukman Hakim, 151
Said, Edward, 122
Said Nursi, Bediuzamman, 105, 115
"Salafi *Haraki*", 103, 104
Salafi movement, 92, 101–4
Salafism, 36, 39
  anti-Shia views, 70
  heterogeneity of, 43–45
  ideology, 37, 38
  in Indonesia, 102–3
  within UMNO, 40
"Salafi *Yamani*", 103, 104
"Salafus Soleh", 77
Salahuddin Al-Ayubi, 54
Salahuddin Ayub, 19
Salim, Agoes, 129
Salman Ghanim, Muhammad, 122
Samad, Khalid, 15
Sambutan Maulidur Rasul Bidáh Dhalalah? (Haji Jainal Al-Jauhari), 53
same sex marriage, 210
Saudi Arabia, 66, 68

Arab Spring, 107
International Islamic University of Malaysia, 65
Malaysia's religious education, 64
oil money, 66, 67
Pan-Islamism, 66
television show, 165
Wahhabi-Salafism, 8, 38, 51
Saudi Development Bank, 69
Saya Tidak Ingin Kaya, Tapi Harus Kaya (Gymnastiar), 181
secularism, 202–3
Selangor religious council, 55
Semangat Tawhid dan Motivasi Kerja (Imaduddin Abdulrahim), 171
Shafie school of law, 220
Shaltut, Mahmud, 122
Shamsuddin Abdul Rahman, 51
Shariah Courts, 4, 6, 52, 204
Shariah law, 4, 15, 25, 41, 120
Shariah revivalism, Singapore, 10, 195
Appeal Board, 219–20
exclusivist mental mode, 216
"fikh of priorities". *See* "fikh of priorities"
hudud. *See hudud*
idealistic assertions, 210
imprints of, 221
Islam as *ad-deen*. *See ad-deen,* Islam as
Islamic resurgence, 196–99
joint tenancy agreement, 221, 222
Malaysian and. *See* Malaysia's Shariah revivalism
marriage application, 219
Muslim marriage, 210
national law in, 203
non-Muslims, 216
political motif, 200, 202, 209
in practice, 219–22
religion and politics, 204
Syura *vs*. parliamentary democracy, 208–10
Shari'ati, Ali, 94
Shi'ism, 55, 75, 115
Shi'ism/Shias movement, in Indonesia, 92, 94–95, 107, 108
Ahlul Bait Indonesia, 95
al-Kalbani's views on, 77
crucial moments, 93
as deviant ideology, 55
Ikatan Jamaah Ahlul Bait Indonesia, 95
intellectual issues, 95
Iranian revolution (1979), 93
jurisprudence, 95
Murtadla Mutahhari, 94
Shari'ati, Ali, 94
Shimogi, Kazuo, 124
shira'ul fikri, 100
Sho'ub, Hasan, 122
Sifat Dua Puluh (the Twenty Attributes of God), 169, 183n4

Singapore
Muslims in, 2, 5, 10
religious revivalism in, 224n3
Shariah revivalism. *See* Shariah revivalism, Singapore
Siradj, Said Aqil, 123, 141
Six Pillars of *Iman (Enam Rukun Iman)*, 179
Sjafruddin Prawiranegera, 129
Southeast Asian Muslims, 2, 3
Middle East influence on, 6, 39–41
Spirit 212: Cinta itu menyatukan Kita, 148
"Spiritual Centred Leadership" training programme, 177
Sufism, 38, 40, 50, 53
Suharto, 98, 171–72, 176
Suleiman Alsalumi, 68
Sultan Haji Ahmad Shah Mosque, 77
Sultan Ibn Abdul Aziz, 65
Sunnah, 41, 101, 209
Syahrur, Muhammad, 9, 122, 124, 125
Syahsiyah Islamiyah (Hizbut Tahrir), 99
Syariati, Ali, 122
Syura *vs*. parliamentary democracy, 208–10

T

tafsir (exegesis), 71
Tafsir al-Misbah (Quraish Shihab), 153
tahrif, 75
Tahrir Samsudin, Datuk, 38, 52–53
takfiri approach, 27–28, 74
Talibanization, 39
Taqiyuddin an-Nabhani, 98, 110n4
taqwa (fear of God), 173
Tariqah Khidiriah, 51
tariqahs, 50–51, 53, 54
Taseer, Aatish, 160n12
Taseer, Salman, 160n12
tauhid, 169, 170, 174, 183
"Tentara Kandjeng Nabi Muhammad" (TKNM), 140–41
"Thirteen Radical Groups, The", 72
Tibi, Bassam, 122
"Tidak Mengutuk, Malah Dikutuk" (Cursed Because Not Cursing), 153
Tien Suharto, 174
Tito Karnavian, 151
Tokoh Maal Hijrah 1430, 47
Tommy Suharto, 174, 176
Toto Tasmara, 10, 166
Etos Kerja Pribadi Muslim, 174, 176, 185n9
interpretation of *jihad*, 174
Islamic management training, 176–77
Islamic theology and, 174
"*kecerdasan ruhaniah*", 176–77

as Muslim preacher, 173
narrative of Abdurrahman bin Auf, 175–76
position in Humpuss Group, 173–74
on work ethic, 175–76
traditional Islamic theology, 169
translation works, 9, 112–13
Abduh's reformism, 122–23
Abed al-Jabiri, 124, 125
Abu Zaid, Nasr Hamid, 124, 125
Arabic words, incorporation of, 114
Arkoun, Mohammed, 123–25
categories of, 119
commercial considerations, 117
critical works, 122
cultural brokers, Indonesian personalities as, 116
developmental creativity, 129, 131n9
dogmatism, 121
endogenous and exogenous ideas, 128–29
enhancement of Indonesian Islamic discourse, 123, 126–27
factors in, 115–16
foreign interests in, 119
good ideas/works, 129
Hanafi, Hassan, 118, 122–24
intellectual vigour and openness, 127, 128
kitab kuning, 113–14
leading figures in, 118–19
Madjid, Nurcholish, 124
Malay-Indonesian vocabulary, 114
Nahdlatul Ulama's circle, 126
pioneering scholars, 124
during post-*reformasi* period, 116, 121
progressive thinkers, 121–26
publishing houses, 116, 127
Rahman, Fazlur, 123–25
readership profile, 118
reformistic/progressive works, 130n5
Saudi funding, 119
ulama, 113
works with fundamentalist bend, 120–21
transnational Islamic movements, 91, 92
Trengganu Islamic Foundation, 66
Tsmarat al-Muhimmah, 130n1
tudong, 199, 215
Turkish movements, 104–6
twinning programmes, 198

U

UKM. *See* National University of Malaysia (UKM)

ulama, 3, 19, 23, 35, 38–40, 45, 118, 130n5
camp, 14
empowerment of, 41–43
Johor, 53
Mujahid Yusof, 20–21
self-manufactured, 154, 157–58
transmissions of Islamic knowledge, 113
Ulil Absha, 206
Umar Abu Qatadah, 74
ummah, 154, 220
Umm al-Qura University, 64, 68
"un-civil" Islam, 4
United Islamic Cultural Center of Indonesia (UICCI), 105
United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), 4, 19, 27, 30, 38, 213
Anwar Ibrahim, 42
commitment to Islam, 42
Malay rulers and, 47
mocking PAS, 17–18
rise of Salafism within, 40
University Malaysia of Sabah (UNIMAS), 67
University of Science in Malaysia, 66
Ustadz Hussein Al-Habsyi, 95
Usul Dakwah, 72
Utusan Malaysia, 48

W

Wadud, Aminah, 122
Wahdah Islamiyah, 159n6
Wahhabi Islam, 64, 67, 68, 72
Wahhabi movement. *See* Salafi movement
Wahhabi-Salafism, 3, 7, 8, 43, 64
Wahhabism, 8, 35, 39, 51, 56, 115
heterogeneity of, 43–46
ideology, 37, 38
in Indonesia, 78
in Malaysia, 66–67, 79
MEDIU promoting, 70–73
transborder propagation, 78
Wahid, Abdurrahman, 123
Wahid Institute, 126
Western management theory, 164, 177
globalization of, 180
Islamic teachings with, 167, 180
popularity of self-help and, 165
Wisata Hati (The Journey of the Heart), 182
women's rights, 6, 206
"work as worship" concept, 175, 177, 179
Work Ethic of the Individual Muslim, The. *See Etos Kerja Pribadi Muslim*
work ethics, Islam, 173–77

Y
Yalla Shabab (Hello Youth), 165
Yarmouk University, 43, 47
Yayasan Pembina Sari Insani (YAASIN) foundation, 169, 171, 173, 183n2
Yemen, Saudi military intervention, 108
Yusof Ahmad, 38, 51–52
Yusof Rawa, 20, 25, 27, 28
Yusuf Said Al Asiriy, 68

Z
Zainuddin MZ, 172, 184n7
Zaitun Rasmin, 141, 145, 155
zakat (religious tax), 173, 212
ziarah kubur (grave visits of pious Muslims), 3
zikr, 54
Zohar, Danah, 176, 178, 185n11
Zulkifli Hasan, 99

ISEAS
YUSOF ISHAK
INSTITUTE

ISEAS YUSOF ISHAK INSTITUTE